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•U.i . NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, (Uu^ptOL
INTERNATIONAL LAW SITUATIONS
WITH
SOLUTIONS
AND
NOTES
1901
WASHINGTON
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
I9OI
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UBHMRY OF THE
LELMD STANFORD, JR., UKIVSIIWf
UW DEPARTMENT.
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INTERNATIONAL LAW SITUATIONS.
PREFACE.
The studies in international law at the Naval War Col-
lege during the summer of 1901 were under the immediate
direction of Mr. John Bassett Moore, late Assistant Secre-
tary of State, now of Columbia University. The mention
to the service of his name gives assurance of the value of
the present work. To his able and careful labors in the
present instance the college is deeply indebted.
The situations were set by Mr. Moore, and tentative
solutions were sent in by the several committees into which
the officers in attendance are divided for the college work.
The tentative solutions were then discussed orally, the dis-
cussions being presided over and directed by Mr. Moore,
who prepared and read the accompanying notes, and who
is also the author of the paper in the appendix, entitled
^'Maritime Law in the War with Spain." The printed
solutions exhibit the consensus of opinion of all concerned.
It is believed that by proposing cases simulating those
which have recently arisen, or which seem likely to arise
under modern conditions, and bringing to bear in mutual
discussion the thought and experience of the officers who
make application of the law, and the trained mind of the
international jurist who expounds it, a method has been
adopted which must give to these solutions a practical value
of great interest and weight.
The results are submitted to the service in the surety
that they represent a valuable addition to work in a domain
of thought which belongs peculiarly to navies.
F. E. Chadwick,
Captain^ U, S, iV^., President.
Naval War College,
Newport^ B. L , Septetnher 5, 1901,
1
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TABLE OF CONTENTS.
Page.
Situation I— Coast warfare 5
Solution 5
Notes 8-37-
Paul Jones 8
War of 1812 10
Bombardment of Greytown 12
Crimean war 22
Bombardment of Valparaiso 23
British-French discussions 33
Chilean rjevolution, 1891 84
Rules of Institute of International Law, 1896 '. 85
Situation II — Contraband 38
Sol ution ^ . . . 38
Notes r. 41-85
Spain's action as to sulphur 41
"Continuous voyages" and civil-war cases 42
The Dolphin 46
The Pearl 48
The Stephen Hart 51
The Bermuda 55
The Springbok : 64
Matamoras cases— the Peterhoff 69
The Science 73
The Volant 73
British Government's action 74
Decision of international commission 78
Delagoa Bay — German cases 79
The Bundesrath , 79
TheHerzog 80
The General : 81
Diplomatic arrangement 82
Delagoa Bay— American cases 84
The Beatrice, Maria, and Mashona 84
Situation III— Transportation of military persons 86
Solution 86
Notes 88-98
Decisions of Sir W. Scott 90
Case in Chile .' 92
British-German discussion 94
Opinion* of publicists %
Resolutions of Institute of International Law 97"
Professor Holland's opinion 98
Situation IV— Neutrals and enemy convoy 99
Solution 99
Notes 100-107
Controversy with Denmark 100
Situation V— Insurgents and contraband 108
Solution 108
3
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4 CONTENTS.
Page.
Notes 110-137
Revolution in Chile, 1891 110
Report of Admiral McCann Ill
Instructions to Admiral Brown Ill
British correspondence 112
Questions of blockade 113
Seizures of coal and other cargoes 114
Payment of duties 116
Insurrection in Brazil, 1893-94 118
.Question of bombardment 118
Question of recognition 119
Ck>mmercial operations 120
United States instructions 121
Question as to coal 123
Protection of American vessels 123
Discussion of principles 127-1 37
Appendix— Maritime law in the war with Spain r 139
I. Situation prior to the war 139
II. Declarations of war 143
III. Additional articles of Geneva Convention 144
IV. Declarations of neutrality 146
Purchase of Brazilian vessels 145
Case of the Monocacy 145
Docking of vessels at Hongkong 146
Question of asylum 147
Coal 148
V. Declarations as to maritime law 150
Auxiliary cruisers 151
Declaration of Paris 1 52
Proclamation of April 26, 1898 152
Royal decree of April 23, 1898 153
VI. Vessels in port before or after the outbreak of the war 154
The Buena Ventura 154
The Panama 155
VII. Vessels sailing for an enemy port before the war 157
The Pedro 157
VIII. Questions of enemy ownership 159
The Pedro f 159
The Benito Estenger 160
The Carlos F. Roses 164
Safe-conducts 166
IX. Case of the fishing smacks 166
X. Questions of blockade 166
Instructions of United States 167
Cases of the Lafayette, Polaria, Myrtledene, Folsjo, and Manoubia 167-169
De facto blockades 167-169
Neutral men-of-war 170
Judicial decisions— the Olinde Rodriguez 171
The Newfoundland 173
TheAdula 173
XI. Contraband 175
XII. Commercial relations 176
United States instructions 176
Cablecutting 177
Disposition of mails 178
Restoration of commercial intercourse 179
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SITUATION I.
A state of war existing between France and Great Brit-
ain, a descent is made by a French fleet on the English
coast, and several undefended towns are bombarded.
The British Government having communicated on the
subject with the neutral powers, the diplomatic represent-
atives of the latter at Paris were instructed to address to
the French Government identic notes, intimating that
the action of the fleet was inconsistent with the rules of
The Hague Conference.
The French Government, in its reply, stated that there
existed in the several cases special circumstances justify-
ing the course which was adopted:
1. In one case a demand was made upon the town for a
ransom, and was refused.
2. In another case a requisition for supplies had been
denied.
3. In yet another, the bombardment was an act of re-
taliation for the destruction of a French man-of-war by
an English torpedo boat using false colors.
The French Government, however, while alleging these
special justifications, reserved the question of the lawful-
ness of bombarding undefended coast towns for purposes
other than those stated.
To what extent is the supposed French answer, both as
to the special cases stated and as to the general question
reserved, supported by modern opinion and practice?
HOIAJTIO:S.
By Article XXV of the "Regulations respecting the
Laws and Customs of War on Land," adopted at The
Hague July 29, 1899, 'Hhe attack or bombardment of
towns, villages, habitations, or buildings which are not
defended is prohibited."
Although this prohibition, since it is found in regula-
tions relating only to war on land, could not be considered
5
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(5 SITUATION I.
expressly applicable to the operations of naval forces, yet
it might, if it were unaffected by any other circumstance,
be considered as in spirit forbidding such a bombardment
as that in question.
But it appears that it was expressly agreed at The Hague
that, without regard to the merits, the question should be
reserved. In the deliberations of the second subcommittee
of the second committee the delegate from Italy proposed
that Article XXV should be made applicable to bombard-
ments by naval forces. Objections were made to this pro-
posal (1) because of the incompatibility of an absolute
prohibition with the possible necessities of a naval force
in regard to obtaining supplies, and (2) because of the
inopportuneness of the proposal. The subcommittee, on
motion of its president, then expressed the opinion that
the matter should be examined by a future conference.
The British delegate, however, adverted to the fact that
his Government had refused to take part in the Brussels
conference (1874) except on condition that naval questions
should remain outside the deliberations. He added that
he did not desire to touch the merits of the question, but
to declare that for the reason indicated it was impossible
for him to associate himself with the subcommittee's
expression of opinion; and at his request the fact that he
abstained from voting on it was entered on the record.
(Conference Internationale de la Paix, part 3, pp. 27-28.)
The conference, in its final act, July 29, 1899, voted
certain wishes, among which was the following:
''The conference expresses the wish that the proposal
to settle the question of the bombardment of ports, towns
and villages by a nayal force may be referred to a subse-
quent conference for consideration."
This wish formed one of five which ' ' were voted unani-
mously, saving some abstentions," the English delegates
having abstained from voting. (Blue Book, Misc. No. 1
(1899), 289.) It appears therefore that there would be no
ground for the supposed representation to France, on the
part of the neutral governments, in the case stated.
As to the special circumstances alleged in justification
of the act complained of, the following observations may
be made:
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COAST WARFARE. 7
1* By Stockton's Naval War Code, which is binding'
upon American officers, ''the bombardment of unfortified
and undefended towns and places for the nonpayment of
ransom is forbidden." This provision is believed to repre-
sent the best modern opinion and practice, and it invali-
dates in principle the first excuse.
2. As to the second case, the French answer is unsatis-
factory. In general, a belligerent is forbidden to use
wanton or disproportionate violence (Hall, 4th ed., 551);
and the mere denial of supplies does not give the right to
bombard. (Stockton, Naval War Code, 7.) In the pres-
ent case there is no claim that the bombardment was in
any way a military necessity or that it was carried out
because requisitioned supplies were forcibly withheld; nor
does it appear that due notice of bombardment was given
or that any special circumstances, such as might excuse
the necessity for notice, existed.
3. The conclusions to be formed as to the third justifi-
cation depend on several considerations. It does not
appear by the French answer whether the torpedo boat,
when she fired her first torpedo or gun, had shown her
true colors. With reference to the use of false colors, it
is laid down "that soldiers clothed in the uniforms of their
enemy must put on a conspicuous mark by which they can
be recognized before attacking, and that a vessel using the
enemy's flag must hoist its own flag before firing with shot
or shell." The United States has taken the lead in forbid-
ding the use of false colors (Stockton, Naval War Code,
8); and it is certain that, even in the case of a naval vessel
of a government which had not laid a like inhibition upon
its officers, the failure to display the true colors before the
actual attack would constitute a flagrant violation of the
laws of war, which should be brought to the notice of that
government and punished by it.
A reasonable opportunity for explanation and repara-
tion should be given, after which, if redress should be neg-
lected or refused, a right of retaliation would arise. If
possible, retaliation should be in kind, unless the action,
was, as in this ease, a gross violation of the dictates of
humanity and of civilized warfare. (Snow, 93.) At the
same time it is enjoined that in making reprisals due regard
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8 NOTES ON COAST WARFARE.
must alwa^^s be had to the duties of humanity (Stockton,
Naval War Code, 8); and it would be desirable to perform
an act of retaliation which would not, as in the present
case, fall upon people apparentl}^ sustaining no proximate
relation to the perfidy complained of.
NOTES ON SITUATION I— COAST WAREARE.
Paul Jones. — During the year 1776 John Paul Jones, in
command of the sloop-of-war Providence^ 14 guns and 107
men, on a cruise ranging from the Bermudas to Nova
Scotia, made several incursions ashore for the purpose of
seizing British stores, releasing American prisoners, and
destroying British shipping/ These incidents, while they
convinced him of the essential importance of a navy to the
American cause, left on his mind a clear impression "that
the best use to be made of the small force that could be put
afloat was to direct it, not so much upon the enemy's com-
merce at sea in transit as upon his coasts and commercial
stations, where his shipping would be found congregated,
with insufficient local protection. Commerce destroying,
to use the modern phrase for an age-long practice, is a wide
term, covering many different methods of application. In
essence, it is a blow at the communications, at the resources
of the country; in system it should be pursued not by ran-
dom prowling, by individual ships for individual enemies
as they pass to and fro, but by despatching adequate force
to important centers, where the hostile shipping for any
reason is known to accumulate. * * * Let a single
ship of war — commerce destroyer — meet twenty or thirt}^
merchant ships at sea, he can take but few; the rest scat-
ter and escape, and the prisoners must be cared for. Cor-
ner the same squadron in port, and neither difficulty, as a
rule, exists."^
In his statement to the Marine Committee of the Con-
tinental Congress on a proposed scheme for the new navy,
he advised against ships of the line, on the ground that the
United States were not theri prepared to contend with
Great Britain for mastery of the sea on a grand scale, and
recommended the immediate construction of five or six
^ Buell, Paul Jones, Founder of the American Navy, I, 53.
'■^Captain Zviaiian, f-cribner's rvijifra/in^, July, 1S98.
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PAUL JONES. y
frigates, of which fast sailing was to be a prime quality.
''Keeping," he said, " such a squadron in British waters,
alarming their coasts, intercepting their trade, and descend-
ing now and then upon their least-protected ports, is the
only way that we, with our slender resources, can sensibly
affect our enemy by sea warfare. Rates of insurance will
rise; necessary supplies from abroad, particularly naval
stores for the British dockyards, will be cut off; transports
carrying troops and supply ships bringing military stores
for land operations against us will be captured, and last
but not least, a considerable force of their ships and seamen
will be kept watching or searching for our frigates. " ^
Two descents were made by Jones on the British isles, at
Whitehaven and St. Mary's Island. The purpose of the
descent at Whitehaven was the destruction of the shipping;
of that at St. Mary's Island, the seizure of the Earl of
Selkirk as a hostage for the better treatment of American
prisoners then in England. The Earl was not at home
at the time. Plate, taken from his castle by some of the
landing party, was afterwards restored by Jones at his
own expense. Whitehaven was defended by two small
forts. As to the descent at Whitehaven Jones reported:
''Its actual results were of little moment, for the intended
destruction of shipping was limited to one vessel. But
the moral effect of it was very great, as it taught the
English that the fancied security of their coasts was a
myth and thereby compelled their Government to take
extensive measures for the defense of numerous ports
hitherto relying for protection wholly on the vigilance
and supposed omnipotence of their navy. It also doubled
or more the rates of insurance, which in the long run
proved the most grievous damage of all. " ^
^Buell, I, 38-42.
=^Buell, I, 109-114. As to the case of the Earl of Selkirk, Mr. Buell
expresses the opinion that "a project to seize the person of a non-
combatant nobleman with a view of holding him as a hostage or of
coercing him to use his influence with his Government for the better
treatment of prisoners of war, fairly captured, can hardly be brought
within the most liberal definition of civilized warfare, ^^ and that **the
fact that it had many examples in the conduct of British landing par-
ties on our own coast is no justification," as ** two wrongs do not make
one right."
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10 NOTES ON COAST WARFARE.
Landings at different points on the British coasts were
plannefl for the expedition in the Bon Ilommxe Michard^
in 1779, but in deference to French wishes these were
abandoned and a cruise against commerce in the open
sea made instead/
War of 1812, — The later stages of the war of 1812 were
marked by incursions of the British naval forces at vari-
ous points on the coast of the Chesapeake Bay, in retalia-
tion for acts of the United States troops in Canada.* The
threat of Admiral Cochrane to enter upon such a course
was the subject of a correspondence between him and Mr,
Monroe, then Secretary of State, in August and. Septem-
ber, 1814.^ But in April and May, 1813, several towns
along the Chesapeake were devastated by the forces
under Rear- Admiral Cockburn, when the plea of retalia-
tion was not alleged.* It appears that Cockburn's orders
were to destroy everything that could serve a warlike
purpose, and to interrupt, as far as possible, communica-
tion along the shore. ^ On April 28 he reached French-
town, a village of a dozen buildings, where he drove away
the few Americans who made a show of resistance, and
burned a quantity of property, " consisting of much flour,
a large quantity of army clothing, of saddles, bridles, arid
other equipments for cavalry, etc., together with various
articles of merchandise," besides five vessels lying near the
place. ^
The first destruction of the town itself took place at
Havre de Grace, a place of some sixty houses. The
immediate object of the attack was the destruction of a
battery lately erected there. The British forces "met
with only resistance enough to offer an excuse for pillage."^
The battery was soon silenced, and the boat's crew having
landed drove the militia to the further extremitj^ of the
^ Captain Mahan, Scribner's Magazine, XXIV, 34.
2 Adams' History of the United States, VIII, 124-128.
3 Am. State Papers, For. Rel. , III, 693-694.
* Reports of Rear- Admiral Cockburn to Admiral Warren, James'
History of the War in America, II, 404-411.
5 Adams, VII, 266, citing London Gazette, July 6, 1813.
•Adams, VII, 266-267, citing the London Gazette.
^Adams, VII, 267.
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WAR OF 1812. 11
town, where, according to Cockburn's report, "no longer
feeling themselves equal to an open and manly resistance,
they commenced a teasing and irritating fire from behind
the houses, walls, trees, etc., from which, I am sorry to
say, my gallant first lieutenant received a shot through his
hand whilst leading the pursuing party; he, however, cour
tinued to head the advance, with which he soon succeeded
in dislodging the whole of the enemy from their lurking
places and driving them for shelter to the neighboring
woods. * * * After setting fire to some of the houses,
to cause the proprietors (who had deserted them and
formed part of the militia who had fled to the woods) to
understand and feel what they were liable to bring upon
themselves by building batteries and acting towards us
with so much useless rancor, I embarked."^ According to
an American account of the affair, the militia, on the kill-
ing of a man by a rocket, fled precipitately, and the
marines then proceeded to plunder and burn the houses,
of which about forty were destroyed. This account gives
the impression that there was little, if any, firing from the
houses.*
Subsequently the villages of Georgetown and Freder-
icktown were destroyed. In his report concerning them
Admiral Cockburn makes nd mention of irregular firing.
He says:
"I sent forward the two Americans in their boat to
warn their countrymen against acting in the same rash
manner the people of Havre de Grace had done, assuring
them, if they did, that their towns would inevitably meet
with a similar fate; but, on the contrary, if they did not
attempt resistance, no injury should be done to them or
their towns; that vessels and public property only would
be seized; that the strictest discipline would be maintained;
and that, whatever provisions or other property of individ-
uals I might require for the use of the squadron, should
be instantly paid for in its fullest value. * * * 1 am
sorry to say, 1 soon found the more unwise alternative was
adopted; for on our reaching within about a mile of the
town, between two projecting elevated points of the river^
• 1 James, II, 406. * North Am. Rev., V. (July, 1817), 157.
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12 NOTES ON COAST WARFARE.
a most heavy fire of musketry was opened on us from
about 400 men, divided and entrenched on the two oppo-
site banks, aided by one long gun. The launches and
rocket boats smartly returned this fire with good effect,
and with the other boats and marines, I pushed ashore
immediately above the enemy's position, thereby ensuring
the capture of the town or the bringing him to a decided
action. He determined, however, not to risk the latter,
for the moment he discerned we had gained the shore, and
that the marines had fixed their bayonets, he fled with his
whole force to the woods, and was neither seen nor heard
of afterwards, although sevei'al parties were sent out to
ascertain whether he had taken up any new position, or
what had become of him. I gave him, however, the mor-
tification of seeing, from wherever he had hid himself,
that I was keeping my word with respect to the towns,
which (excepting the houses of those who had continued
peaceably in them, and had taken no part in the attack
made upon us) were forthwith destroyed.''
In these affairs. Admiral Cockburn seemed to have acted
on the old idea that where a useless defense is made, those
who resist are not entitled to the privileges of belligerents.
''Where he met no resistance he paid in part for what
private propert}^ he took."^
Borahardment of Grey town ^ or San Juan del Norte. —
In March, 1852, the Mosquito authorities, by a proclama-
tion issued by the British consul, called on the people of
" Greytown," a name which had been given to the town of
San Juan del Norte, in Nicaragua, to form a constitution
and set up a government. This government came into
power on May 1, 1852, the Mosquito authorities surrender-
ing their functions and retiring from office. A contro-
vers}^ soon broke out between the new authorities and the
Accessory Transit Company, an organization composed of
citizens of the United States who held a charter from
Nicaragua, as to the occupation by the company of a
portion of land on the north side of the harbor known as
Punta Arenas, over which jurisdiction was claimed by the
municipality. Greytown was regarded b}^ the United
States as being within the limits of Nicaragua. It was
1 Adams, VII, 269; North Am. Rev., V, 157, July, 1817.
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BOMBARDMENT OF GREYTOWN. 13
understood to cJaim independence under a charter from
the Mosquito King; but the United States never recognized
the Mosquito King nor the independence of the town,
though American naval officers were instructed to respect
the police regulations of any de facto authorities there,
and not to molest such authorities unless they should
attempt to disturb the rights of American citizens.
February 8, 1853, the city council passed a resolution
notifying the Accessory Transit Company to remove
certain buildings within five da^^s and its entire establish-
ment within thirty days, and declaring that if this was
(not done summary measures would be taken, as the land
was needed for public uses. The buildings which were to
be removed within five days were a structure used for
boarding and lodging the employees of the company and
a brick oven belonging to one McCerren, a citizen of the
United States, who at the time was absent. The^^ were
not removed; and on February 21 they were demolished
by a party of armed men, who, accompanied by the mar-
shal of Greytown, and under the joint command of a
member of the city council and " Major" Lj^ons, a colored
resident, ''acted in a most outrageous manner, not even
permitting the clerks of the company to save the property
in the house, and actually imprisoned and fined one of them
for attempting to rescue some valuable articles from
destruction."^ When, a few days later, Mr. Baldwin, the
agent of the compan}^ went to Greytown to invoke the
protection of a British man-of-war, he was arrested and
held some time in custody.^
March 10, 1853, Capt. HoUins, of the U. S. S. Cyaiie,
arrived at Greytown. The agent of the company imme-
diately invoked his protection, and he promptly advised
the mayor of the town that he could not permit any dep-
redations on the property of the company. The mayor
replied that no "depredations" had been or would be
made upon the property of the company, but that he
should proceed to eject the company according to law,
unless illegally prevented by a superior force. It was
^Capt. Hollins to the Secretary of the Navy, March 30, 1858, Br. &
For. State Papers, XLVII, 1033-1044.
^Br. & For. State Papers, XLVII, 1019.
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14 NOTES ON COAST WAKFAKE.
afterwards learned that a force from the town wg^s under
arms, preparing to proceed against Punta Arenas and the
Accessory Transit Company, and that the destruction of
the company's property by fire was threatened. Capt.
HoUins then placed a marine guard on Punta Arenas, with
instructions to inform the "marshal" that the property
could not be molested. When the marshal landed he was
so advised, and he then mustered his ''posse of carpenters"
and returned to Grey town. In consequence of many
threats and manifest excitement among the citizens of the
town, Capt. HoUins continued the guard at Punta Arenas
and warned the citizens of Grey town of his intention to
protect the persons and property of citizens of the United
States against molestation. His proceedings were ap-
proved by the Secretary of the Navy.^
In consequence of the dispute as to jurisdiction over
Punta Arenas, the difficulties between the municipality
and the Accessory Transit Company continued. Early in
May, 1853, some men, who were then or had previously
been employed by the company, ran off with some of its
property in a boat to Grey town. They were pursued by
employees of the company, who, while attempting to ar-
rest the fugitives, were compelled by the municipal police
to desist. Subsequently a clerk of the company who, un-
der orders of the agent, sought to recover the boat was
forcibly interrupted by the police, and was obliged to leave
behind some of the stolen property, which afterwards dis-
appeared. On the same day a warrant was issued for the
arrest, on a charge of assault and battery, of one of the
employees who had endeavored to seize the fugitives.
The agent of the company, on jurisdictional grounds, re-
fused to allow the service of the warrant at Punta Arenas,
but the marshal returned and effected the arrest with a
force of armed men. The prisoner, whose name was
Sloman, was taken to Greytown, where Mr. Fabens, the
U. S. commercial agent, procured his discharge under
bond. The company's agent was afterwards arrested at
Greytown and held to bail on a charge of having obstructed
Sloman's arrest at Punta Arenas.^
^Br. and For. State Papers, XLVII, 1012-1018.
2 British and Foreign State Papers, XLVI, 859.
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BOMBARDMENT OF GREYTOWN. 15
Disputes also existed as to the pa^^ment of dues and port
charges by the steamers of the Accessory Transit Com-
pany. The agent of the company finally instructed the
officers of the steamers to pa}^ no more port charges at
(xreytown and to take no letters or packages or freight for
its inhabitants. This action much exasperated the people
of the town.
On the evening of May lO, 1854, a difficuilty of more
serious import occurred. The population of Greytown
then numbered about 800 persons, consisting of a few
Englishmen, Frenchmen, Cxermans, and men from the
United States, but mainly of negroes from Jamaica and
some natives of the Mosquito shore. On the day men-
tioned the steamer RoutK of the Accessory Transit Com-
pan3% arrived at Punta Arenas under the command of
Capt. T. T. Smith, and took her position alongside the
steamer Xorthern Light to deliver her passengers. About
dusk a bungo, having on board 25 or 30 armed men,
mostly Jamaica negroes headed by a mulatto as marshal,
came over from Greytown and ran alongside the Routh,
The marshal, accompanied by several armed men, then
jumped on board and announced their purpose to arrest
Captain Smith under a warrant from the mayor of Grey-
town on a charge of murder, based upon the shooting by
Captain Smith of a native boatman.
At this stage of the proceedings Mr. Borland, United
States minister to Central America, who was on board the
Nirrthern Light on his way to the United States, was
appealed to. He went on board the Bouth and found
Capt. Smith standing at his cabin door, keeping the mar-
shal and his men at bay. Mr. Borland informed the mar-
shal that the United States did not recognize the authority
of the municipality at Punta Arenas to arrest an American
citizen, and ordered him with his men to withdraw.
Meanwhile, loud and threatening language was used by
the men on the bungo, and several of them rushed on
board the steamer. A further invasion was prevented by
Mr. Borland taking a rifle and warning the men on the
bungo to keep ofl'.
Early in the evening Mr. Borland went to Greytown to
call upon Mr. Fabens, the United States commercial agent.
6482-01 2
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1<> NOTES ON COAST WARFARE.
He then learned that, at a meeting of the people of the
town, it had been resolved to arrest him. This meeting
was presided over by the maA'^or, a Frenchman named
Siguad, who, though he afterwards disavowed responsi-
l)ility for what took place, was said to have been present
when it was proposed by Martin, the ex-ma^^or, to make
the arrest. The attempt was made. A body of men, con-
sisting in part of the regular police of the town, armed
with muskets, and headed by a Jamaica negro, went to Mr.
Fabens's house and announced that they came by order of
tHe mayor to arrest Mr. Borland for preventing the arrest
of Capt. Smith. Mr. Borland appeared and warned them
against the consequences of what they proposed, and called
several gentlemen who were in an upper room to wit-
ness the threatened assault upon him. The leader of the
armed force then summoned Martin, the ex-mayor, as if to
consult him, but Martin not answering, they drew off a little
way from the door. The ma^^or then came up and assured
Mr. Borland that the proceedings had been taken without
his order and authority; and while the conversation was
going on someone from the crowd threw a broken bottle
at Mr. Borland, slightly wounding him in the face. The
person who threw the missile was not recognized. Soon
afterwards the crowd dispersed. At Mr. Borland's request,
Mr. Fabens proceeded in a boat to the Northern Light in
order if possible to obtain aid. On deliberation, it was
decided that a committee of three passengers should return
with Mr. Fabens to Greytown, communicate with ]\Ir. Bor-
land and agree upon a proper course to be taken. The boat
bearing them, though notice was given that the consul was
on it, was fired on and not aHowed to land, and was thus com-
pelled to return to the Norflwrn Light, During the night
the town was occupied b}" armed men, whose sentinels, sta-
tioned between the American consulate, where Mr. Bor-
land was, and the harbor, challenged all who attempted to
pass, prevented boats from landing or leaving the shore,
and thus kept Mr. Borland a prisoner all night. On the
following morning, between seven and eight o'clock, Mr.
Borland, taking advantage of a momentary lull in the
excitement, procured a boat and returned to the North^^u
lAght^ where it was decided, at a meeting of the passen-
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BOMBARDMENT OF GREYTOWN. 17
gers, to engage the services of fifty men to act as an armed
guard at Punta Arenas till the United States Government
could be informed of the state of affairs/
Mr. Marcy, who was then Secretary of State, on June
3. 1854, informed Mr. Fabens that a man-of-war would be
ordered to visit San Juan; that the conduct of the people
there had attracted the attention of the Government of
the United States and would not pass unnoticed; and that
the inhabitants of the place would be expected to make repa-
ration for the wrongs and outrages they had committed.
On the 9th of June he advised Mr. Fabens thatCapt. HoUins
would immediatelv proceed to San eluan. The Government,
said Mr. Marcy, was embarrassed by the rumor that the
pretended.civil and political authority' of the place had dis-
solved; nevertheless, should there be no organized body
upon which a demand for redress could be made, the indi-
viduals who had participated in the infliction of the wrongs
could not escape from responsibilities resulting from the
conduct of the late political organization. The people of
San Juan were expected to repair the injury they had
caused to the Accessory Transit Company by withholding
from it the property which had been stolen and taken to
San Juan, and by protecting persons who were guilty of
felon3\ Moreover, the indignity to Mr. Borland could
not, declared Mr. Marcy, pass unnoticed. If done by order
of the authorities of the place, they must answer for it in
their assumed political character, and nothing short of an
apology for the outrage would save the place from the in-
fliction that such an act merited. If it was committed by
lawless individuals, without the authority or connivance
of the town, then it was clearh' the duty of those who ex-
ercised the civil power in San Juan to inflict upon them
exemplary punishment. The nominal magistrates there,
in neglecting to bring them to justice, would impliedly sanc-
tion their acts and assume responsibility for them.^
The instructions of Mr. Dobbin, Secretary of the Navy,
to Capt. HoUins bear date June 10, ISo-t. They refer to
the two incidents of the stealing of the company's property
^ Br. and For. State Papers^, XLVI, 866-872.
•^ Br. and For. State Papern, XLVI, 847.
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18 NOTES ON COAST WARFARE.
and the indignity to Mr. Borland. Capt. HoUins was to
consult freely with Mr. Fabens. It was, declared the
instructions, very desirable that the people of Greytown
"'should be taught that the United States will not tolerate
these outrages, and that they have the power and deter-
mination to check them. It is, however, very much to be
hoped that you can effect the purposes of your visit with-
out a resort to violence and destruction of property and
loss of life. The presence of your vessel will, no doubt,
work much good. The Department reposes much in your
prudence and good sense. ''^
June 12, 1854, Mr. Fabens informed Capt. Hollins, who
had then arrived at San Juan, that he had demanded, on
behalf of the United States, an indemnity for the property
feloniously taken from the Accessory Transit Company.
He had also renewed the demand for indemnity for the
destruction of the company's property in March, 1853.
He had learned that, although a second demand for satis-
faction had been made, no redress would be given; nor
would any apology be made by the town or its authorities
for the insult to Mr. Borland, nor would any steps be
taken to bring the perpetrators to justice. He added
that the chief actors and instigators were in undisputed
possession of the town, its arms and ammunition, and the
people were thus virtually countenancing and approving
the indignity.^
On July 12 Capt. Hollins, at 9 ox'lock in the morning,
issued a proclamation announcing that, if the demands for
satisfaction presented by Mr. Fabens were not forthwith
complied with, he would, at 9 o'clock a. m. of the follow-
ing day, proceed to bombard the town. The particular
demands in question were those specified in a letter of
Mr. Fabens, of July 11, addressed ''To those now or
lately pretending to and exercising authority in and to
the people of San Juan del Norte." They comprised the
immediate payment of $24,000 as an indemnit}^ for injuries
to the Accessory Transit Company and for outrages per-
petrated on the persons of American citizens, and an
1 Br. and For. State Papers, XLVI, 875.
'Br, and For. State Papers, XLVI, 877.
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BOMBARDMENT OF GREYTOWN. 19
apolog}^ for the indignity to Mr. Borland, together with
satisfactory assurances of future good behavior.
After the issuance of the proclamation, a force went
ashore from the Cyane and secured the arms and ammu-
nition on shore. At the same time foreigners generally,
and persons favorable to the United States, were notified
that a steamer would be in readiness on the morning of
the bombardment to convey them to a place of safet3\
An offer was also made to Commander Jolley, of the Brit-
ish war schooner Befwuda^ of assistance in removing any
British persons or property. He responded with the fol-
lowing protest:
"The inhabitants of this city, as well as the houses and
property, are entireh^ defenseless and at your mercy. I
do, therefore, notify you, that such an act will be without
precedent among civilized nations; and T beg to call your
attention to the fact that a large amount of property of
British subjects, as well as others, which it is my duty to
protect, will be destroyed; but the force under m}^ com-
mand is so totally inadequate for this protection against
the Cyane^ I can only enter this my protest. "
Capt. HoUins at once replied:
"'The people of San Juan del Norte have seen fit to com-
mit outrages upon the property and persons of citizens of
the United States after a manner only to be regarded as
piratical, and I am directed to enforce that reparation
demanded b}^ my Government. Be assured 1 sympathize
with yourself in the risk of J^nglish subjects and property
under the circumstances, and regret exceedingly the force
under your command is not doubly equal to that of the
Cyane,'^
A steamer was sent to the town at daylight on the morn-
ing of the 13th to take away such persons as desired to go.
A few only accepted the opportunity, and these were con-
veyed to Punta Arenas. The majority of the inhabitants
either had left or were willing to remain and risk the con-
sequences. It was hoped that the show of determination
on the part of the ship would at this stage have brought
about a satisfactory adjustment of differences; but none'
of the inhabitants called upon Capt. HoUins, and no expla-
nation or apology was attempted.
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20 NOTES ON COAST WAKFAKE.
At 9 O'clock in the morning of the 13th the batteries of
the Cyane were opened on the town with shot and shell
for three-quarters of an hour. After an intermission of
the same length they were opened again for half an hour,
and this was followed by an intermission of three hours,
after which the firing was renewed for twenty minutes, and
then the bombardment ceased. The object of the several
intervals in the bombardment was to afford an opportunity
to the people of the town to treat and arrange matters.
No advantage was taken of it, and at four o'clock p. m. a
force was sent ashore to complete the destruction of the
town by fire, though instructions were given to exempt
from destruction, if possible, the property of a French-
man named De Bardwell, who was understood to have
held aloof from the action of the people. No lives were
lost, although an attack was made by an armed part}^ on
the men who were sent ashore; but on the volley being
returned the assailants fled. ''The execution,-' says Capt.
HoUins, "done b}'^ our shot and shell amounted to the
almost total destruction of the buildings; but it was
thought best to make the punishment of such a character
as to inculcate a lesson never to be forgotten b}^ those wha
have for so long a time set at defiance all warnings, and
satisfy the w^hole world that the United States have the
power and determination to enforce that reparation and
respect due to them as a Government in whatever quarter
the outrages may be committed."^
This transaction was fully discussed in President Pierce's
second annual message of Dec. 4, 1854, which contains the
following comments:
''This pretended community, a heterogeneous assem-
blage gathered from various countries, and composed for
the most part of blacks and persons of mixed blood, had
previously [to the mobbing of Mr. Borland] given other
indications of mischievous and dangerous propensities.
Early in the same month property was clandestinely
abstracted from the depot of the Transit Company and
taken to Greytown. The plunderers obtained shelter
there and their pursuers were driven back by its people,
^ Br. and For. State Papern, XLVI, 878, et seq.
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BOMBARDMENT OF GREYTOWN. 21
who not only protected the wrongdoers and shared the
phmder, but treated with rudeness and violence those who
sought to recover their property. ^*" ^'' * I could not
doubt that the case demanded the interposition of this
Government. Justice required that reparation should he
made for so many and such gross wrongs, and that a
course of insolence and plunder, tending directly to the
insecurit}^ of the lives of numerous travelers and of the
rich treasure belonging to our citizens passing over this
transit way, should be peremptorily arrested. Whatever
it might be in other respects, the community in question,
in power to do mischief, was not despicable. It was well
provided with ordnance, small arms, and ammunition, and
might easily seize on the unarmed boats, freighted with
millions of property, which passed almost daily within its
reach. It did not profess to belong to any regular gov-
ernment, and had, in fact, no recognized dependence on
or connection with any one to which the United States or
their injured citizens might appl}^ for redress or which
could be held responsible in any way for the outmges
committed. Not standing before the world in the attitude*
of an organized political society, being neither competent
to exercise the rights nor to discharge the obligations of
a government, it was, in fact, a mamuding establishment
too dangerous to be disregarded and too guilty to pass
unpunished, and yet incapable of being treated in any
other way than as a piratical resort of outlaws or a camp
of savages depredating on emigrant trains or caravans
and the frontier settlements of civilized states.' * ^'* *
No individuals, if any there were, who regarded them-
selves as not responsible for the misconduct of the com-
munity adopted any means to separate themselves from
the fate of the guilty. The several charges on which the
demands for redress were founded had been publicly
known to all for some time, and were again announced to
them. They did not deny an}" of these charges; they
offered no explanation, nothing in extenuation of their
conduct, but contumaciously refused to hold any inter-
course with the commander of the Cijam^ By their obsti-
nate silence they seemed rather desirious to provoke chas-
tisement than to escape it. * * * When the Ctjane
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22 NOTES ON COAbT WARFARE.
was ordered to Central America it was confidently hoped
and expected that no occasion would arise for a 'resort to
violence and destruction of propert}" and loss of life/
Instructions to that effect were given to her commander;
and no extreme act would have been requisite had not the
people themselves, by their extraordinary conduct in the
affair, frustrated all the possible mild measures for obtain-
ing satisfaction. ''* * *
"This transaction has been the subject of complaint on
the part of some foreign powers, and has been character-
ized with more of harshness than of justice. If compari-
sons were to be instituted, it would not be ditficult to pre-
sent repeated instances in the history of states standing in
the ver^^ front of modern civilization where communities
far less offending and more defenseless than Gre3"town
have been chastised with much greater severity, and where
not cities only have been laid in ruins, but human life has
been recklessly sacrificed and the blood of the innocent
made profusely to mingle with that of the guilty."
The Government of the United States declined to enter-
tain the claims of French subjects, growing out of the
bombardment, on the ground that persons domiciled at
Grey town must look to that community for protection.^
It is to be noticed that President Pierce, in the passages
above quoted, clearly assumed the position that the inhab-
itants of Gre^'town were not as a body entitled to be treated
as a civilized and responsible community.
The CrhneanWar, — In the Mcyinteur of May 6, 1854, is
given the report of the French admiral on the bombard-
ment of Odessa, which had taken place on April 22. It
was claimed that a flag of truce had ])een fired on and that
the bombardment was in retaliation. The bombardment
was directed at the public establishments, the public ves-
sels, and the fortifications, the city itself and the merchant
vessels being spared. The admiral mentions the fact that
his orders had directed him to spare open towns.
At pp. 381-347 of the British Expedition to the Crimea,
])y W. H. Russell, the London Times correspondent, is
^ ^Ir. Marcv, Sec. of State, to Count Sartiges, French niinij^ter, Fe)).
26, 1857, S. Ex. Doc. 9, 35 Cong. 1 sess.; Lawrence's Wheaton (1863),
173, note 59.
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CRIMEAN WAR. 23
given the history of the expedition to the Sea of Azov.
During this expedition numerous landings were made
along the shore, and extensive plundering was engaged in.
These proceedings are referred to by a writer in the Time^^
Aug. 31, 1888. who signs llaud Ignaras Mali, He states
that at various places on the Sea of Azov large stores of
corn, private property, were burnt, and that the English
press approved rather than condemned what was done.
Bmyihard'inent of Valparaiso, — The series of events which
culminated in the bombardment of Valparaiso by a Span-
ish squadron, March 31, 1866, originated in a controversy'
between Spain and Peru, known as the "Talambo" ques-
tion, and involving alleged delays, defaults, and denials of
justice in the administration of the criminal law b}' the
tribunals of the latter country.^ On the refusal of Peru
to comply with certain demands for redress, as well as to
receive and negotiate with a new diplomatic agent of Spain,
on whose life attempts were alleged to have been made by
Peruvians, a Spanish squadron took possession of the
Chincha Islands. Any design against the territorial integ-
rity of Peru was afterwards disclaimed, but the seizure of
the islands was accompanied wdth a manifesto in which it
was intimated that, as Spain had never acknowledged the
independence of Peru, she might rightfully reassert her
ancient title to them.^
When intelligence of these things reached Chile it pro-
duced great excitement, and every effort was made to force
the Government into a warlike attitude. May 4, 1864,
Senor Tocornal, then Chilean minister for foreign affairs,
addressed to the Governments of America a circular in
which he declared that the manifesto issued b}^ the Span-
ish representatives in Peru sanctioned principles which
placed in doubt the independence of that country and
must therefore be reprobated and protested against by
Chile, and he expressed confidence that the Spanish
Government would not approve it. This circular, how-
ever, was not considered sufficiently demonstrative; and
on May 7 Seiior Tocornal, yielding to popular clamor,
resigned. He was succeeded by Senor Covarrubias. It
^Dip. (W., 1864, IV, 15, 18.
^^Dip. Cor., 1864, IV, 28, 82, 85, 87, 89.
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24 NOTES ON COAST WARFARE.
Ava« understood that orders wen^ issued to officials along-
the coast to refuse supplies and coal to Spanish men-of-
war, and in the following September a decree was promul-
gated declaring coal to 1)6 contraband of war and directing
that supplies of it be withheld from public vessels of a
state employed in hostilities against another state/
The relations between Spain and Chile were soon aggra-
vated hy various incidents. Instructions were issued to
Admiral Pareja, commanding the Spanish forces in the
Pacific, which invested him with plenipotentiarj^ powers.
The Spanish minister at Santiago, Mr. Tavira, sought,
however, to eifect an amicable arrangement. In a note of
May I'K 18*)5, he set forth the grievances of his (xovern-
ment. The note complained of popular affronts to the
Spanish flag, at which officials were alleged to have con-
nived; of Mr. Tocornal's circular of Ma}^ 4; of the failure
to correct expressions of public opinions which contra-
vened the law; of the permission given to the Peruvian
war steamer Lerzundi to obtain munitions of war and sup-
plies and to enlist men, while obstacles were placed in the
way of sending supplies to the Spanish squadron; of the
failure to prevent unlawful expeditions; of the refusal to
allow Spanish steamers to take coal, and of the decree
declaring coal to be contraband of war, with the object of
prejudicing Spain; of the subsequent permission given to
Peru to purchase horses, which were contmband of war
by the law of nations; and of the failure to bring actions
for certain libels in the press. Mr. Tavira stated that his
Government would be willing to receive ''the solemn
declarations" which the case demanded, provided they
were compatible with its dignit3\ Mr. Covarrubias
replied on May 16, 1865, reviewing the subjects of com-
plaint, flattering himself that he had dissipated- them, and
declaring that his explanations were a fresh testimonial to
the constant yearning and efforts of his Government to
maintain friendly relations with Spain. Mr. Tavira re-
sponded, on May 20, saying that the explanations given
dissipated, in his judgment, all motives of complaint, and
that he would advise his Government of them.
1 Dip. Vox., 1864, IV, 179-188, 189-190.
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BOMBARDMENT OF VALPARAISO. 25
The Spanish Government repudiated Mr. Tavira's action
and charged him with antedating the note of May 13, in
order to make it appear that it was sent before the arrival
of instructions which he received on the 14th of that month.
He was removed from his post and ordered home. The
terms of settlement insisted upon in the instructions
embraced disapproval of or apology for the grievances of
Spain, and a salute to the Spanish flag, which would be
immediately returned and no indemnit}^ asked. Tf these
terms were refused Admiral Pareja was authorized to take
measures of another kind. Spain reserving the right to
exact indemnities for the past and guarantees for the
future.^
Admiral Pareja was instructed, if Chile refused the
demands of Spain, to address, in the first place, a circular
to all the Spanish- American Republics assuring theiu that
Spain had no designs on their territory or independence.
He was then to put the whole Chilean coast under block-
ade. This blockade was to continue one month, and if
Chile had not then accepted the conditions ottered by
Spain he was authorized to perform any and every other
hostile act against the power and prosperity of Chile
recognized as legitimate in a state of war, throwing upon
the Chilean Government the responsibility. The point on
which Spain specially insisted was the salute to her flag,
which she felt had been insulted. If such a salute was^
given, it would be immediately returned by the Spanish
fleet, a new minister would instantly be sent to Santiago,
and the Spanish forces would be withdrawn from the
Pacific. The Spanish minister of state repeatedly declared
that his Goviprnment would not permanently occupy any
Spanish- American territory.^
September 17, 1865, Admiral Pareja, who, although a
diplomatic agent of Spain then resided at Santiago, was^
invested with plenipotentiary powers, sent an ultimatum
to the Chilean Government, demanding satisfactory expla-
nations, with a salute of 21 guns to the Spanish flag, and
intimating that if his demands were not complied with
^Dip. Cor., 1865, II, 545-552.
*^Dip. Cor., 1865, II, 546-547,556,557.
(
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26 NOTES ON COAST WARFARE.
diplomatic relations would be broken off, and that, if his
forces wer*e called into action, he would claim indemnity
for injuries sustained by the Spanish squadron in conse-
quence of the decrees of the Chilean Government. This
ultimatum, signed by the Spanish admiral, was received
at Santiago on the 18th of September, during the celebration
of the fifty-fifth aniversary of the birth of the Republic.
It was immediately rejected. It was presented again by
the admiral, and on the 23d of September was again re-
jected. Next day Valpai'aiso was blockaded and a blockade
was proclaimed of the other ports of the Republic. Chile
responded by a declaration of war. The extended block-
ade was not in fact maintained, since there were fifty -three
ports, while the Spanish forces comprised only four frig-
ates and two smaller vessels. October 28, 1865, Admiral
Pareja reduced the blockade to six ports. ^
Early in the contest the Chileans were greatly elated by
the capture of the Spanish man-of-war Covadonga, This
mishap caused deep mortification both to the Spanish navy
and to the Government at Madrid. The Spanish force in
Chilean waters was reenforced by two ships, which were
withdrawn from Callao, notwithstanding the fact that in
Peru, whose own dispute with Spain had seemed to be
amicabl}^ adjusted, there had just taken place a sympa-
thetic revolution which presaged an alliance with Chile. ^
At the end of December, 1865, the death of Admiral
Pareja on board his flagship was announced; the United
States minister at Santiago reported that from what he
could gather the admiral had committed suicide. His
military operations had entirely failed; and it was gener-
ally believed that a joint Chilean-Peruvian fleet, which
was to include the Covadonga^ was fitting out at the island
of ChiloCi
Admiral Pareja was succeeded in command by Senor
Castro Mendez Nunez, captain of the iron-clad Numancia^
the most formidable of the Spanish ships. He reduced
the blockade to the ports of Caldera and Valparaiso, and
later to Valparaiso alone. In January, 1866, news reached
Chile of the conclusion of an alliance with Peru, and of
iDip. Cor., 1866, II, 345, 349-362. ^Djp.Cor., 1866, II, 364-365.
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BOMBARDMENT OF VALPARAISO. 27
the declaration of war by the latter. This alliance wan
joined by Ecuador and Bolivia. February 7 the Spanish
fleet endeavored to engage that of Chile and Peru near the
island of Chiloe, and was worsted.
The first intimation of a possible bombardment of Val-
paraiso was made by Admiral Pareja in October, 1865,
but nothing came of it. In February, 1866, his successor
caused the Chilean Government to be advised that in the
event of an attempt being made from the town to destroy
his vessels with torpedoes he would instantly open fire
upon it.^ Personally Admiral Nufiez seems to have been
desirous of an amicable arrangement, and of avoiding such
a measure of violence. About the middle of March, how-
ever, he received a formal appointment as commander in
chief and plenipotentiary, and this was accompanied with
or was soon followed by instructions which left him no
other alternative. General Kilpatrick, then United States
minister to Chile, and Commodore John Rodgers, com-
manding a special United States squadron at Valparaiso,
labored in vain to bring about a pacific adjustment.
Admiral Nunez stated that the only terms which his
instructions wpuld permit him to accept were (1) a note
disclaiming an intention to insult Spain, and declaring that
the treaty of peace was only interrupted, not broken, by
^ March 3, 1866, Admiral Denman wrote to the Lords Commissioners
of the Admiralty that he intended to use two of his ships to enforce
twenty-four hours' delay before the Spanish squadron should open fire
on Valparaiso, in the event of the use of torpedoes against the Spanish
ships. (Br. & For. State Papers, LVI, 937. ) This intention the Lords
considered ' ' not to be justified by any rule of international law. ' ' April
16, 1866, Lord Clarendon instructed the British minister in Chile that
he had consulted the law. offices of the crown on the subject, and that
in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government the course which the
Spanish admiral had declared he would pursue would, under the cir-
cumstances stated, *'be justifiable by international law." **Her
Majesty's Government," said Lord Clarendon, '* think it impossible
to deny the belligerent right of Chile to employ torpedoes against the
Spanish squadron: and equally impossible to deny the belligerent
right of Spain to bombard the town which those instruments are
employed to protect. In the opinion of Her Majesty's Government,
however, it would be highly impolitic on the part of the Chilean
Government to give cause to the Spanish commodore to put his threat
into execution." (939.)
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28 NOTES ON COAST WAR>«'ARE.
the declaration of war, and in proof of this the return of
the t'm'odmiga, and all other prizes; (2) a responsive
declaration by Spain of a return of friendship, together with
a discla* ner of any desire for conquest in America, or
of exclusive influence in American Republics, and in proof
of this the return of all prizes in the possession of the
Spanish squadron; (8) after this exchange of notes, a
reciprocal salute of 21 guns, the first gun to be fired from
the Chilean forts, when, this accomplished, he would pro-
ceed to Santiago and present his credentials as envoy
extraordinary- and minister plenipotentiary and enter
into negotiations for a permanent settlement. If these
terms were accepted b}^ Chile, similar ones would te
offered to her allies.
Mr. Covarrubias, when advised of these terms, declined
to act upon them without the concurrence of the repre-
sentatives of the allies. This was construed as a rejection
of Ihem, and it seems correctly so, since not only was the
minister of Peru then absent, but Mr. Covarrubias, as will
be seen, soon afterwards made a counter-proposal which
^as evidenth^ not the result of mutual consultation.
On the morning of March 27 Admiral >'unez notified
the diplomatic corps, the dean of the consular body at
Valparaiso, and the intendente of the city that he would
open his l)atteries on Saturday morning, the 31st of the
month, thus allowing four da^s to noncombatants for
removing with their effects, and that he would endeavor
to injure only public property, but that if private prop-
erty should be destroyed he could only place the entire
responsibility on Chile. Tn a manifesto he stated that two
ineffectual attempts had been made to engage the allied
fleets in the waters of Chiloe, where they were protected
by narrow passages and natural bulwarks of rock, so that
vessels of the class of the Spanish squadron could not
attack them. ''The impossibility," he declared, ''of get-
ting within gunshot of vessels which shelter themselves
behind the impassable barriers of locality, and the per-
sistence of Chile in refusing the amends justly demanded
of her, impose upon Spain the painful but unavoidable
duty of making her feel all the weight of rigor to wHich
that country exposes itself which absolutely refuses to
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BOMBARDM^TNT OF VALPARAISO, 29
recognize the duties imposed upon the civilized communi-
ties of the universe/'
The foreign residents of various nationalities addressed
petitions and sent deputations to the foreign ministers and
to the commanders of the foreign naval forces, praying
for protection against the bombardment. Gen. Kilpatrick
convoked a meeting of the diplomatic corps, but only the
representatives of Italy and Prussia appeared; and it was
decided that it was inexpedient for the American naval
forces to make any physical opposition, in view of the
course of the ministers of England and France. ' ' Had
those representatives,-' says Gen. Kilpatrick, ''asked
that our forces cooperate with those of England to that
end, and thus given us moral support in our contemplated
action, neither Commodore Rodgers nor myself would
have hesitated to have used force to prevent the destruc-
tion of this city.''
All the consular }>ody, except the representatives of the
Argentine Republic, Belgium, England, and France, joined
in a protest to Admiral Nunez, ''In the face of the civi-
lized world, against the consummation of an act which
is inconsistent with the civilization of the age.'- The
consuls of England, France, and the Argentine Republic
made a joint and similar protest. The Belgian consul pro-
tested separately.
General Kilpatrick, in a written communication to
Admiral Nunez, said: ''While belligerent rights permit
a recourse to extreme measures for the carrying out of
legitimate militar^^ operations, the}" do not include the
wanton destruction of private propert}^ where no result
advantageous to the lawful ends of the war can be attained.
International law expressly exempts from destruction
purely commercial communities, such as Valparaiso, and
the undersigned would beg his excellenc}' to consider most
earnestly the immense loss to neutral residents, and the
impossibility of removing within the brief term alloted to
them their household goods, chatties, and merchandise.
If, however, his excellency persists in his intention
* * * it only remains for the undersigned to reiterate
in the clearest manner, in the name of his Government,
his most solemn protest against the act as unusual and
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30 NOTES ON COAST WARFARE.
unneees-sarv. and in contravention of the laws and customs
of civilized nations; reselling to hi.s Government the right
to take .such action a.s it may deem proper in the prem-
ises/'^
The British minister, Mr. Thomson, in a similar protest,
drew attention to the large neutral interests at stake
and the impossibility of Avithdi^awing them in four days,
and to the futility- of the proposed measure from a military
point of view; and, reserving ail the rights of his Govern-
ment in the premises, he declared: "In attacking an open
and undefended town an act will l>e committed against
the laws and usages of war, against the rules established
by international law, and against the lawr. of humanity. "-
The diplomatic representatives of France, Itah\ and
Prussia also protested.'
On the morning of March 2J) General Kilpatrick advised
Mr. Covarrubias that Admiral Nunez was disposed to saj'
to the intendente of Valpai^aiso that, inasmuch as it was a
purely commercial and unfoititied port, the magnanimitv
of Spain would not permit its destruction if Chile, in reply,
would state that she yielded to magnanimity what she
refused to 3neld to force. Mr. Cov^arrubias answered by
proposing that, as Adm. Nunez had given as a reason for
the bombardment that he could not meet the vessels of
the allies, their squadron should be placed 10 miles from
Valparaiso, there to engage an equal force from the Span-
ish fleet {th^ Xtuitfivrlfi being excluded), Commodore Rodg-
ers to match the ships and act as umpire. Admiral Nuiiez
declined this proposal, saying that as a military man he
knew the superiority of his forces and should of course
avail himself of it*
On the morning of March 31 the bombardment took
place, lasting three hours. The shots were chiefly directed
at the public buildings — the bonded warehouses, the inten-
dencia, and the railway station. Four of the warehouses
were destroyed, containing neutral property valued at
$10,000,000. White flags were at the Admiml's request
^Dip. Cor., 1866, II, 402.
2 Br. & For. State Papers, LVI, 966.
•'^Dip. Cor., 1866, II, 386-393.
*Dip. Cor., 1866, II, 391, 392, 404-4a5.
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BOMBARDMENT OF VALPARAISO. 31.
placed on the hospitals and churches, but some of these
were struck. A part of the streets Planhada and Cocharne,
extending from the intendencia toward the customs stores,
was destroyed by fire, and some twenty-five private
dwellings were consumed. The total loss was estimated
at $15,000,000, less than 6 per cent of which fell on
Chileans. Two or three persons were killed and as many
wounded.^
Mr. Seward, in acknowledging General Kilpatrick's
dispatches, said: "The conclusion at which you ar-
rived . . . that it was not j'^our duty to advise and instruct
Commodore Rodgers to resist the bombardment by force
is accepted and approved."^ Subsequently Mr. Seward,
in a letter to the Attorney-General, expressed the opinion
that citizens of the United States domiciled in Valparaiso
would have lo claim for indemnity either against Spain or
against Chile,* and the Attorney-General gave to this view
his sanction.*
Mr. Welles, Secretary of the Navy, in his annual report
of Dec. 3, 1866, stated that Commodore Rodgers "was not
required to interpose his force against or for either party;"
that it was "his duty, even while endeavoring to mitigate
the harsh severities of war, to maintain a strict neutrality;"
and that, "the officers of other neutral powers having de-
clined to unite in any decided steps to protect the city, no
alternative remained for him to pursue consistentl}'^ with
the position of this Government towards the parties than
that which he adopted."^
Lord Clarendon, on hearing of the bombardment, de-
scribed it in a communication designed for the Spanish
Government as "a wanton destruction unparalleled in
modern times and unjustifiable on any grounds of a vast
amount of neutral property stored up in the magazines of
a defenceless town, without any material damage to the
1 Dip. Cor., 1866, II, 386-393; Br. & For. State Papers, LVI, 971. For
a circular of Mr. Covarrubias of April 1, 1866, on the bombardment,
see Dip. Cor., 1866, II, 421.
2 Dip. Cor., 1866, 11411-412.
=» Aug. 24, 1866, 74 MS. Dom. Let., 64.
*12 0p., 21.
^Messages and Documents, 1 866-' 67, Abridgement, 703.
6482—01 3
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32 NOTES ON COAST WARFARE.
enemies of Spain, but with most disastrous consequences
for those whom Spain professes to regard as friends." It
appears, however, that Admiral Denman had been in-
structed "not to transgress the limits permissible to the
representative of a neutral power, or to associate himself
with any proceedings of the United States commodore
which might be inconsistent with the neutral character."^
The opinion of publicists is expressed by Hall, who de-
clares that "the act gave rise to universal indignation at
the time, and has never been defended."*
The bombardment practically ended hostilities in Chile;
but, to the great inconvenience of neutral powers and par-
ticularly of the United States, it eflfectualh^ blocked the
way to the conclusion of a peace. ^ At length, after re-
peated efforts at mediation, a conference between repre-
sentatives of Spain and the allies was opened at Washing-
ington Oct. 29, 1870, under the presidency of Mr. Fish,
April 11, 1871, an armistice was concluded whereby the
de facto suspension of hostilities was converted into an in-
definite truce, which was not to be broken by any of the
belligerents except on three years' notice, given through
the Government of the United States; and so long as the
truce lasted all restrictions on neutral commerce were to
cease. The last session of the conference took place Jan-
uary 24, 1872. Mr. Fish renewed his entreaties for a per-
manent peace. The Spanish minister declared this to be the
desire of his Government. The Chilean minister, with the
support of the ministers of Peru and Ecuador, replied that
peace would be made if Spain would '' remove the obstacle"
by making reparation for the bombardment of Valparaiso.
The Spanish minister declined to enter into a discussion
which could produce '"no beneficial result." At this an-
nouncement Mr. Fish expressed his disappointment, de-
claring that the United States had hoped that, in view of
the great changes which had taken place in the executive
Government of Spain, " the present sovereign * * *
^ Br. and For. State Papers, LVI, 942, 953-954, 987.
^ Int. Law, 4th ed., 556. See Calvo, Droit Int., 5th ed., VI, § 428.
^ Military necessity ''does not permit * * * the doing of any
hostile act that would make the return of peace unnecessarily difficult."
(Stockton, Naval War Code, art. 3.)
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BRITISH-FRENCH DISCUSSIONS. 33
might not be held morally accountable for the severe act of
his predecessor in the assault on Valparaiso, but might
satisfy the natural sensitiveness of Chile by expressing
regret that the Government of Isabel II had omitted to
offer Chile satisfactory explanations on that subject."
Nearly twenty years elapsed before treaties were made
by Spain with Peru and Bolivia, the first of the allies with
which she was able to conclude a formal peace. ^
British- Freiwh discussions. — A discussion of the subject
of coast warfare was started in 1882 by Admiral Aube, of
the French navy, who, iif an article against the proposed
discontinuance of Rochefort as a military port, argued
that as ''wealth is the sinews of war, all that strikes at the
wealth of the enemy, a fortiori all that strikes at the
sources of his wealth, becomes not only legitimate but
imposes itself as obligatory. It must therefore be expected
to see the fleets, mistresses of the sea, turn their power of
attack and destruction, instead of letting the enemy escape
from their blows, against all the cities of the coast, forti-
fied or not, peaceful or warlike, to burn them, to ruin
them, and at least ransom them without mercy. This was
the former practice; it ceased; it will prevail again." ^
Similar views were expressed by other French writers.'
Contrary opinions were maintained by Admiral Bourgois,
who deprecated any suggestion of repudiating "the prin-
ciples of the law of nations which protect inoffensive citi-
zens, noncombatants, and open and undefended towns
against the horrors of war."*
The effect of these discussions was reflected in the British
naval manoeuvres of July and August, 1888, in which the
enemy's fleet shelled "fine marine residences and watering
places" and levied ransoms on undefended towns. ^ These
1 Moore, Int. Arbitrations, V, 5048-5056.
2 Revue des Deux Mondes, L, 314, March 15, 1882.
•'^M. Etienne Lamy, Revue des Deux Mondes, LIII, 320, Sept. 15,
1882; M. Gabriel Charmes, "LaReforme Maritime," Revue des Deux
Mondes, LXVI, LXVIII, Dec. 15, 1884, March 1, 1885, April 15, 1885.
* '*Les Torpilles et Le Droit des Gens," La Nouvelle Revue, April
1, 1886; **La Defense des Cotes et Les Torpilles," Dec. 1, 1887, and
Feb. 1, 1888. In the same publication, June 1, 1886, there is a reply
to Admiral Bourgois' first article by "Un ancien officier de marine."
»The Times, Aug. 7, 18SS.
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34 NOTES ON COAST WARFARE.
proceedings were objected to by Mr. Holland, on the
ground that they might be cited as giving an implied sanc-
tion to such a mode of hostilities.^ The}" were also con-
demned by Hall, who declared that "the plea * * *
that every means is legitimate which drives an enemy to
submission * * * would cover every barbarity that
disgraced the wars of the seventeenth century;" that the
proposal to revive in maritime hostilities a practice which
had been ''abandoned as brutal in hostilities on land" was
"nothing short of astounding;" but that, before such things
were done, "states are likely to reflect that reprisals may
be made, and that reprisals need not be confined to acts
identical with those which have called them forth."*
Chilean Revolution^ 189 L — January 16, 1891, during the
contest between the government of Balmacedo and the
Congressionalists, two forts at Valparaiso fired on the
Congressionalist man-of-war Blanco Encalada^ killing and
wounding a number of persons on board. The attack
"was not returned for reasons of humanit}^ towards the
people and the town." '
February 16, 1891, a report having reached Iquique that
the government troops had been defeated on the pampas
near that place, the intendente surrendered the town to the
Congressionalists, who occupied it with their naval forces.
Early in the morning of February 19, government troops
about 250 strong surprised the city, and the marines retired
into the custom house, where they were supported by the
squadron. Firing continued all day, and two fires broke
out. Late in the afternoon a British naval officer, at the
request of the revolutionary leaders on the Blanco Enca-
lada^ went ashore under a flag of truce, and arranged a
suspension of arms to enable foreigners and non-combat-
ants to leave the town. But for this, said the British
admiral, Hotham, "Iquique would have disappeared, and
with 250 drunken Chilean soldiers, no discipline nor police,
and supplemented by roughs, the sufferings, and worse,
^ Studies in Int. Law, 96 et seq.
2 Int. Law, 4th ed., 556.
8 Blue-book, Chile, No. 1 (1892), 24. This abstention on the part of
the Congressionalists is said to have been due to the influence of Cap-
tain St. Clair, of H. M. S. Champion. (Id. 83.)
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CHILEAN ^EVOLUTION, 3891. 35
of non-combatants, especially women and children, may
be imagined."^
March 26, 1891, Mr. Tracy, Secretary of Navy, ad-
dressed to Rear- Admiral Brown instructions in relation
to the protection of American interests in Chile during
the revolution then going on. With reference to the fleet
of the Congressionalist party, whose belligerency had not
been recognized by the United States, Mr. Tracy said:
''Should the bombardment of any place, by which the
lives or property of Americans may be endangered, be
attempted or threatened by such ships, you will, if and
when your force is sufficient for the purpose, require
them to refrain from bombarding the place until sufficient
time has been allowed for placing American life and
property in safety. You will enforce this demand if it is
refused, and if it is granted, proceed to give effect to the
the measures necessary for the security of such life or
property." ^
July 27, 1891, Mr. Kennedy, British minister at Santi-
ago, inclosed to Lord Salisbury a correspondence relating
to the then recent bombardment of the town of Pisagua
without provocation or notice of any kind by the Chilean
Government ships Ahnirante Condel and Imperial^ on
June 8, 1891. Among the inclosures there was a protest
of the consular body at Pisagua, which stated that the
vessels came close into the port about 2 o'clock in the
afternoon, and without notice of any kind began to fire
their guns into the town, causing much damage. On July
7th Mr. Kennedy addressed a protest to the Chilean Gov-
ernment characterizing the proceeding as being ''opposed
to the recognized principles of international law or of
civil warfare." He also reserved all rights of British
subjects as to property destroyed.
August 25, 1891, Mr. Kennedy's protest was approved
by Lord Salisbury.^
Rules of the hutitute of International Law^ 1896. — The
question of the bombardment of open towns by naval forces
1 Blue-book, Chile, No. 1 (1892), 82-83.
2 H. Ex. Doc. 91, 52 Cong. 1 sess., 245.
^Blue Book, Chile No. 1 (1892), 198, 218. See Calvo, Droit Int.,
5th ed., VI, § 428etseq.
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36 NOTES ON COAST VaRFARE.
was considered by the Institute of International Law at
Cambridge in 1895, and at Venice in 1896. At the latter
session rules were adopted which were designed to supple-
nient, in regard to this question, the Manual of the Laws
of War previously resolved upon at the session at Oxford.
The rules, which were adopted September 29, 1896, were
as follows:^
''Art. 1. There is no difference between the rules of the
law of war as to bombardment by militar}^ forces on land
and that by naval forces.
"Art. 2. Consequently there apply to the latter the gen-
eral principles enunciated in art. 32 of the Manual of the
Institute — i. e., it is forbidden (a) to destroy public or pri-
vate property, if such destruction is not commanded by
the imperious necessity of war; (b) to attack and bombard
localities which are not defended.
"Art. 3. The rules enunciated in arts. 33 and 34^ of the
Manual are equally applicable to naval bombardments.
"Art. 4. In virtue of the foregoing principles, the
bombardment by a naval force of an open town — i. e., one
not defended by fortifications or other means of attack or
of resistance for immediate defense, or by detached forts
situated in proximity to it, for example, at the maximum
distance of from 4 to 10 kil., is inadmissible, except in the
following cases:
"(1) In order to obtain by means of requisitions or of
contributions what is necessary for the fleet.
" Nevertheless, such requisitions and contributions must
remain within the bounds prescribed by arts. 56 and 58^
of the Manual of the Institute.
lAnnuaire, XV, 213.
2 33. In case of bombardment all needful measures shall be taken to
spare, if it be possible to do so, buildings devoted to religion and
charity, to the arts and sciences, hospitals, and depots of sick and
wounded. This on condition, however, that such places be not made
use of, directly or indirectly, for purposes of defence.
34. It is the duty of the besieged to designate such buildings by
suitable marks or signs, indicated, in advance, to the besieger.
*56. Impositions in kind (requisitions), levied upon communes, or
the residents of invaded districts, should bear direct relation to the
generally recognized necessities of war, and should be in proportion
to the resources of the district. Requisitions can only be made, or
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INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. 37
"(2) In order to destroy dockyards, military establish-
ments, depots of munitions of war, or vessels of war found
in a port.
''Moreover, an open town which is defended against the
entrance of troops or of disembarked marines may be
bombarded in order to protect the landing of soldiers and
of marines if the open town attempts to prevent it, and as
an auxiliar}'^ measure of war in order to facilitate an
assault made by the troops and disembarked marines, if
the town defends itself.
' ' There are specially forbidden bombardments whose sole
object is to exact a ransom {Brcmdschatz)^ and, with
greater reason, those destined only to induce the sub-
mission of the countr}^ b}^ the destruction, without other
motive, of peaceable inhabitants or their property.
''Art. 5. An open town may not be exposed to bom-
bardment by the sole fact:
''(1) That it is the capital of a State or the seat of Gov-
ment (but, naturally, these circumstances give it no guar-
antee against bombardment).
'' (2) That it is actually occupied by troops, or that it is
ordinarily garrisoned by troops of various arms, destined
to rejoin the army in time of war."
levied, with the authority of the commanding officer of the occupied
district.
58. The invader can not levy extraordinary contributions of money,
save as an equivalent for fines, or imports not paid, or for payments
not made in kind. Contributions in money can only be imposed by
the order, and upon the responsibility, of the general in chief, or that
of the superior civil authority established in the occupied territory;
aifd then, as nearly as possible, in accordance with the rule of appor-
tionment and assessment of existing imposts.
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SITIIATION^ II.
Sulphur, which is obtained chiefly from Sicily, is used
in the manufacture of powder; it is also used, very largely,
in the manufacture of paper from wood pulp and in other
mechanical arts. On the understanding that it may,
because of the former use, be treated as contraband, the
Sicilian merchants, in the case of war between the United
States and another power, cease to send it to the United
States ports, but ship it by Italian vessels to merchants in
Quebec, from whom the American manufacturers of pow-
der as well as of othei articles, obtain their supplies, by
railway.
Should the vessel in question be seized ?
SOLUTION.
''The tendency of all recent authorities * * * goes
to show that contraband or not contraband of war is a
question of evidence to be determined in each case by ref-
erence, not to one particular rule of law, but many; not
to any one fact, however strong that may be, but to all
the circumstances connected with the goods in question.
It is not only, or not so much, whether the goods are
* * * capable of being applied to military or naval use,
but whether, from all the circumstances connected with
them, those very goods are or are not destined for such
use."^
We must, therefore, consider (1) the nature of the goods;
(2) their origin and ownership; (3) their destination.
1. Nature of the goods, — According to the usual classifi-
cation, derived from Grotius, articles of merchandise are
divided with reference to the question of contraband as
follows:
1. Those manufactured and primarily and ordinarily
used for military purposes in time of war.
2. Those th it may be and are used for purposes of war
or of peace, according to circumstances.
^ Moseley on Contraband of War, 9.
38
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CONTRABAND. 39
3. Those exclusivel}^ used for peaceful purposes.
" Merchandise of the first class, destined to a belligerent
country or places occupied by the array or navy of a bel-
ligerent, is always contraband; merchandise of the second
class is contraband only when actually destined to the
military or naval use of a belligerent, while merchandise
of the third class is not contraband at all, though liable to
seizure and condemnation for violation of blockade or
seige."^
With respect to sulphur and saltpetre, " there is much
difficulty in deciding whether thej^ come within the defini-
tion of ammunition, so as to render them liable, in the
first degree, as to all the consequences of such. * * *
As things clearly of a doubtful or double use, however
much they may be required for and specially adapted for
war, it is, no doubt, better to consider them as of the sec-
ond class of contraband where no treaty exists, and to
render them liable to confiscation, to require some other
proof, which for such goods need not be very strong, of a
warlike destination."^
In this relation is to be observed that the importance of
sulphur, as an element entering into explosives, has lately
declined, while its use in the arts has become more extensive.
In the Instructions to Blockading Vessels and Cruisers,
issued by the Navy Department during the war with Spain,
certain articles are classed as ''absolutely contraband" and
certain others as "conditionally contraband." Among
the former is included saltpetre, but sulphur is omitted
from both lists, and apparently intentionally so. Nor is
it included' among contraband articles, either absolute or
conditional, in the present Naval War Code.
In the royal decree of Spain, of April 23, 1898, sulphur
was included in the list of contraband; but it appears that
the Spanish Government, upon the request of the Italian
Government, afterwards announced its suspension from
that category.
2. Origin and ownership, — Special consideration has
been shown in times past to thu natural produce of a neu-
tral country, shipped by and belonging to its nationals.
^ Chase, C. J., in the case of The Peterhoff, 5 Wallace, 28, 58.
2 Moseley, 47, 48.
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40 SITUATION II SOLUTION.
This consideration is founded on the principle 'Hhat the
people of such a country are not needlessly to be deprived
of a fair and usual market for their produce;" and ''so
strong is the rule that, even though it [the produce] be of
the nature of contraband in the first degree, In some few
specified instances it will be protected." And still more
strongly will favorable consideration be justified in respect
of articles of a 'Mess degree of contraband."^
3. D est mat Ian, — In various cases that arose during the
civil war, it was held by the courts of the United States
that goods, although they might bi? proceeding to a neutral
port, were liable to seizure and confiscation as contraband,
or for breach of blockade, as the case might be, if they
were, at the time of capture, in reality intended, not to be
delivered and sold in the neutral market, but to be con-
tinuously carried on from their colorcMe destination, by
the same or another vessel, or by means of inland transit,
to the enemy. These decisions were acquiesced in by the
British Government as being in harmony with the prece-
dents in its prize courts. On the other hand, the
American courts repeatedly declared that the goods, if
honajide intended for sale in the neutral market, were not
subject to capture.'^
Of the belligerent destination, where a ''continuous
voyage" is alleged, there should be some definite evidence.
It has been said that the evidence must be ""full and clear; "
but, in determining what evidence may satisfy this require-
ment, it may be proper to bear in mind the doctrine laid
down by the same writer, that ""in the administration of
all law, international as well as municipal, realities and not
shams are to be regarded."* But, "there seems to be but
little question that the evidence as to the destination of
the cargo should be definite. A mere presumJ)tion should
not be suflicient."*
ConduHnm, — Since sulphur may be considered as only
conditionally contraband, and since it is, in the case stated,
the natural produce of the country from which it is shipped,
and is consigned to merchants in a neutral port, the pre-
^Moseley, 11-15.
'-^See the Introduction to Lushington's Manual of Naval Prize Law.
^Creasy, First Platform of International Law, 024, 625.
*Snow, Int. La:v, 157.
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CONTRABAND. 41
sumption is in favor of the innocent character of the cargo.
But if there is reasonable ground to believe that it is not
to be sold in the neutral market, but that it has been pur-
chased on American account and is to be reshipped to the
United States and there used for warlike purposes, the
vessel should be seized. The evidence on these points,
whether such evidence be found in statements or in defects
in the papers, or in the testimony of persons on board,
should be substantial, though not necessarily conclusive,
to justif}^ the capture.
Due regard must of course be paid to any existing treaty
stipulations.
NOTES ON SITUATION II.
I. Sj)ain''8 action as to sulphur, — April 29, 1898, the
Italian ambassador at Madrid was orally advised that
instructions had been issued to Spanish naval officers
temporarily to suspend, in regard to sulphur, the applica-
tion of the royal decree of April 23, concerning contra-
band of war. This resolution was confirmed by a note of
May 31, 1898, the Spanish Government reserving the
right to restore sulphur to the contraband list, should its
interests require it, but promising not to do so without
sufficient notice, so that pending contracts might be per-
formed. The Italian ambassador replied June 3, 1898,
accepting the notification of Spain's resolution, but ex-
pressly reserving the question of principle. It was under-
stood to be the opinion of the Italian Government that
sulphur could not properly be considered as contraband of
war, since it was used in many innocent arts and had ceased
to be an ingredient of the higher class of gunpowders.^
June 8, 1898, there appeared in the official Imperial
Gazette, at Berlin, an announcement that the Spanish
ambassador had informed the German Government that
sulphur, which had been included in the royal decree of
April 23 as contraband of war, was no longei to be so
considered.^
■ Mr. Draper, United States ambassador at Rome, to Mr. Day, Sec-
. 3tary of State, June 9, 1898; Mr. Iddin^ United States charg^ d'af-
fairs ad int. at Rome, to Mr. Day, July 16, 1898. (MSS. Department of
State. )
''Mr. White, United States ambassador, to Mr. Day, June 11, 1898.
(MSS. Department of State. )
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42 "continuous voyages" — notes.
II. Decisions of the United States courts^ during the
civil war^ as to the question of '^ continv/nts voyages^ —
Early in the war the Confederate Government, whose
ports were blockaded by the United States, sent abroad
agents for the purpose, among others, of obtaining arms
and munitions of war and other needful supplies, as well
as vessels to transport them, the means of payment to be
derived chiefly from the proceeds of the Southern cotton
crop. To carry out this plan a firm under the name of
Frazer,Trenholm& Co., composed of merchants of Charles-
ton, South Carolina, and constituting a branch of a house
in that city, was established in Liverpool. Consignments
of cotton were made to this firm, to be drawn against for
purchases for the Confederacy.^ In this way a vast sys-
tem of blockade running was soon built up, under cover
of the neutral flag, but under actual Confederate super-
vision and control. Commander Bulloch, C. S. N., writing
at Liverpool, May 3, 1862, to Mr. Mason, Confederate
commissioner in London, stated that he had read to Messrs.
Frazer, Trenholm & Co. a part of one of Mr. Mason's let-
ters, and added: ''These gentlemen say that their ships
are necessarily sailed under the British flag, and the pres-
ence on board of any persons known to have been in the
Confederate service would compromise their character,
and in this view of the case they feel reluctantly compelled
to decline giving a passage to any of the Sumter^ s men."*
As the system of blockade running grew in notoriety
it became more difficult of execution, and Confederate
agents were established in the various West India islands
to facilitate its operations; and, instead of direct voyages
to blockaded ports, goods were shipped in British bottoms
to neutral ports and there transshipped into steamers of
light draft and great speed, which could carry coal enough
for the short passage to Charleston, Savannah, or Wil-
mington. Of the neutral ports thus used, Nassau, in the
island of New Providence, acquired the greatest celebrity.^
July 5, 1862, Mr. A. H. Layard, by direction of Earl
Kussell, addressed a letter to certain British merchants
^ Moore, Int. Arbitrations, I, 580.
^ Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies, Ser. I, vol. 1,
p. 770.
^Int. Arbitrations, I. 581.
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CIVIL WAE CASES. 43
and shipowners of Liverpool in reply to a memorial in
which they invoked the protection of the British Govern-
ment against "the hostile attitude assumed by Federal
cruisers in the Bahama waters," so as to put a check on
the seizures frequently made therein. Earl Russell, in his
reply, stated that complaint had, on the other hand, been
made on the part of the United States that ships had been
sent out from Great Britain to America ''with a fixed
purpose to run the blockade; that high premiums of insu-
rance have been paid with this view, and that arms and
ammunition have been thus conveyed to the Southern
States to enable them to carry on the war.* Lord Rus-
sell," so the letter continues, "was unable either to deny
the truth of those allegations or to prosecute to convic-
tion the parties engaged in those transactions. But he
can not be suprised that the cruisers of the United States
should watch with vigilance a port which is said to be the
great entrepot of this commerce.
"Her Majesty's Government have no reason to doubt
the equity and adherence to legal requirements of the
United States prize courts. But he is aware that many
vessels are subject to harsh treatment, and that, if cap-
tured, the loss to the merchant is far from being compen-
sated even by a favorable decision in a prize court.
"The true remedy would be that' the merchants and
shipowners of Liverpool should refrain from this species
of trade. It exposes innocent commerce to vexatious
detention and search by American cruisers; it produces
irritation and ill will on the part of the population of the
Northern States of America; it is contrary to the spirit of
Her Majesty's proclamation, and it exposes the British
name to suspicions of bad faith, to which neither Her
Majesty's Government nor the great body of the nation
are justly obnoxious.
"It is true, indeed, that supplies of arms and ammuni-
tion have been sept to the Federals equally in contraven-
tion of that neutrality which Her Majesty has proclaimed.
It is true, also, that the Federals obtain more freely and
more easily that of which they stand in need. But if the
Confederates had the command of the sea they would no
doubt watch as vigilantly and capture as readily British
vessels going to New York as the Federals now watch
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44 "continuous voyages" — notes.
Charleston and capture vessels seeking to l)reak the
blockade.
''There can be no doubt that the watchfulness exercised
by Federal cruisers to prevent supplies reaching the Con-
federates by sea will occasionalh^ lead to vexatious visits
of merchant ships not engaged in any pursuit to which
the Federals can properly object. This, however, is an
evil to which war on the ocean is liable to expose neutral
commerce, and Her Majesty's Government have done all
they can fairly do — that is to say, they have urged the
Federal Government to enjoin upon their naval officers
greater caution in the exercise of their belligerent rights.
''Her Majesty's Government having represented to the
United States Government every case in which they were
justified in interfering, have only further to observe that
it is the duty of Her Majestv's subjects to conform to Her
Majesty's proclamation, and to abstain from furnishing
to either of the belligerent parties any of the means of
war which are prohibited to be furnished by that
proclamation."^
Early in August, 1862, Mr. Stuart, British charg^. d'
affaires ad intet'iin^ represented to Mr. Seward, on the
strength of information received from British naval offi-
cers, that a British steamer had been chased and fired on
by a United States cruiser without display of her colors,
and had then been captured without any search, and that
the senior United States naval officer present had declared
that the American cruisers had orders to seize any British
vessels whose names had been forwarded to them from the
Government at Washington. Mr. Stuart protested against
these instructions as being ''entirely at variance with the
recognized principles of international law." On the 9th
of August Mr. Seward communicated to Mr. Stuart a copy
of a letter which he had addressed on the preceding day
to Mr. Welles, Secretar}^ of the Navy, conveying the direc-
tion of the President that certain instructions, which were
set forth in the letter, should be issued* to naval officers.^
Instructions were issued by Mr. Welles August 18, 1862.
They embodied the substance of Mr. Seward's draft with
certain amendments. Thev contained the following clauses:
' Dip. Cor., 1862, 171.
^Blue Book, North America, No. 5 (1863).
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NAVAL INSTRUCTIONS. 45
*' First. That >^ou will exercise constant vigilance to
prevent supplies of anns, munitions, and contraband of
war from being conveyed to the insurgents, but that under
no circumstances will you seize any vessel within the waters
of a friendly nation.
'' Secondly. That, while diligently exercising the right
of visitation on all suspected vessels, you are in no case
authorized to chase and fire at a foreign vessel without
showing your colors and giving her the customary pre-
liminary notice of a desire to speak and visit her.
"Thirdly. That when that visit is made the vessel is not
then to be seized without a search carefully made, so far
as to render it reasonable to believe that she is engaged in
carrying contraband of war for or to the insurgents, and
to their ports directlv or indirectly bv transshipment, or
otherwise violating the blockade; and that if, after visita-
tion and search, it shall appear to your satisfaction that
she is in good faith and without contraband, actually
bound and passing from one friendly or so-called neutral
port to another, and not bound or proceeding to or from a
port in the possession of the insurgents, then she can not
be lawfully seized. * * *
''You are specially informed that the fact that a suspi-
cious vessel has been indicated to you as cruising in any
limit which has been prescribed by this Department does
not in any wa}' authorize you to depart from the practice
of rules of visitation, search, and capture prescribed by
the law of nations.'' ^
Diligent watch was kept by the United States consuls in
English ports for vessels believed to be engaged in contra-
band and blockade-running ventures. December 30, 1862,
Mr. Adams, United States minister at London, communi-
cated to Earl Russell two lists, respectively furnished by
the consuls at Liverpool and London, of vessels which, as
Mr. Adams said, were believed to have 'Mef t with supplies,
principally contraband of war, with the intention of either
running the blockade directly or of going to a neighboring
Atlantic or Gulf port and there discharging their cargoes
into another class of vessels, the more easily to get such
cargoes to their places of destination." In these lists,
which contained the names of 82 vessels, were the steam-
ers Bermuda^ Circassians Gertrude^ Lahuan^ Pearly and
^ Official Records of the Union and Confederate Na\'ies, Ser. I, vol.
1, p. 417.
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46 "continuous voyages'' — notes.
Peterhoff^ and the sailing- vessels Springhok and Stephen
Hart'
Case of the Dolphin, — ^The first judicial application dur-
ing the civil war of the doctrine of continuous voyages
was made by Judge Marvin, of the district court of the
United States for the southern district of Florida, in the
case of the Dolphin^ a steamer of 129 tons net, of apparent
British ownership. She was captured March 25, 1863, at
5.15 o'clock a. m., by Lieut. Commander Fleming, of the
U. S. S. Wachusett^ between the islands of Culebra and
Porto Rico, while ostensibly on a voyage from Liverpool
to Nassau.^ The Dolphin left St. Thomas just after mid-
night on March 25. The Wachusett followed her but lost
her in the night; descried her again at daylight, and cap-
tured her after an hour and a half's chase and the firing of
a number of shots. In his first brief report, March 25,
Commander Fleming said: ''Suspicion being strong against
her I seized her. " In a further report, of March 28, he said
that the report of the boarding oflScer, " together with an
examination I had of her papers, and the strong suspicion .
attached to her of intending to run the blockade, induced
me to capture her and to send her to Key West.*
When sent before the prize court, the vessel and cargo
were claimed by one Grazebrook, of Liverpool, to whose
order the bills of lading consigned the cargo, while the
freight bill consigned it to Messrs. Chambers & Raw, of
Nassau. It corresponded to the freight list found on
board, except as to certain cases containing- in all 920
rifles and 2,2^1:0 cavalry swords, which were described as
"hardware."
Judge Marvin said that if the vessel and cargo were
owned as claimed and ''there was no intention on the part
of the owner that the vessel should proceed with the cargo
to a port of the enemy" there would be no justification
for the capture or condemnation of either; but that "if,
on the other hand, it was the intention of the owner that
the vessel should simply touch at Nassau and should pro-
ceed thence to Charleston or some other port of the enemy,
then the voyage was not a voyage prosecuted by a neutral
1 Blue Book, North America, No. 3 (1863), 29, 34, 35.
2 The Dolphin (May, 1863), 7 Fed. Cases, 868.
^ Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies, Ser. I, vol. 2,
pp. 135, 136. The DoZp/im was "on the list," and had been under
observation for several days. (Id., 131. )
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THE DOLPHIN. 47
from one neutral port to another, hut was a voyage to a
port of the enemy. l>e^n and carried on in violation of
the belligerent rights of the United States to blockade the
enenn's ports and pi-event the introduction of munitions
of war. . . . The cutting up of a continuous voyage into
several paints b3' the intervention or proposed intervention
of sevei-al intenuediate ports may render it the more dif-
ficult for cruisers and prize courts to determine where the
ultimate terminus is intended to \k\ but it can not make a
vo\'age which in its nature is one to )iecome two or more
voyages, nor make any of the parts of one entire voyage
to become legal which would l>e illegal if not so divided.'*
The master and some of the crew swore that Nassau was
the teiTuinus of the voyage. Three letters, however, were
found on board, all signed by Grazebrook. One of them,
addressed to Chambers & Raw, suggested that if the mar-
ket at Nassau was •' overdone from New York and the
States.'" or if the "French charter" for "army stores,
rum. etc.," had fallen through, a "fine trade" might be
done "between Nassau and Boston and New York,'' and a
"return cargo" of coal might Ik* brought from Prince
Edward Island for blockade runners: or perhaps the
steamer might he sold, but not for any of "your Fedeml
or Confederate paper." but only for "hard cash." An-
other letter, addressed to the master, was of similar pur-
ix)rt. The third, which evidently was not intended to \)e
shown to visiting cruisers, and the contents of which were
unknown to the master, was addivssed to Chambers &
Raw. It canceled the prior instructions, which were said
to have been given "for a certain reason:" declared that
the vessel "of course" was "not to lie sold to anyone:"
stated that "a jxiwer of attorney, for certain pui-poses,"
would be sent to the firm by the next mail, and expressed
the hope that they would " V>e able to get some more goods
on, instead of taking any off. and at good rates."
Commenting ujxin the evidence. Judge Marvin ob-
served —
1. That Nassau furnished no market for such a cargo as
that of the Bolphru, "It is." he said, "a small town.
The adjacent islands possess but a small population, de-
pendent on it for supplies. Probably not three merchant
steamers ever arrived at that port from any part of the
6482—01 i
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48 ' ' CONTINUOUS VOYAGES " NOTES.
world until after the present blockade was established,
except the regular Government mail steamers. Was her
cargo to be sold in Nassau, including the 920 rifles and the
2,240 swords? These are questions which it is not unrea-
sonable that a prize court should ask and expect some
reasonable explanation of in a case like this."
2. That it appeared that Mr. Grazebrook did not intend
that the vessel should be sold at Nassau or that her voyage
should end there. '" She was," said Judge Marvin, '' to go
from Nassau somewhere. More goods were to be put on,
instead of taking any off. The studied effort to conceal
the ulterior destination; the swords and rifles found on
board, and denominated 'hardware;- the almost certain
impossibility of employing a steamer of this class and size
in any trade in this part of the world by which she could
earn even her expenses, other than in the trade and busi-
ness of violating the blockade; all point with unerring
certainty to Charleston or Wilmington a^the ulterior des-
tination of the vessel and cargo."
Both were accordingh^ condenmed;^ and no appeal was
taken.
Cone of file Pearl, — May 6, 1863, Judge Marvin de-=
cided the case of the PearV^ This vessel, a small steamer
of 72.17 tons net, was captured by the U. S. S. Tioga^
January 20, 1863, about 60 or 70 miles from Nassau, while
ostensibly on a voyage from Liverpool to that port. A
claim to the vessel was made by the master on behalf of
one Wigg, a merchant of Liverpool, and to the cargo, on
behalf of H. Adderly & Co. , of Nassau.
In deciding the case, Judge Marvin observed that he had
already held, in the case of the Dolphin^ ^Hhat a vessel
bound on a voyage from Liverpool to Nassau, with an
intention of touching only at the latter port, and of pro-
ceeding thence to a blockaded port of the enemy, is
engaged in an attempt to violate the blockade, which sub-
jects her to capture in the antecedent as well as in the
^ Judge Marvin in the course of his opinion cited The Columbia,
1 C. Rob., 154; The Neptunus, 2 C. Rob., 110; The Imina, 3 C. Rob.,
167; The .Afaria, 5 C. Rob., 365; The William, 5 C. Rob., 385; The
Richmond, 5 C. Rob., 325; The Tlwmyris, Edwards's Adm., 17; The
Odin, 1 C. Rob., 252.
2 19 Fed. Casey, 54.
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THE PEARL. 49
ultimate stage of the voyage — before arriving at Nassau
as well as after having left that port. I think the law also
is that if an owner sends his vessel to a neutral port, with a
settled intention to commence from such a port a series of
voj^ages to a blockaded port, he thereby commences to
violate the blockade, and subjects his vessel to capture,
notwithstanding he may also intend to unlade the vessel at
the neutral port, discharge the crew, and give all other
external manifestations of an intention to end the voyage
at such port. Where a deliberate purpose exists to violate
a blockade, and measures are actually taken to accomplish
that object, the law couples the act and the intent together
and declares the^ offense to be complete. The resorting,
therefore, to a neutral port for the purpose of the better
disguising the intention, or of procuring a pilot for the
blockaded port, or of perfecting the arrangements so as to
increase the chances of a successful violation of the block-
aded port, will not, in the least, extenuate the offense or
avoid the penalt^^ These measures may increase the diffi-
culty of discovering the true intention, but whenever it
is discovered it will give to the transaction its true legal
character.''^
The bill of lading stated that the cargo was shipped by
Wigg to be delivered to Adderly & Co. No letter of
advice, nor any invoice, was found among the papers; and
aeven members of the crew concurred in the understand-
ing that they were engaged in a blockade-running venture.
Nevertheless, as the vessel when captured was really
going from one neutral port to another, Judge Marvin
stated that he was unwilling to pronounce a condemnation
without affording the claimants all the facilities they might
desire for rebutting the presumption that they were en-
gaged in an unlawful enterprise. He therefore ordered
that the claimant of the vessel ''be allowed to produce
further evidence, by his own oath and otherwise, touching
his interest therein, and the use he intended at the time of
capture to make of the vessel after her arrival at Nassau,
^Citing The Columbia, 1 C. Rob., 154; The Neptunus, 2 C. Rob.,
110; Yeatoii r. Fry, 5 Cranch, 835; The Bichmond, 5 C. Rob., 325;
The Maria, id., 365; The William, id., 385.
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50 ''continuous voyages" NOTES.
the trade or business he intended she should be engaged
in, and for what purpose she was going to that port; and
that the claimant of the goods have time to procure an
affidavit of his right and title thereto, and to produce
such other proof of neutral ownership as he may be
advised."
No new evidence was taken under this order; but the
court, on a further hearing, probably influenced by the
fact that the cargo consisted of 10 bales of cloth and
ready-made clothing, and contained nothing distinctively
pointing to a belligerent destination, decreed restitution
of the vessel and cargo, on payment by the claimants of
expenses and costs/
The Supreme Court reversed this decree, and condemned
both ship and cargo. In pronouncing sentence as to the
vessel, the following grounds were mentioned:
The fact that the firm of H. Adderly & Co. had become
well known in the court as largely engaged in the business
of blockade running; the testimony of the crew as to the
Confederate destination of the vessel; the failure to take
new evidence on the order for further proof; the absence
from Wigg's affidavit, produced on the motion for fur-
ther proof, of any statement as to the use intended to be
made of the vessel after her arrival at Nassau, or as to the
purpose for which she was going thither; and the defec
tive and suspicious character of other testimony for the
claimant. The court declared itself satisfied that the ves-
sel '"was destined, either immediately after touching at
that port [Nassau] or as soon as practicable after needed
repairs, for one of the ports of the blockaded coast."
As to the cargo, it was observed that the evidence
showed ownership in Wigg rather than in an}^ other person,
but that no claim was put in by him. The master put in
a claim for Adderly & Co. , but in his deposition disclaimed
all knowledge of ownership, except from the consignment;
and the neglect of the firm to put in an affidavit of title or
neutral ownership, under the order for further proof,
could not, said the court, be construed otherwise than as
1 The Pearl, 5 Wallace, 574.
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THE STEPHEN HART. 51
an admisHion that they were not entitled to restitution.
The cargo was therefore condemned with the ship.^
Ccme of the Stephe)) Hart. — The doctrine of continuous
voyages was next judicially discussed by Judge Betts, of
the United States district court for the southern district
of New York, in a series of cases of which we may take,
as the leading example, that of the Stephen Ilart^ con-
demned Juty 30, 1863.^ On the same day Judge Betts
rendered similar sentences in the cases of the Sjyringhoh
and the Peterhojf\ which will be noticed hereafter, the
case of the Gertrude^ which will also be mentioned in
association with them, having been disposed of by a sen-
tence of condemnation previoush' in the same month. ^
The Stephen Hart was captured «lanuary 29, 1862, by
the l^. S. S. Supply^ off the southern coast of Florida,
about 25 miles from Kej^ West and 82 miles from Point
de Yeacos, in Cuba. The vessel was claimed by one Harris,
a British subject, and the cargo by the firm of Isaac. Camp-
>)ell & Co., of London. The cargo consisted of arms,
ammunition, and military clothing. The vessel was bound
ostensibly to Cardenas, in Cuba. There were found on
board, at the time of her capture, her register and sundry
bills, certificates, telegrams, and letters, a clearance, two log
books, a cop5^ of the Ignited States Coast Survev for 185(),
and various other papers, but no invoices, no bills of lading,
' The Pearl (1866), 5 Wall., 574.
'^ Blatchford'a Prize Cases, 387.
=* The Gertrude, an English iron screw steamer, 450 tons, was captured
<jff the island of Eleuthera, April 16, 1863, by the U. S. S. Vanderbilt,
Bald^^in, commanding. In his report to Admiral Wilkes, Commander
Baldwin said: ''The (lertrude has on board an assorted cargo, includ-
ing 250 barrels of powder, which stamps her as a contraband trader.
* * * No log book can be found as yet." She was ''caught after
a hard chase of 28 miles, during which time a part of her cargo was
thrown overboard. She was endeavoring to reach I larbor Island, ' ' and
showed no colors till three shots had been tired, the last one at her,
when she hoisted English colors. She ' ' left Nassau on or about the 8th
of Ai)ril," and had since l)een off the southern coast, but having failed
to run the blockade, and having only 36 hours' coal aboard, was on
her way back to Nassau when fallen in with. A person was on board,
a citizen of Charleston, who was taken to be a pilot. (Official Records
of the Union and Confederate Navies, Ser. I, vol. 2, p. 159.) No claim
was put in for the vessel and no ai)peal taken from the sentence of
i'ondemnation.
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52 '^ CONTINUOUS VOYAGP:s" NOTES.
and no manifest. The vessel was originally built and
owned in the United States, and there was strong evidene(»
to show that she was enemy's property. The shipping
articles specilied a voyage from London to Cuba and Sierra
Leone ai.d any ports on the coast of Africa, of North or
South America, or of the West Indies, and back to the
United Kingdom. The letter of instructions from the
owners of the cargo directed the master to proceed to
Cardenas, Cuba, and on arrival there to report to •* Charles
J. Helm, esq.," who was to direct his '* future actions
with reference to the schooner and cargo." Charles J.
Helm was the agent of the Confederate States in Cuba.
The first mate testified that ''the destination of the
cargo was certainly to one of the Confederate States, and
the vessel was in like manner so destined, if Charles J.
Helm, the Confederate agent at Cuba, should so direct."
He narrated at length how he had met Mr. Yancey and
other w^ell -known agents of the Confederacy at the house
of Isaac, Campbell &Co., and how he was at first employed
to undertake a blockade-running adventure on the steamer
Gladiator^ and was afterwards transferred to the Stephen
Ilart^ nominalh' as mate but really in charge of the cargo,
l^fore the Stephen Hart sailed he was directed by one of
the Confedei^ate agents to proc*eed to Cardenas and there
work under the instructions of Charles J. Helm, and he
was informed that the cargo was to l)e transshipped into '
a steamer which could with greater facility run the block-
ade, unless, indeed, the Stephen Hart should be ordered
to proceed herself.
L^pon this and much other evidence of similar purport,
rFudge Betts declared that no doubt was left upon his \
mind that the case was '"one of a manifest attempt to
introduce contraband goods into the enemv's territory by a
breach of blockade.'' There was an absence of all papers ^
and circumstances to warrant the conclusion *' that there
was an}' intent to dispose of the cargo at Cardenas in the
usual way of lawful commerce." The consignee of the
entire cargo was the agent of the enemy, and it was laden
on board by the enemy's agent in London.
The broad issue upon the merits of the cause was. sjiid
Judge Betts. "whether the adventure of the Stcj/hm Hart
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THE STEPHEN HART. 53
was the honest vo^^age of a neutral vessel from one neu-
tral port to another neutral port, carrying neutral goods
between those two ports only, or was a simulated voyage,
the cargo being contraband of war, and being reall}^ des-
tined for the use of the enemy, and to be introduced into
the enemy's country by a breach of blockade b}- the >'^'^ -
plien Ilart^ or by transshipment from her to another ves-
sel at Cardenas." This question, declared Judge Betts,
was not to be decided by merely ascertaining whether the
vessel was documented for, and sailing upon, a voyage
from London to Cardenas. If the inquiry were thus
limited '"a very wide door would be opened for fraud and
evasion." The commerce consisted in the destination and
intended use of the propert}^ laden on board the vessel,
and the i)roper test to be applied was whether the con-
traband goods "are intended for sale or consumption in
the neutral market, or whether the direct and intended
oT)ject of their transportation is to supply the enemy with
them.'' If such was the object they were not exempt
from forfeiture merely on the ground that they were neu-
tral property, and that the port of delivery was also
neutral. In this relation. Judge Betts said:
"'If the guilty intention, that the contraband goods
should reach a port of the enemy, existed when such
goods left their English port, that guilt}^ intention can
not ])e obliterated by the innocent intention of stopping
at a neutral port on the way. If there be, in stopping at
such port, no intention of transshipping the cargo, and if
it is to proceed to the enemy's country in the same vessel
in which it came from England, of course there can be no
purpose of lawful neutral commerce at the neutral port
by the sale or use of the cargo in the market there; and
the sole purpose of stopping at the neutral port must
merely be to have upon the papers of the vessel an osten-
sible neutral terminus for the voyage. If, on the other
hand, the object of stopping at the neutral port be to trans-
ship the cargo to another vessel to be transported to a port
of the enemy, while the vessel in which it was brought
from England does not proceed to the port of the enemy,
there is equally an absence of all lawful neutral commerce
at the neutral port; and the only commerce carried on in
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54 ' ' CONTINUOUS VOYAGES " NOTES.
the case is that of the transportation of the contraband
cargo from the English port to the port of the enemy, as
was intended when it left the English port. The court
holds that, in all such cases, the transportation or voj^age
of the contraband goods is to be considered as a unit, from
the port of lading to the port of delivery in the enemy's
country; that if any part of such voyage or transporta-
tion be unlawful, it is unlawful throughout; and that the
vessel and her cargo are subject to capture, as well before
arriving at the lirst neutral port at w^hich she touches after
her departure from England, as on the voyage or trans-
portation by sea from such neutral port to the port of the
enemy.'- ^
Judge Betts was careful to distinguish betw^een such a
voyage as that in which the Sfeplie^i IFart was engaged
and a voyage having an actual neutral terminus. With
regard to the latter and to the vessel })ef ore the court he
said:
*'If she was, in fact, a neutral vessel and if her cargo,
although contraband of war, was being carried from an
English port to Cardenas for the general purpose of trade
and commerce at Cardenas, and for use or sale at Car-
denas, without any actual destination of the cargo, prior
to the time of capture, to the use and aid of the enenu',
then most certainly both the vessel and her cargo were
free from liability of capture."
The sentence of condemnation pronounced by Judge
Betts in this case was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
Chief Justice Chase, who deli veered the opinion, observed
that the principal features of the case resembled that of
the Bermuda and her cargo, but were perhaps even more
irreconcilable with neutral good faith, ''It is enough to
say," declared Chief Justice Chase, ''that neutrals who
^ In Hupport of these propositions Judge Betts cited the cases of The
Dolphiii and The Pearl, supra; Halleck on International Law, chap.
21, sect. 11, p. 504; 1 Kent's Commentaries, eighth edition, p. 85, note
a; 1 Duer on Insurance, 568; .lecker v. Montgomery, 18 Howard, 110,
115; 2Wildman's International Law, 20; TYmJongc Fieter, 4 C.Rob.,
79; The Richmond, 5 C. Rob., 356; The Wi/liam, 5 C. Rob., 385; The
Xancy, 3 C. Rob., 122; The United States, Stewart's Adm. Rep., 116;
The Iwhia, 3 C. Rob., 167; The Trnide Sodre, 6 C. Rob, 390; The
(blumhkt, 1 C. Rob., 154; The Xeptunm, 2 C. Rob., 110.
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THE BERMUDA. 55
place their vessels under })elligerent control and engage
them in belligerent trade or permit them to be sent with
contraband cargoes under cover of false destination to neu-
tral ports, while the real destination is to belligerent ports,
impress upon them the character of the belligerent in
whose service they are employed, and can not complain if
they are seized and condemned as enemy property."^
Case of the Bermuda. — The question discussed in the
foregoing cases was first dealt with by the Supreme Court
in the case of the steamship Benmida^^ which C3,me up on
an appeal from a decree of the United States district court
for the eastern district of Pennsylvania condemning the
vessel and part of her cargo, which were captured by the
U. S. S. Mercedita. April 26, 1862, near the British West
India island of Abaco. *
It was claimed b}^ the captors that the vessel was
enemy's property; that it was her intention with her
cargo, which was largely composed of munitions of war,
to break, either directly or bv transshipment, the block-
ade of the southern coast of the United States, and that
both ship and cargo were on these and other grounds
liable to capture and condemnation.
The ostensible owner of the ship was one Haigh, a Brit-
ish subject; her original master was one Tessier, a South
Carolinian. On the day after her registration, Haigh, as
appeared b}^ a document from the Liverpool customs,
executed a power of attorney' to two persons named Hencle
and Trenholm, both of Charleston, South Carolina, to sell
the ship at any place out of the Kingdom for any sum
the}^ might deem sufficient. Trenholm was a member of
the firm of Frazer, Trenholm & Co., of Liverpool, a
branch of the house of John Frazer & Co. , of Charleston,
and the fiscal agents of the Confederacy in Great Britain,
in which capacity they were largely engaged in fitting out
cruisers and blockade runners.
With the registr}^ and power of attorney above men-
tioned the Bermuda sailed for Charleston, S. C. Subse-
quentl}" she changed her course and ran the blockade of
Savannah, returning to Liverpool in the autumn of the
same year. Her master, Tessier, was then transferred to
^The Hart, 3 Wallace, 559. ''\^ Wallace, 514; 1865.
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56 "continuous voyages'' — notes.
the BaJtanuu which afterwards became known for carry-
ing the armament of the Confedei'ate cruiser Alahanm,
In his place, as master of the B(^niiiida^ was installed one
Westendorff, who was licensed by the British authorities,
on the recommendation of Frazer, Trenholm & Co., as an
experienced shipmaster, sailing out of Charleston, who
had commanded one of their ships. The name of the
firm of Frazer, Trenholm & Co., Liverpool, was indorsed
on the back of Westendorff's license as his address.
The Benn udu was now prepared at West Hartlepool for
another yoyage, ostensibly to Bermuda. The cargo con-
sisted of various things, including tea, coflfee, drugs, sur-
gical instruments, shoes, boots, leather, saddlery, lawns
with figures of a youth bearing onward the Confederate
flag, military decorations, epaulettes, stars for the shoulder
straps of officers of rank, many military articles with
designs appropriate for use in the Confederate States,
cases of cutlery stamped with the names of merchants in
Confederate cities, seyeral cases of double-barrelled guns
stamped as manufactured for a dealer in Charleston, a large
amount of munitions of war, fiye finished Blakely cannon
in cases, with carriages, six cannon without cases, a thou-
sand shells, several hundred barrels of gunpowder, 72,000
cartridges, 2,500,000 percussion caps, 21 cases of swords,
and in addition a large quantity of arni}^ blankets and other
materials. Numerous letters of friendship and business
were found on board the vessel, as well as books and news-
papers addressed to different persons in the Confederate
States, and also a few memoranda, apparently in the nature
of requests from persons in Charleston to Capt. Westen-
dorff' to buy things for them in England and bring them
through the blockade. There were also on board several
persons denominated in yarious letters as '^Government
passengers," and in one letter as ^^ printers and engrayers,''
who had been sent from Scotland hy an agent of the Con-
federate Goyernment, and who were entered on the crew
list of the Benaudd as common sailors. They had wMth
them a large numV)er of boxes containing Confederate
postage stamps, copper plates, envelopes, printing ink,
and many reams of white bank-note paper watermarked
C. S. A. There were also on board certain well-known
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THE BERMUDA. 57
gentlemen, residents of Charleston, who were also entered
on the shipping list as common sailors, under disguised
names. Of the ship's real company, the master, the first
mate, the clerk, and three seamen, were citizens of South
Carolina, and the second mate, carpenter, and cook be-
longed to other Confederate States.
There were 45 bills of lading, of which 41 were for goods
shipped by Frazer, Trenholm & Co. The whole cargo was
shipped under their direction, and according to the bills
of lading was to be delivered at the island of Bermuda
"unto order or assigns.'' No consignees were named.
Several persons connected with the ship, who were exam-
ined hi preparatorlo^ thought that she ])e longed to Frazer,
Trenholm & Co. A letter of one of the mates, found on
board, seemed to indicate the same thing, as also a letter
of the former captain, Tessier, to Westendorff.
Much stress was laid by the captors upon the corre-
spondence found on board. It appeared that on January
16, 1862, Frazer, Trenholm & Co., at Liverpool, wrote to
John Frazer & Co. , at Charleston, that they had dispatched
the ship Jilld with a cargo to N. T. Butterfield, their agent
at Hamilton, Bermuda, and that she would be followed by
the steamer Bermuda with goods. On January 23 they
wrote again, inclosing bills of lading of the cargo of the
Ella and copies of invoices. The goods, they said, were
"all shipped by our friends here; but the disposition of
them there is left entirely to you, and in any market in
which you may please to direct them. The bills of lading
are indorsed to your order, or that of your authorized
agent. * * * Captain Carter [of the Ella\ is instructed
to proceed to Bermuda, and there await your instructions/'
which were to be sent under cover to Butterlield. By a
later letter, of February 28, 1862, addressed to "Messrs.
Jno. Frazer & Co. (or their authorized agent), Hamilton,
Bermuda," Messrs. Frazer, Trenholm & Co., referring to
the invoices and bills of hiding of the Brrinu-d((, said they
were "very full in every particular, and we think will
greatly facilitate the delivery and a/.so the tranHHldpmenf^
should this be determined upon.'' On April 1, 1862, the
Charleston house, having by a previous letter informed
Butterfield that they have been advised that the Ella had
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58 '^ CONTINUOUS voyages" NOTES.
been dispatched and that she would be followed by the
Bermuda^ wrote another letter requesting him to direct
Captain Westendorff to take certain articles from the Ella
and proceed to Nassau, reporting himself on arrival there
to H. Adderly & Co., and to request Captain Carter to
* ' keep in his cargo and wait further orders from us. "
This letter was received by Butterfield on the 19th of
April and was forwarded the same day to Westendorff, at
St. George's. Westendorff immediately acted upon it and
sailed on the 23d of April toward Nassau. He had arrived
at Bermuda on the 19th of March and had remained there
about five weeks, during which the cargo was not touched.
The gentlemen from Charleston were aboard.
Among the papers taken on board there was also an
unfinished letter without signature, but apparently written
by the engineer of the Bermuda to a friend. This letter
was dated at Liverpool, February 16, 1862, and stated
that ^' our tender," a light-draft boat called the Herald^ had
left the day before with a crew shipped for twelve months
'"for some port or ports south of Mason and Dixon's
line;" that '^ three captains" were on the tender — ''one
an Englishman, nominal; another, an experienced coast
pilot from the Potomac to Charleston; another, ditto,
ditto, from Charleston to the San Juan Kiver in Texas.
If the Yankees reach her, they are smarter than I give
them credit for. She awaits our arrival in Bermuda; goes
first into Charleston, * * ^ /'
The record disclosed that the captain of the Ilefiwld^ after
his arrival at Bermuda, drew a bill on Frazer, Trenholm
& Co., at Liverpool, in favor of Westendorff, showing
that the latter had advanced a certain amount of mone}^ to
the Herald, It was also testified by a person on the Ber-
j/iuda that the Herald was connected with the former ship.
At the time of the capture, and after the vessel was
boarded, the captain's brother, by his order, threw over-
board two small boxes and a package, which he swore he
understood contained postage stamps, and a bag which he
understood contained letters, and which he was instructed
to destro}^ in case of capture. One of the gentlemen from
Charleston also destroyed a number of letters, which he
.swore were private letters, intrusted to him by Americans
in Europe.
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THE BERMUDA. 59
On the part of the claimants it was contended —
1. That the vessel was captured within British territo-
rial waters.
2. That both the vessel and the car^o were owned by
neutrals, and that their destination was either Bermuda or
Nassau, a neuti'al port.
3. That there was no intent to run the blockade; that
the ship, after arriving at Bermuda, was instructed to
proceed to Nassau in order that her cargo might be landed
and another cargo be taken on board for some port in
Europe; that it was the intention of the consignees at Nas-
sau, who were correspondents of Frazer, Trenholm & Co. ,
to carry out these instructions strictly ; that a part of the
munitions of war were intended for the Government of
Hayti, and the rest, ''for sale at Bermuda or Nassau, in
the usual course of business, to any person willing to pur-
chase the same."
4. That the fact that the ship was not intended to run
the blockade was shown by the circumstance that the ''gov-
ernment passengers," though they a'l undoubtedly wished
to enter the Confederate States, all disembarked at Ber-.
muda and did not rejoin the A^essel when she sailed to
Nassau.
5. That there was no concealment as to anything on
board; that everything was fairly entered on the bills of
lading and manifest; and that the crew were shipped for
a term not exceeding twelve months from Liverpool to
Bermuda, and thence, if required, to an}^ ports or places
in the West Indies, British North .Vmerica, the United
States, and back to the United Kingdom; and that their
wages did not exceed that of ordinary voyages in peaceful
times.
The opinion of the court was delivered by Chief Justice
Chase, and was unanimous.
The court held that all the circumstiinces, including that
of the spoliation of papers, which was one of unusual
aggravation, Varranted the most unfavorable inference as
to ownership, employment, and destination; that all the
transactions repelled the conclusion that Haigh was the
true owner; that not a document taken on the ship showed
ownership in him except the shipping articles, which were
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60 "continuous voyages" NOTES.
false in putting upon the crew list employees of the Con-
federate Government and enemy passengers; that there
was no indication that, after Haigh gave the power of
attorney, he performed a single act of ownership; that no
letter alluded to him as owner, and no direction as to vessel
or cargo recognized him as such; but that, on the contrary,
nil the papers and all the circumstances indicated that a
.sale was made in Charleston under the power, by which
the beneficial control and real ownership were transferred
to John Frazer & Co., while the apparent title, by the
British papers, was suffered to remain in Haigh as a cover.
It was therefore held that the ownership of Haigh was a
pretense, and that the vessel was rightly condemned as
f^nem}' property.
Assuming for the moment, however, that Haigh was
the owner of the ship, the court next considered the ques-
tion as to the employment of the vessel and cargo at the
time of the capture. The theor}^ of counsel for Haigh
was, said the court, that the ship was neutral and carried
a neutral cargo, in good faith, from one neutral port to
another; and the}^ insisted that the description^ of cargo,
if neutral, and in a neutral ship, and on a neutral voyage,
could not be inquired into in the courts of a belligerent.
'* We agree to this," said the court. Neutmls might ' 'con-
vey in neutral ships, from one neutral port to another, any
goods, whether contraband of war or not, if intended for
actual delivery at the port of destination, and to become
part of the common stock of the country or of the port."
It was asserted by counsel, said the court, that British
merchants had " a perfect right to trade, even in militarj"
stores, between their own ports, and to sell at one of them
goods of all sorts, even to an enemy of the United States,
with knowledge of his intent to employ them in rebel war
against the American Government. If," continued the
court, " by trade between neutral ports is meant real trade,
in the course of which goods conveyed from one port to
another become incorporated into the mass* of goods for
sale in the port of destination; and if by sale to the ene-
^ Possibly the phrase "description of cargo," which appears in the
jHiblished report, is a misprint. The character of the cargo is what
seems to be meant.
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THE BERMUDA. 61
mies of the United States is meant sale to either belliger-
ent, without partiality to either, we accept the proposition
of counsel as correct. But if it is intended to affirm that
a neutral ship may take on a contraband cargo ostensibly
for a neutral port, but destined in reality for a belligerent
port, either by the same ship or by another, without becom-
ing liable, from the commencement to the end of the voy-
age, to seizure, in order to the confiscation of the cargo,
we do not agree to it."
Apph^ng these principles to the case under consideration,
the court observed that a large part of the cargo was contra-
band in the narrowest sense of the word, and a part of it
expressly destined to the Confederate States,so that the char-
acter of the cargo made " its ulterior, if not direct, destina-
tion to a rebel port quite certain . " There was, besides, eyi-
dence of destination found in the letters of Frazer, Trenholm
& Co. which made distinct references to the contingency
of transshipment; and the eyidence showed that the Hei^ald
was sent oyer with a yiew to this. Moreover, the consign-
ment of the whole cargo to order or assigns, which meant
in fact to the order of John Frazer & Co., of Charleston,
was '^ conclusive, in the absence of proof to the contrary,
that its destination was the port in which the consignee
resided and transacted business. * * * It makes no
difference," said the court, *' whether the destination to the
rebel port was ulterior or direct; nor could the question
of destination be affected by transshipment at Nassau, if
transshipment was intended, for that could not break the
continuity of transportation of the cargo. The interposi-
tion of a neutral port between neutral departure and bel-
ligerent destination has always been a favorite resort of
contraband carriers and blockade runners. But it never
avails them when the ultimate destination is ascertained.
A transportation from one point to another remains con-
tinuous, so long as intent remains unchanged, no matter
what stoppages or transshipments intervene."^ There
seemed to be no reason, said the court, ''why this reason-
able and settled doctrine should not be applied to each ship
^ The court cited Jecker i\ Montgomery, 18 Howard, 114; The FoUif^
2 C. Rob., 369; The WilUam, 5 C. Rob., 395; 1 Kent's Commentaries,
84, note.
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62 "continuous voyages" — notes.
where several are engaged successively in one transaction,
namely, the conveyance of a contraband cargo to a bellig-
erent. The question of liability must depend on the good
or bad faith of the owners of the ships. If a part of the
voyage is lawful, and the owners of the ship conveying the
cargo in that part are ignorant of the ulterior destination,
and do not hire their ship with a view to it, the ship can
not be liable; but if the ulterior destination is the known
inducement to the partial voyage, and the ship is engaged
in the latter with a view to the former, then whatever lia-
bility may attach to the final voyage must attach to the
earlier, undertaken with the same cargo and in continuity
of its conveyance. Successive voyages, connected by a
common plan and a common object, form a plural unit.
They are links of the same chain, each identical in descrip-
tion with every other, and each essential to the continuous
whole."
Should the Bermuda^ on these principles, be condemned
for the conveyance of contraband ? B}^ the ancient rule,
said the court, the vessel which carried contraband was
condemned as well as the cargo. Of this rule there had
been a great but very proper relaxation to the effect that
the neutral might convey contraband to a belligerent, sub-
ject to no liability except seizure with a view to the con-
fiscation of the oft'ending goods. This relaxation, however,
required good faith on the part of the neutral, and did not
protect the ship where good faith was wanting. Thus, the
carrjdng of contraband with, a false destination was a
ground of condemnation.^ Mere consent to transportation
of contraband will not always or usually be taken to be a
violation of good faith; but the belligerent is entitled to
require of neutrals a frank m\Ahona fide conduct.^ So,
too, vessels had been condemned for being engaged act-
ually or practically in enemy service.^
What, then, inquired the court, were the marks by
which the conveyance of contraband on the Bennuda was
^The Franklin, 3 C. Rob., 224.
^The Neutralitet, 3 C. Rob., 296; Carrington r. Merchants' Insuraiice
Co., 8 Peters, 518; The Ranger, 6 C. Rob., 126.
3 The Jonge Emilia, 'S C. Rob., 52; The Carolina, 4 C. Ro))., 256.
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THE BERMUDA. 63
accompanied ? First, there was the character of the con-
traband articles fitted for immediate militai*y use in battle
or for the immediate civil service of the enemy govern-
ment; then, the deceptive bills of lading requiring deliv-
ery at Bermuda, when there was either no intention to
deliver there at all or none not subject to be changed by
the enemies of the United States*, then, the appointment
of one of these enemies as master, necessarily made with
the knowledge and consent of Haigh, if he was the owner;
then the complete surrender of the vessel to the use and
control of such enemies, without even the pretence of
want of knowledge b}" the alleged owner, of her destined
and actual employment. The circumstances rendered it
highly probable that the ship at the time of capture was
actually in the service of the Confederate Government, and
known to be so by all parties interested in her ownership.
But, however this might be, it could not be doubted that
the Bermuda was justly liable to condemnation "for the
conveyance of contraband goods destined to a belligerent
port, under circumstances of fraud and bad faith, which
make the owner, if Haigh was owner, responsible for
unneutral participation in the war. The cargo, having all
been consigned to enemies, and most of it contraband,
must share the fate of the ship."
Having thus disposed of the questions connected with
the ownership, control, and employment of the Bermuda
and the character of her cargo, the court added that little
need be said on the subject of liability for the violation of
the blockade. ''What has been already adduced of the
evidence," said the court, '*• satisfies us completely that
the original destination of the ^Bermuda was to a block-
aded port, or, if otherwise, to an intermediate port, with
intent to send forward the cargo by transshipment into a
vessel provided for the completion of the voyage. It may
be that the instructions to Westendortf were not settled
when the steamship left St. George's for Nassau; but it is
quite clear to us that the ship was then at the disposition
of John Frazer & Co., and that the voyage, begun at Liv-
erpool with intent to violate the blockade, delayed at St.
George's for instructions from that firm, continued toward
6482—01 5
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64 ''CONTINUOUS voyages" NOTES.
Nassau for the pui-pose of completion from that port to a
rebel port, either by the Berrtaida herself or by trans-
shipment, was one voyage from Liverpool to a blockaded
port, and that the liability to condemnation for attempted
breach of blockade was, by sailing with such purpose,
fastened on the ship as firmly as it would have been by
proof of intent that the cargo should be transported by
the Bermuda herself to a blockaded port, or as near as
possible, without encountering the blockading squadron,
and then sent in by a steamer, like the Herald^ of lighter
draft or greater speed."
As to the question of capture within neutral waters, the
court observed that there was nothing in the evidence
which proved to its satisfaction that such was the fact.
It was therefore held that '' both vessels and cargo, even
if both were neutral, were rightly condemned."
By this judgment the decree of the court below con-
demning the vessel and the munitions of war was affirmed.
Subsequently the district court passed a decree condemn-
ing the residue of the cargo.
Case of the Springhol\ — Of all the decisions rendered
by the Supreme Court in cases involving the question of
continuous voyage, that which was pronounced in th^ case
of the British bark Springbok has been most discussed and
most criticised.^ The case came up on appeal from a
decree of the United States district court for the southern
district of New York, condemning the bark and her
cargo,^ which had been captured at sea by the United
States gunboat Sonoma,^
It appeared the vessel was owned by British subjects
and was commanded by the. son of one of the owners. She
1 The Springbok (1866) , 5 Wallace, 1.
2 Blatchford's Prize Cases, 349; May, 1863. <
^ Commander T. H. Stevens, U. S. S. Sonoma, in a report to Admiral
Wilkes, Feb. 9, 1863, said: "On the morning of the 3d of February,
while looking for the Oreto, I captured the English bark Springbok,
loaded with contraband, bound to Nassau, but having nothing in the
way of a manifest of a legal character, and being upon the list fur-
nished by you. I sent her to New York for adjudication in charge of
Acting Master Foster Willis, with a prize crew from this vessel. The
vessel was from London. The capture was made in latitude 25° ^V
N., long. 74° 46^ W.^' (Official Records of the Union and Confederate
Navies, Ser. I, vol. 2, p. 70.)
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THE SPRINGBOK. 65
was chartered November 12, 1862, to T. S. Begbie, of Lon-
don, to take a cargo of merchandise and therewith " pro-
ceed to Nassau, or so near thereunto as she may safely get,
and deliver same," and thirty days were allowed "for
loading at port of loading and discharging at Nassau."
This document was indorsed by Speyer & Haywood, who,
on December 8, 1862, instructed the master: " You will
proceed at once to the port of Nassau, N. P., and on
arrival report yourself to Mr. B. W. Hart there, who will
give you orders as to the delivery of your cargo." In a -
letter directed to Hart, Speyer & Haywood spoke of them-
selves as acting " under instructions from Messrs. Isaac,
Campbell & Co." By the bills of lading the cargo was to
be delivered to order or assigns.
The ship set sail from London December 8, 1862, and
was captured February 3, 1863, about 150 miles east of
Nassau, when making for that port. When captured, she
made no resistance and her papers were given up without
any attempt at concealment or spoliation.
On the hearing before the district court, counsel for the
captors invoked the proofs taken in two other cases then
on trial, namely. United States v. The Steamer Gertrude,^
and United States v. The Schooner Stephen Hart.^ As
has been seen, the Stephen Hart was captured January 29,
1862, and the claimants of her cargo were Isaac, Campbell
<& Co., who claimed jointly with Begbie the cargo of the
Springhoh, The brokers who had charge of the lading of
the Stephen Hart were also Spe3^er & Haywood. The
Gertrude was captured April 16, 1863, off one of the
Bahama islands while on a voyage ostensibly from Nassau
to St. John's, N. B. She was condemned, and no claim
was put in either to the vessel or her cargo. The testi-
mony showed that she belonged to Begbie; that her cargo
consisted, among other things, of hops, dry goods, drugs,
leather, cotton cards, paper, 3,960 pair of gray army
blankets, 335 pair of white blankets, linen, woolen shirts,
flannel, 750 pair of army brogans. Congress gaiters, and
24,900 pounds of powder; that she was captured after a
iBlatchford'8 Prize Cases, 374; July, 1863.
2 Id. 387; July, 1863, supra.
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66 ''continuous voyages" — notes.
chase of three hours, and when making for the harbor of
Charleston, her master knowing of its blockade, and hav-
ing on board a Charleston pilot under an assumed name.
The opinion of the Supreme Court in the case of the
Springhok was delivered by Chief Justice Chase. He
admitted that the invocation of the documents in the cases
of the Gertrude and the Stephen Ilart^ at the original
hearing, was not '' strictly regular;" but he also held that
the irregularit}^ was not such as would justify a reversal
of the decree of the court below, or a refusal to examine
the documents invoked and forming part of the record.
It had already been held, said the court, in the case of
the Bermuda that where goods destined ultimately for a
belligerent port were "being conveyed between two neu-
tral ports by a neutral ship, under a charter made in good
faith for that voyage, and without any fraudulent connec-
tion on the part of her owners with the ulterior destina-
tion of the goods," the ship, though liable to seizure in
order that the goods might be confiscated, was not liable
to condemnation as prize. The Springhok was thought
fairly to come within this rule. Her papers were regular
and genuine and showed a neutral destination of the ship.
Her owners were neutral and did not appear to have any
interest in the cargo, nor was there any proof that they
knew of its alleged unlawful destination. It was there-
fore adjudged that the ship should be restored; but in
view of a misrepresentation made by the master when ex-
amined and of the circumstance that he signed bills of
lading which did not truly and fully state the nature of
the goods contained in certain bales and cases, no costs or
damages were allowed to the claimant.
The case of the cargo was, said the court, quite differ-
ent. In addition to the facts heretofore noted as to the
lading and consignment of the cargo, the court stated that
the bills of lading, while they disclosed the contents of
619 packages, ''concealed" the contents of 1,888. On
this point the court laid great stress, especially in view of
the fact that the owners of the cargo knew that it was
going " to a port in the trade with which the utmost can-
dor of statement might be reasonably required." The
true reason of the concealment must be found in the de-
sire of the owners to hide from the scrutinv of the Amer-
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THE SPRINGBOK. 67
ican cruisers the contraband character of a considerable
part of the contents of the packages. Moreover, the bills
of lading and the manifest '^concealed" the names of the
owners. The true motive of this concealment must have
been, said the court, the apprehension of the claimants
that the disclosure of their names as owners would lead
to the seizure of the ship in order that the cargo might
be condemned. It was admitted, however, that "these
concealments" did not of themselves warrant condemna-
tion, and the court then proceeded '"to ascertain the real
destination of the cargo." "If," said the court, "the real
intention of the owners was that the cargo should be
landed at Nassau and incorporated b\" real sale into the
common stock of the island, it must be restored, notwith-
standing this misconduct. What, then, was this real
intention ? "
That some other destination than Nassau was intended
was inferred, first, from the fact that by the bills of lading
and the manifest the cargo was consigned to order or
assigns. This was treated as a " negation " that a sale was
intended to anyone at Nassau, since, if such a sale had
been intended, the goods would most likely have been
consigned for that pui'pose to some established house
named in the bills of lading. This inference was strength-
ened by the fact that the agent of the owners at Nassau
was to receive the property and execute the instructions
of his principals.
These instructions were not in evidence; but they might,
said the court, be collected in part from the character of
the cargo. A part of it, small in comparison with the
whole, consisted of arms and munitions of war. A some-
what larger part consisted of articles useful and necessary
in war. These portions being contraband, the residue
belonging to the same owners must share their fate.
"But," declared the court, "we do not now refer to the
character of the cargo for the purpose of determining
whether it was liable to condemnation as contraband, but
for the purpose of ascertaining its real destination; for,
we repeat, contraband or not, it could not be condemned,
if really destined for Nassau and not beyond; and, contra-
band or* not, it must be condemned if destined to any rebel
port, for all rebel ports were under blockade.
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68 "continuous voyages" — notes.
"Looking at the cargo with this view we find that a
part of it was specially fitted for use in the rebel military
service and a larger part, though not so specially fitted,
was yet well adapted to such use. Under the first head
we include the sixteen dozen swords, and the ten dozen
rifle bayonets, and the forty -five thousand navy .buttons,
and the one hundred and fifty thousand army buttons; and
under the latter the seven bales of army cloth and the
twenty bales of army blankets and other similar goods.
We can not look at such a cargo as this and doubt that a
considerable. portion of it was going to the rebel States,
where alone it could be used; nor can we doubt that the
whole cargo had one destination.
''Now if this cargo was not to be carried to its ultimate
destination by the Springbok (and the proof does not war-
rant us in saying that it was), the plan must have been to
send it forward by transshipment. And we think it evi-
dent that such was the purpose. We have already referred
to the bills of lading, the manifest, and the letter of
Speyer & Haywood as indicating this intention, and the
same inference must be drawn from the disclosures by the
invocation that Isaac, Campbell & Co. had before sup-
plied military goods to the rebel authorities by indirect
shipments and that Begbie was the owner of the Gertrude
and engaged in the business of running the blockade.
" If these circumstances were insufficient grounds for %
satisfactory conclusion, another might be found in the
presence of the Gertrude in the harbor of Nassau with
undenied intent to run the blockade about the time when
the arrival of the Springhoh was expected there. It seems
to us extremely probable that she had been sent to Nassau
to await the arrival of the Springbok and to convey her
cargo to a belligerent and blockaded port, and that she
did not so convey it onl}^ because the voyage was inter-
cepted by the capture.
''All these condemnatory circumstances must be taken
in connection with the fraudulent concealment attempted
in the bills of lading and the manifest and with the ver}-
remarkable fact that not only has no application been made
by the claimants for leave to take further proof in order
to furnish some explanation of these circumstances, but
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MATAMORAS CASES THE PETERHOFF. 69
that no claim, sworn to personally, by either of the claim-
ants, has ever been filed.
" Upon the whole case we can not doubt that the car^o
was originally shipped with intent to violate the blockade;
that the owners of the cargo intended that it should be
transshipped at Nassau into some vessel more likely to suc-
ceed in reaching safely a blockaded port than the Spring-
hok; that the voyage from London to the blockaded port
was, as to cargo, both in law and in the intent of the par-
ties, one voyage; and that the liability to condemnation,
if. captured during any part of that voyage, attached to
the cargo from the time of sailing." ,
In conformity with this opinion the decree of condem-
nation of the district court was reversed as to the ship,
but without costs or damages to the claimants, and was
affirmed as to the cargo.
Matamords cases — the Peterhoff,-—ThQ Mexican town of
Matamoras, situated on the Rio Grande, nearly opposite
Brownsville, in Texas, which formed one of the Confeder-
ate States, offered obvious advantages as a base of contra-
band trade.
The steamer Peterhoff was captured Feb. 25, 1863, near
the island of St. Thomas, D. W. I., by the U. S. S. Van-
derhilt^ and was condemned by the United States district
court for the southern district of New York, together with
her cargo, for attempt to break the blockade. From this
sentence an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court. ^
Th.^ Peter Jwff YfdiS fully documented as a British mer-
chant steamer upon a voyage, as shown by her manifest,
shipping list, clearances, and other papers, from London,
England, to Matamoras, in Mexico. The bills of lading
all stipulated for the delivery of the goods "off the Rio
Grande, Gulf of Mexico, for Matamoras," adding that
they were to be taken from alongside the ship, provided
that lighters could cross the bar at the mouth of the river.
The cargo was miscellaneous, and shipped b}'^ 'different
persons, all but one of whom were British subjects, and a
part of it belonged to the owner of the vessel. ^ Of the
numerous packages a certain number contained articles
^The Peterliorf (1866), 5 Wallace, 28.
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70 "continuous voyages" NOTES.
useful for military purposes during war. Among them
were 36 cases of artillery harness, 14^450 pair of '' Blucher "
boots, 5,580 pair of "government regulation grey blan-
kets," 95 casks of horseshoes of large size, suitable for
cavalry service, and 52,000 horseshoe nails. There were
also considerable amounts of iron, steel, shovels, spades,
blacksmiths' bellows and anvils, nails^ and leather, and an
assorted lot of drugs — 1,000 pounds of calomel, large
quantities of morphine, 265 pounds of chloroform, and
2,640 ounces of quinine. Owing to the blockade of the
coast, drugs, and especiall}" quinine, were greatly needed
in the Southern States.
With the exception of a portion consigned to the order
of the master, which belonged to the owners of the vessel,
the cargo was represented in agenc}^ or consigneeship
chiefly by three different persons on board the vessel as
passengers — Redgate, Bowden, and Almond — all natives
of Great Britain, and at the time of the capture all British
subjects, except Redgate, who had become a citizen of the
United States, and who, before the outbreak of the war,
resided in Texas. He stated that at the time of the cap-
ture he intended to establish a mercantile house at Mata-
moras, and that, had his "goods arrived there, they were
to take the chances of the market. " Bowden and Almond
testified to substantially the same effect as to their re-
spective ventures. During the war Matamoras, which
lies on the Mexican side of the Rio Grande, nearly oppo-
site the town of Brownsville, in Texas, had, by reason of
the facilities which as a neutral port it oflered for trade
with the Confederac}^, whose seaports were all blockaded,
suddenly risen from the position of a place of no im-
portance ''into a great centre of commercial activity,
rivalling the trade of New York or Liverpool."
The opinion of the Supreme Court in the case of the
Peterhoff was delivered by Chief Justice Chase. He
stated that the record satisfied the court that the voyage
of the ship " was not simulated." She was "in the proper
course of a voyage from London to Matamoras; " nor was
there any evidence which fairly warranted the belief
"that the cargo had any other direct destination." The
proposed delivery of the cargo off the mouth of the Rio
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THE PETERHOFF. 71
Grande into lighters for Matamoras was "in the usual
coui*se of trade," since it was impossible for a vessel of
heavy draught to enter the river. ''It is true," said the
court, ''that by these lighters some of the cargo might be
conveyed directly to the blockaded coast; but there is no
evidence which warrants us in saying that such convey-
ance was intended by the master or the shippers. We
dismiss, therefore, from consideration, the claim, suggested
rather than urged in behalf of the Government, that the
ship and cargo, both or either, were destined for the
blockaded coast."
But it was maintained in argument b}^ counsel for the
captors (1) that trade with Matamoras was, at the time of
the capture, made unlawful b}^ the blockade of the mouth
of the Rio Grande; and, if this was not the case, (2) that
the ulterior destination of the cargo was Texas and the
other States in rebellion, and that this ulterior destination
constituted a breach of the blockade.
On these points the court held —
1. That "the mouth of the Rio Grande was not included
in the blockade of the ports of the rebel States, and that
neutral commerce with Matamoras, except in contraband,
was entirely free."
2. That "neutral trade to or from a blockaded country
by inland navigation or transportation," is lawful; and,
"therefore, that trade, between London and Matamoras,
even with intent to suppl}^ from Matamoras goods to
Texas, violated no blockade, and can not be declared un-
lawful. " " Such trade," said the court, " with unrestricted
inland commerce between such a port and the enemy's
territory, impairs undoubtedly and very seriously impairs
the value of *a blockade of the enemy's coast. But in
cases such as that now in judgment, we administer the
public law of nations, and are not at liberty to inquire
what is for the particular advantage or disadvantage of
our own or another countr}'."
The question of breach of blockade being thus excluded,
the court proceeded to consider the question of the desti-
nation of the cargo in connection with the question of
contraband. Taking up the usual classification of articles
with reference to this question — (1) those used primarily
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72 "continuous voyages" — notes.
for purposes of war, (2) those used for purposes of war or
of peace according to circumstances, and (3) those used
exclusively for peaceful purposes — the court observed
that a considerable part of the cargo was of the third
class and need not be further considered. A large part,
perhaps, was of the second class, but as it was "not
proved * * * to have been actually destined to belliger-
ent use," it therefore could not, said the court, " be treated
as contraband. " '' Another portion was, in our judgment,"
continued the court, ''destined directly to the rebel mili-
tary service. 'This portion of the cargo consisted of the
cases of artillery harness and of articles described in the
invoices as 'men's army bluchers,' 'artillery boots,' and
'government regulation gray blankets.' These goods
come fairly under the description of goods primarily and
ordinarily used for military purposes in time of war.
They make part of the necessary equipment of an army."
With regard to these articles, which were adjudged to be
condemned as contraband, the language of the court is to
be specially noted. " It is true that even these goods," said
the court, "if really intended for sale in the market of
Matamoras, would be free of liability: for contraband may
be transported by neutrals to a neutral port, if intended
to make part of its general stock in trade. But there is
nothing in the case which tends to convince us that such
was their real destination, while all the circumstances indi-
cate that these articles, at least, were destined for the use
of the rebel forces then occupying Brownsville, and other
places in the vicinity.
"And contraband merchandise is subject to a different
rule in respect to ulterior destination than that which ap-
plies to merchandise not contraband. The latter is liable
to capture only when a violation of blockade is intended;
the former when destined to the hostile country, or to the
actual military or naval use of the enem}'^, whether block-
aded or not. * * * Hence, while articles, not con-
traband, might be sent to Matamoras and beyond to the
rebel region, where the communications were not inter-
rupted by blockade, articles of a contraband character,
destined in fact to a State in rebellion, or for the use of
the rebel military forces, were liable to capture though
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THE SCIENCE, THE VOLANT. 73
primarily destined to Matamoras. We are obliged to con-
clude that the portion of the cargo which we have cliarac-
terized as contraband must be condemned."
Restitution of the ship was decreed on payment of costs
and expenses. This condition was imposed, notwithstand-
ing the finding that her destination was neutral, (1) because^
the master, when brought to by the Vanderhilt^ refused to
send his papers on board; (2) because papers were destroyed
on board the ship at the time of the capture; and (3) because^
it was the duty of the captors, since contraband was found
on board ''destined to the enemy," to bring the ship in for
adjudication.
Case of the Science, — In two other Matamoras cases, de-
cided at the same term, the Supreme Court decreed resti-
tution, in the absence of proof of actual enemy destina-
tion. The first of these was that of the Science,^ Chief
Justice Chase, delivering the opinion of the court, stated
that the evidence was " clear that the vessel and her out-
ward cargo were neutral property, destined to neutral
consignees at Matamoras, and that the cargo had actualh^
been delivered as consigned." "Some of the proof," the
court added, "tended to show that a portion of this cargo-
consisted of Confederate uniform cloth; but there was.
none showing destination to enemy territory or immediate
enemy use. There was, therefore, nothing in the charac-
ter of the vessel or of the outward cargo which warrants
condemnation."
Case of the Volant. — At the same time the court decided
the case of the Volant^ another Matamoras case. The
Chief Justice, delivering the opinion, stated that the proof
showed that the vessel was the property of a neutral mer-
chant of the island of Jersey, documented as a British
merchantman, and regularly cleared from London to
Matamoras. The cargo was shipped by the charterers of
the vessel for neutral owners, and consigned to neutrals at
Matamoras, but had not been discharged at the time of
capture. " It consisted," said the court, "in part of bales-
of Confederate uniform cloth, of the same mark and of
corresponding numbers with like goods found on the
^5 Wallace, 178. 25 Wallace, 179.
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74 ' ' CONTINUOUS VOYAGES " NOTES.
Science; but there is no proof of unlawful destination."
The decree of the court below, condemning the ship and
cargo, was accordingly reversed.
Hall, referring to the cases in which the English prize
courts have applied the doctrine of continuous voyages,
states that those courts ''were careful not to condemn
until what they conceived to be the hostile act was irrev-
ocably entered upon" by departure "from the port of
colorable importation to the enemy country;" and he
declares that "the American decisions have been univer-
sally reprobated outside the United States, and would
probably now find no defenders in their own country."^
He does not cite, however, any case in which it was held
by an English court that the performance of the process
of "colorable importation" was a prerequisite to con-
demnation, nor does he exhibit his usual accuracy in his
censure of the American decisions, which found, as will
be shown, a defender in his own Government.
In the cases of the Susan and the Hope^ fteutral Ameri-
can vessels were condemned by Sir William Scott for car-
r3'ing, on vo3^ages from Bordeaux to the neutral port of
New York, ofiicial dispatches destined to French authori-
ties in the West Indies. In neither case does it appear to
have been alleged that the apparent destination of the
vessel was not her true and final destination, or that she
was specially employed by the French Government.
Nevertheless, it was held that the transportation of the
dispatches toward their belligerent destination was an
unneutral and prohibited service.
Returning to the American decisions, it appears that
on February 20, 1864, Earl Russell instructed Lord
Lyons, then British minister at Washington, that Her
Majesty's Government had considered the judgment of
Judge Betts in the case of the SpririghoJc^ in communi-
cation with the law ofiicers of the Crown, and saw no
reason to change the opinion that they " could not officially
interfere in the matter, but that the owners must be left
to the usual and proper remedy of an appeal. On the con-
trary," declared Earl Russell, "a careful perusal of this
lint. Law, 4th ed., 695, note.
2 The Caroline, 6 C. Rob., 641, note.
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BRITISH government's POSITION. 75
elaborate and able judgment, containing the reasons of the
judge, the authorities cited by him in support of it, and
the important evidence properly invoked from the cases of
the Stephen Hart and the Gertrude (which Her Majesty's
Government have now seen for the first time) in which the
same parties were concerned, goes so far to establish that
the cargo of the Springbok^ containing a considerable por-
tion of contraband, was never really and ionafide destined
for Nassau, but was either destined merely to call there or
to be immediately transshipped after its arrival there
without breaking bulk and without any previous incorpo-
ration into the common stock of that colony, and then to
proceed to its real destination, being a blockaded port.
The complicity of the owners of the ship, with the design
of the owners of the cargo, is, to say the least, so probable
on the evidence that there would be great difficulty in con-
tending that this ship and cargo had not been rightly
condemned."
February 5, 1868, the attorney of the owners of the
cargo transmitted to Lord Stanley, then foreign secretary,
the sentence of the Supreme Court, by which the condem-
nation of the cargo was affirmed and a decree of restitution
entered as to the vessel. He also enclosed a copy of the
joint opinion of Messrs. George Mellish, Q. C, and W.
Vernon Harcourt, Q. C. , holding the sentence to be erro-
neous and unjust, and stated that in that opinion he had
no doubt the law officers of the Crown would concur. He
asked that compensation be demanded for the owners of
the cargo from the United States for the condemnation of
their property.
This petition was referred to the law officers of the
Crown, and on July 24, 1868, the foreign office, after an
extended review of the papers in the case, including the
opinion of counsel, announced the conclusion that Her
Majesty's Government would not be "justified, on the
materials before them, in making any claim "for compen-
sation. With reference to the opinion of counsel, the
foreign office observed that it found fault with the judg-
ment because one ground taken by the court as justifying
the conclusion that Nassau was not the real destination of
the cargo, was derived from the forms of the bills of ^
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76 "continuous voyages" — notes.
lading, which, although they did not disclose the contents
of the packages or name any consignee, the x?argo being
deliverable to " order or assigns," were, it was maintained,
on the testimony of some of the principal brokers of
London, ''in the usual and regular forai of consignment
to an agent for sale at such a port as Nassau. " No doubt,
said the foreign office, the form was usual in time of peace;
but a practice which might be "perfectly regular in time
of peace under the municipal regulations of a particular
state, will not always satisfy the laws of nations in time
of war, more particularly when the voyage may expose
the ship to the visit of belligerent cruisers." Thus it was
laid down by Dr. Lushington, in the case of the Aho^^ that
where cargo is shipped jlagromte hello^ the bills of lading
on their face ought to express for whose account and risk
the property was shipped. The ship's manifest in the
present case was, said the foreign oflSce, equally silent on
the subject; and, "having regard to the very doubtful char-
acter of all trade ostensibly carried on at Nassau during
the late war in the United States, and to many other cir-
cumstances of suspicion before the court, Her Majesty's
Government are not disposed to consider the argument of
the court on this point as otherwise than tenable."
As to the argument of counsel that the character of the
cargo, being fitted for blockade running, was a proof that
it was destined for Nassau, which was the great entrep6t
for contraband of war, the foreign office declared that it
was one "to which much weight cannot be attached."
Under "all the circumstances of time and place," and in
the absence of evidence from the claimants as to what was
to become of the goods on their arrival at Nassau, Her
Majesty's Government thought "the court was entitled to
draw the inference that the consignors of the goods in-
tended to be parties to the immediate transshipment and
importation of these goods into a blockaded port, on their
being taken out of the Springhoh,'^'^
In connection with the contention of counsel that the
-court erred in its statement that the Gertrude was at Nas-
sau with undenied intent to run the blockade about the
1 Spinks, 350.
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BRITISH government's POSITION. 77
time when the Springbok was expected to arrive there, the
foreign office observed that the decision of the couil; did
not appear to be based on that ground, but found "that
the owners of the cargo intended that it should be trans-
shipped at Nassau in some vessel more likely to succeed in
reaching a blockaded port than the Sjprm^hoky As a fact,
said the foreign office, the voyage of the Gertrude appeared
to have been dela^^ed, but "when she did reach Nassau,
after the capture of the Springbok^ she took on board a
contraband cargo, upon which the marks and numbers cor-
responded to some extent with certain marks and numbers
on many packages in the Springhok^ and she was captured
and condemned without any attempt being made to resist
such condemnation."^
In the case of the Peterhx)ff^ it appears that the British
consul at New York on August 3, 1863, transmitted to his
Government a copy of Judge Betts's decree condemning the
vessel and her cargo, and stated that the judge would later
AQliveY irif extenso his reasons for the condemnation. With
reference to the decree. Earl Russell instructed Lord
Lyons, Oct. 31, 1863, that Her Majesty's Government,
having considered the judicial proceedings, in communica-
tion with the law officers of the Crown, adhered to the opin-
ion that any official intervention in the present stage of the
case was inexpedient. "The evidence," said Earl Russell,
"is certainly not 'clearly and unequivocally inadequate to
sustain the sentence,' but, on the contrary, in various par-
ticulars tends to sustain it; such as the false swearing of
the master or, at least, the palpable equivocation and dis-
ingenuousness of his evidence; the throwing overboard of
papers, the contents of which are said to be unknown at
the moment of capture; the incredible and conflicting sug-
gestions (in the absence of a true explanation which the
claimants might have obtained) as to their contents, and
the character of certain portions of the cargo."
April 22, 1864, the full opinion of Judge Betts in the
case of the Peterhoffhdivmg been received, as well as that
of Judge Marvin in the cases of the Dolphin and the Pearly
Earl Russell instructed Lord Lyons, after consulting the
^Blue Book, Miscellaneous, No. 1 (1900).
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78 "continuous voyages" — notes.
law officers of the Crown, that Her Majesty's Government
did not consider that the decisions in the cases of the Peter-
hoff^nA the Dolphin called '' for any intervention on their
part. Her Majesty's Government," continued Earl Rus-
sell, ''without adopting all the reasons assigned in these
judgments (in some of them, indeed, they do not concur),
are not prepared to say that the decisions themselves,
under all the circumstances of the cases, are not in harmony
with the principles of the judgments of the English prize
courts. With respect to the case of the Pearly Her Maj-
esty's Government consider that the course adopted by the
judge is fair and equitable."^
In the cases of the Springhok^ Peter hoff^ Dolphi?), and
Pearly claims for compensation were made before the
international commission under Art. XIH of the Treaty
of Washington of May 8, 1871. None was presented in
the case of the Befnnuda,
In the case of the Springbok the commission unani-
mously disallowed all claims on account of the cargo.
An award of $5,065 tvas made as damages for the deten-
tion of the vessel from the date of the decree of the dis-
trict court till her discharge under the decree of the
Supreme Court. ^
The P^^^ Acclaims were all unanimously disallowed.*
The cases of the Dolphin and the Pearl were similarly
disposed of.*
The commission consisted of the Hon. J. S. Frazer,
sometime a justice of the supreme court of the State of
Indiana; the Rt. Hon. Russell Gurnej^ a member of Her
Majesty's privy council and recorder of London, and
Count Corti, Italian minister at Washington.^
When we consider on the one hand the not infrequent
censure of the American decisions as introducing novel
and unwarranted doctrines, and on the other hand the
contrary opinion expressed by the British Government
and implied b}^ the action of the international commision,
iBlue Book, Miscellaneous, No. 1 (1890).
2 Int. Arbitrations, III, 3928-8035.
» Int. Arbitrations, III, 383^-3843.
male's Report, 92, 115.
^nt. Arbitration's, 1, ()90.
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DEL AGO A BAY GERMAN CASES. 79
it seems not inappropriate to recall the words of Lord
Stowell:^
''AH law is resolvable into general principles: The cases
which may arise under new combinations of circumstances,
leading to an extended application of principles, ancient
and recognized, by just corollaries, may be infinite; but
so long as the continuity of the original and established
principles is preserved pure and unbroken, the practice is
not nefic^ nor is it justly chargeable with being an innoDa-
tion on the ancient law, when, in fact, the court does
nothing more than apply old principles to new circum-
stances."
III. Delagoa Bay: German cases, — An interesting and
impoi-tant discussion of questions of contraband and con-
tinuous voyage may be found in the correspondence
between Germany and Great Britain growing out of the
seizure and detention b}^ British cruisers of the three
(xeiTiian east African mail steamers Bundesrath^ General^
and Ilerzog.
The first case was that of the Bundesrath, As early as
Dec. 5, 1899, Rear Admiral Sir R. Harris reported that that
vessel had sailed from Aden for Delagoa Bay ; that '^ ammu-
nition" was '' suspected, but none ascertained;" and that
she carried ^'twenty Dutch and Germans and two supposed
Boers, three Germans and two Austrians, believed to be
officers, all believed to be intending combatants, although
shown as civilians; also twenty-four Portuguese soldiers." ^
On the 29th of December she arrived at Durban in charge
of the British cruiser Magicienne, The German Govern-
ment requested her release on the ground, among others,
of ''positive assurances" given by the Hamburg Compan}^
that she carried no contraband. Lord Salisbur}^ replied
that she "was suspected to be carrying ammunition in her
cargo, and that she had on board a number of passengers
believed to be volunteers for service with the Boers," but
that no details as to the grounds of the seizure had been
received. Subsequently the British Government was
advised by Admiral Harris that the ship changed the
1 The Atalanta (1808) , 6 C. Rob., 440, 458'.
2 Africa, No. 1 (1900), 1.
6482—01 6
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80 ''continuous voyages" NOTES.
position of her cargo on being chased; that a partial search
had revealed some sugar consigned to a person at Delagoa
Bay, and some i^ailwa}^ sleepers and small trucks consigned
to a firm at the same place, but labelled Johannesburg;
and that a further search was expected to disclose ''arms
among baggage of Germans on board, who state openly
the}^ are going to the Transvaal." The German Govern-
ment declared that it had no knowledge of more than two
officers having proceeded to the Transvaal, where they
were unable to obtain commands. On Jan. 3, 1900, the
British Government directed that an application be made
to the prize court for the release of the mails; that, if the
application should be granted, they be handed over to the
German consul, to be hastened to their destination b}^ a
British cruiser if available, or by mail steamer, or other-
wise; and that every facilitv for proceeding to his desti-
nation should be afforded "to an}" passenger whom the
court considers innocent." The search of the steamer was
continued for nine davs, but no contraband was found.
Jan. 5 the mails and passengers were released by order of
the prize court, and were taken on board the German
war ship Condor for Delagoa Bay. The steamer and her
cargo was discharged on the 18th of January.
Dec. 16, 1899, the Admirality communicated to the for-
eign office two telegrams, one from the commander in
chief of the Mediterranean Station, and the other from the
commander in chief at the Cape of Good Hope, in relation
to the Ilerzog. One of the telegrams conveyed a report
that this steamer, though she had declared that there were
no troops on board, had left the Suez Canal for South
Africa with " a considerable number of male passengers,
many in khaki, apparently soldiers;" the other spoke of
'*a number of passengers dressed in khaki," and asked
whether the}" could be legally removed. Dec. 21 the sen-
ior naval officer at Aden reported her as having sailed on
the 18th for Delagoa Bay "conveying, probably for sei'vice
in [the] Transvaal, about forty Dutch and German medical
and other officers and nurses." Jan. 1, 1900, the Admi-
ralty telegmphed to Admiral Harris: "Neither the 7?^26>,<7
nor any other German mail steamer should be arrested on
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DELAGOA BAY GERMAN CASES. 81
suspicion onl}^ until it becomes obvious that the Bimdes-
rath is carrying contraband." The Herzog was broug'ht
into Durban on the 6th of January. It seems that she
had among her passengers three Red Cross expeditions,
one of which, however, had no official character nor any
connection with the regular Red Cross societies. Jan. 7
the Admiralty directed her immediate release unless guns
or ammunition were revealed by the summary search. To
this there was added next day the further proviso, ^'unless
provisions on board are destined for the enemy's govern-
ment or agents, and are also for the supply of troops or
are specially adapted for use as rations for troops." The
steamer was released on the 9th of January.
Jan. 4, 1900, the senior naval officer at Aden reported
that the steamer General was detained ^'on strong sus-
picion " and was undergoing search. The German Govern-
ment protested, and asked that explicit instructions be
given to British officers ''to respect the rules of inter-
national law, and to place no further impediments in the
way of the trade between neutrals" — a request to the
form and imputations of which the British Government
strongly excepted. The Admiralty had previously tele-
graphed to Aden that it was undesirable to detain the
steamer if she carried the mails. It appears that she was
detained on 'information" that various suspicious articles
were on board for Delagoa Bay, including boxes of ammu-
nition stowed in the main hold, buried under reserve
coal. The manifest contained several large cases of rifle
ammunition for Mauser, Mannlicher, and sporting rifles,
consigned to Mombasa, but this consignment was believed
to be ho7ia fide. After a search, which included the
removal of 1,200 tons of cargo and the digging out of a
large quantity of coal — a task which occupied the Mara-
tJion's ship's company, assisted by 100 coolies, several
days — no contraband was found. The British Govern-
ment ordered the vessel's release on the 7th of January,
but, as time was requisite for the replacement of the 1,200
tons of cargo which had then been removed, she was
unable to sail till the 10th. She had on board a consider-
able number of Dutch and German passengers for the
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82 *' CONTINUOUS voyages" NOTES.
Transvaal, in plain clothes, but ''of military appearance,'^
some of whom were believed to be trained artillerymen,
though it was stated b}^ the British officials that proof of
this suspicion could be obtained only by searching their
baggage. Lord Salisbury afterwards stated that "there
was no sufficient evidence as to their destination to justify
further action on the part of the officers conducting the
search."
With the release of the ships and their passengers and
cargoes, and an expression of regret by Great Britain
for what had occurred, the subject in controversy was
arranged as follows:
1. The British Government admitted in principle the
obligation to make compensation, and expressed its readi-
ness to arbitrate the claims should an agreement by other
means be impracticable.
2. Instructions were issued to prevent the stopping and
searching of vessels at Aden or at any point equally or
more distant from the seat of war.
3. It was agreed provisionally, till another arrangement
should be made, that German mail steamers should not in
future be searched on ''suspicion only." By a mail
steamer, however, was understood not every steamer that
had a bag of letters on board, but a steamer (Lying the
Geiman mail flag.
On the other hand, the German Government substan-
tially modified its original position with regard to the
questions of international law involved. In a note to
Lord Salisbur}^ of January 4, VM)0, Count Hatzfeldt,
German ambassador at London, declared it to be the opin-
ion of his Government that prize proceedings in the case
of the BundeHi'dth were not justified, for the reason that,
no matter what may have been on board, "there could
have been no contraband of war, since, according to recog-
nized principles of international law, there can not be con-
traband of war in trade between neutral ports." He also
declared this to be the view taken by the British Govern-
ment in 1863 as against the judgment of the American
prize court in the case of the Spririghoh; and by the
British Admiralty in the Manual of Naval Prize Law, in
1866.
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DELAGOA BAY GERMAN CASES. 83
Lord Salisbury, in his reply of the 10th of January,
pointed out the error of the German Government as to the
case of the Springhoh. As to the Manual of Naval Prize
Law, he declared that, while its directions were for prac-
tical purposes sufficient for wars such as Great Britain had
waged in the past, they were ''quite inapplicable to the
case which has now ai'isen of war with an inland state,
whose only communication with the sea is over a few miles
of railway to a neutral port." He also adverted to the fact
that the author of the Manual, in another part of the work
than that cited, had discussed ''the question of destination
of the cargo, as distinguished from destination of the ves-
sel, in a manner by no means favorable to the contention
advanced in Count Hatzfeldt's note," and that Professor
Holland, who edited a revised edition of the Manual in
1888, had, in a recent letter in Tfw Tiines^ expressed an
opinion altogether inconsistent with that which the German
Government had endeavored to found on its words. Lord
Salisbury stated that, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Gov-
ernment, the passage cited from the Manual, "that the
destination of the vessel is conclusive as to the destination
of the goods on board," could not apply to "contraband
on board of a neutral vessel if such contraband was at the
time of seizure consigned or intended to be delivered to
an agent of the enemy at a neutral port, or, in fact, des-
tined for the enemy's country," and that the true view in
regard to such goods, as Her Majesty's Government be-
lieved, was correctly stated by Bluntschli, as follows: "If
the ships or goods are sent to the destination of a neutral
port only the better to come to the aid of the enemj", there
will be contraband of war and confiscation will be justified. " ^
In his speech in the Reichstag, January 19, 1900, announc-
ing the arrangement with Great Britain, Count von Biilow
laid down certain propositions as constituting a system of
law which should be operative in practice, and a disregard
of which would constitute a breach of international treaties
and customs. One of these propositions was that by the
^ Si les navires ou niarchandiaes ne sont exp^di^s k destination d'uii
port neutre que pour mieux venir en aide k I'ennemi il y aura contre-
bande de guerre et la confiscation sera justifiee. (Droit Int. Codifie,
ed. 1874, §813.)
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84 "continuous voyages" — notes,
term contraband of war ''only such articles or persons are
to be understood as are suited for war, and at the same time
are destined for one of the belligerents." Count von Billow
added that the Imperial Government had striven from the
outset to induce the English Government, in dealing with
neutral vessels consigned to Delagoa Bay, "to adhere to
that theory of international law which guarantees the
greatest security to commerce and industry, and which
finds expression in the principle that, for ships consigned
from neutral states to a neutral port, the notion of con-
traband of war simply does not exist. To this the English
Government demurred. We have reserved to ourselves
the right of raising the question in the future, in the first
place, because it was essential to us to arrive at an expe-
ditious solution of the pending diflaculty, and, secondly,
because, in point of fact, the principle here set up by us
has not yet met with universal recognition in theory and
practice."
IV. Delagoa Bay : American cases. — Contemporaneously
with the British-German controversy, a question arose
between the United States and Great Britain as to the
seizure of various articles shipped at New York, some of
them on regular monthly orders, by American merchants^
and manufacturers on the vessels Beatrice^ Maria^ and
MasTwna^ which were seized by British cruisers while on
the way to Delagoa Bay. These articles consisted chiefly
of flour, canned meats, and other food stuffs, but also
embraced lumber, hardware, and various miscellaneous
articles, as well as quantities of lubricating oil, which were
consigned partly to the Netherlands South African Kail-
way, in the Transvaal, and partly to the Louren^o Marques
Railway, a Portuguese concern. It was at first supposed that
the seizures were made on the ground of contraband, and
with reference to this possibility the Government of the
United States declared that it could not recognize their
validity ''under any belligerent right of capture of provi-
sions and other goods shipped by American citizens in
ordinary course of trade to a neutral port." ^
It soon transpired, however, that the Beatrice and
^Mr. Hay, Sec. of State, to Mr. Choate, ambassador at London, tel.,.
Jan. 2, 1900, S. Doc. 173, 56 Cong., 1 sess., 13-14.
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DELAGOA BAY AMERICAN CASES. 85
Mashana^ which were British ships, and the Maria^ which,
though a Dutch ship, was at first supposed to be British,^
were arrested for violating a municipal regulation for-
bidding British subjects to trade with the enemy, the
alleged offense consisting in the transportation of goods
destined to the enemy's territory. The seizure of the car-
goes was declared to be only incidental to the seizure of
the ships. As to certain articles, however (particularly
the oil consigned to the Netherlands South African Rail-
way in the Transvaal), an allegation of enemy's property
was made; but no question of contraband was raised and
.it was eventually agreed that the United States consul-
general at Cape Town should arrange with Sir Alfred
Milner, the British high commissioner, for the release or
purchase by the British Government of any American-
owned goods, which, if purchased, were to be paid for at
the price they would have brought at the port of destina-
tion at the time they would have arrived there in case the
voyage had not been interrupted.'^
In the course of the correspondence Lord Salisbury
thus defined the position of Her Majesty's Government on
the question of contraband:
"Foodstuffs, with a hostile destination, can be consid-
ered contraband of war only if they are supplies for the
enemy's forces. It is not suflScient that they are capable
of being so used; it must be shown that this was in fact
their destination at the time of seizure." ^
Mr. Thomas Gibson Bowles, in a letter in the London
Tlme.^, January 4, 1900, says: '^n July, 1896, the Dutch
steamer Doelwljk took a cargo of arms and ammunition,
destined to Abyssinia, then at war with Italy, from the
neutral port of Rotterdam to the neutral (French) port of
Jibutil, in the Gulf of Tajura. The steamer being cap-
tured by the Italian cruiser Etna and brought in for adju-
dication, was condemned as lawful prize by the prize court
at Rome on December 8, 1896."'
^S. Doc. 173, 56 (^ong., i sess., 16.
•''Mr. Ilay, Sec. of State, tc Mr. Tooiney, March 2, 1900; to the Bal-
lard & Ballard Co., March 9, 190<); to Mr. Newman, March 13, 1900:
243 MS. Dom. Let., 317, 412, 488. *
»S. Doc. 173, 56 Cong., 1 sess., 29.
*S. Doc. 173, 56 Cong., 1 aess., 21-22.
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SITITATIOIS" III.
Two countries, on the verge of war, summon home all
their military and naval officers. When war is declared,
an officer of one of the belligerents, of high rank, whose
presence is specially desired for important service, is on
the high seas, as a passenger on a neutral ship, bound to
an intermediate neutral port, where he intends to take
passage by another vessel for a port in his own country,
or to enter upon active service on one of its men-of-war,
should any call.
May the ship on which the officer is sailing be captured
as prize by a cruiser of the enemy, or may the officer be
taken out and the ship be permitted to proceed 'i
The answer to the foregoing question involves the con-
sideration (1) of the right of a belligerent to prevent the
transportation by a neutral ship of persons in the military'
service of the enemy and (2) of the destination of the
officer in the case stated.
1. Right of the helUgerent. — ^It is admitted that a neutral
vessel engaged in the carriage of persons in the service of a
belligerent becomes liable to condemnation either when the
belligerent "has so hired it that it has become a transport
in his service and that he has entire control over it, or when
the persons on board are such in number, importance, or
distinction, and at the same time the circumstances of their
reception are such, as to create a reasonable presumption
that the owner or his agent intend to aid the belligerent
in his war.*" ^ This rule leaves open the question as to the
carriage of persons in the service of a belligerent by a neu-
tral vessel in the ordinary course of trade. The view has
been expressed that if such persons may be classed as con-
traband the vessel may be seized and brought in for adju-
dication; but that if the}^ may not be so classed the vessel
in which they are traveling remains a ship under neutral
^ Hall, International Law, 4th ed., p. 701.
86
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SITUATION III SOLUTION. 87
jurisdiction which has not been brought by the conduct of
the persons having control over it within the scope of those
exceptional rights in restraint of trade which belligerents
have been allowed to assume/ On the other hand, the
view has been expressed that "it is incorrect to speak of
the conveyance of persons in the military or civil employ-
ment of a belligerent as if it were the same thing as the
conveyance of contraband of war, or as if the same rules
were applicable to it. It is a different thing, and the rules
applicable to it are different/' ^ Apparenth" the great
majority of writers treat the transportation of persons in
the military service of the enemy either as a carriage of
contraband or as an act analogous thereto. It is proba-
ble, however, that too much importance has been given to
this somewhat technical aspect of the matter, since it seems
to be generalh' agreed that the carriage of such persons to
a military destination is an enemy service far more impor-
tant than the carriage of contraband. From the belliger-
ent's point of view the importance of the act consists not
in the manner or in the motive with which it may be done,
but in the aid rendered to the enemy. Whether the cir-
cumstances of the transportation may or ma}^ not be such
as to render the vessel liable to confiscation, it is reasona-
ble to hold that it is a right of the belligerent to take
proper measures to prevent the enemy from receiving
military aid under the protection of a neutml flag. As to
the number of military persons necessary to sul)ject the
vessel to confiscation no rule can be laid down. "To
carry a veteran general under some circumstances might
be a much more noxious act than the conveyance of a
whole regiment." ^
2. Deatinaflon. — Upon the facts stated, the destination
of the oflScer in question, though he is immediatel}" bound
to a neutral port, appears to be in realit}^ belligerent. It
has been declared that even provisions which, although
destined to the enemy's country, are not in general
contraband, are to be deemed such " if destined for the
army or nav}^ of the enem}'^ or for his ports of naval or
^ Hall, International Law, 4th ed., p. 705.
^Mountague Bernard, quoted by Hall, International Law, 4th ed.,
p. 708.
'^Lawrence's Wheaton, edition of 1863, p. 802.
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88 TRANSPORTATION OF MILITARY PERSONS NOTES.
military equipment."^ The destination of the officer in
(juestion for ''military use" is, in the case stated, evident.
Conclmion. — Although the case of the Trent related to
persons in the diplomatic and not in the military service
of the enemy, a considerable majority of the authorities
seem to concur in the opinion that the discussion which
then took place resulted in a general understanding that in
the absence of a treaty it is no longer allowable to take
persons out of a neutral ship, but that the ship herself, with
the noxious persons on board, must be brought in for judi-
cial examination. In the case stated, therefore, the ship
should be seized arrid brought in with the officer on board.
The fact that he embarked before the declaration of war
doubtless would be taken into considei'ation by the prize
court in making up its judgment. While such a circum-
stance might materially affect the question of the ship's
culpabilit}^, it would not appear to destroy, any more than
in the case of contraband, the right of the belligerent to
prevent his enemy from receiving military aid under cover
of a neutral flag.
NOTES ON SITUATION HI.
The ''Instructions to blockading vessels and cruisers,"
issued by the Nav^y Department during the war with Spain,^
contained the following clause:
''16. A neutral vessel in the service of the enemy, in
the transportation of troops or military persons, is liable
to seizure."
Stockton's Naval War Code contains a similar but ampli-
fied provision as follows:
"Art. 16. Neutral vessels in the military or naval serv-
ice of the eneni}', or under the control of the enemy for
military or naval purposes, are subject to capture or
destruction."
It is to be observed, however, that in this clause noth-
ing is expressed as to the transportation of troops or mili-
tary persons, the design appearing to be to class as a
punishable act the performance by a neutral vessel of mili-
tary or naval services for the enemy, perhaps under the
latter's immediate employment or control.
^ The Comiiiercen, AVheaton, 382.
Hxeneral Orders No. 492, June 20, 1898.
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TREATY CLAUSES. 89^
Another provision of the code which ma}" be cited here
reads as follows:
"Art. 35. Vessels, whether neutral or otherwise, carry-
ing contraband of war destined for the enemy are liable
to seizure and detention, unless treaty stipulations other-
wise provide."
This clause would cover the carriage of military persons,
should such persons be admitted to fall within the category
of contraband.
In numerous treaties running back to the seventeenth
century, a provision may be found in connection with the
subject of contraband to the effect that the persons of ene-
mies shall not be taken out of free ships unless the}^ are
military persons in the actual service of the enem3\ Such
a clause may be found in various treaties entered into by
the United States with foreign powers. Article XXIII
of the treaty of amity and commerce with France of Fe))-
ruary 6, 1778 — the first treaty concluded by the United
States — stipulated that free ships should make free goods,
and in connection therewith that the same liberty should
be extended to persons on board such ships, so that, "al-
though they be enemies to both or either party, the}^ are
not to be taken out of that free ship unless they are sol-
diers and in actual service of the enemies." A similar
clause ma}" be found in Article XIV of the treaty with
France of September 30, 1800; in Article XI of the treaty
with the Netherlands of October 8, 1782; in Article VII
of the treaty with Sweden of April 3, 1783, and in various
other early treaties, most of which have ceased to be in
force. A similar provision has, however, been included
by the United States in various recent or comparatively
recent conventions. It may be found in Article XV of the
treaty with New Granada (Colombia) of December 12,
1846; in Article XVI of the treaty with Bolivia of May
13, 1858; in Article XIX of the treaty with Hayti of No-
vember 3, 1864; in Article XVI of the treaty with Italy
of 1871; in Article XVII of the treaty with JPeru of Au-
gust 31, 1887. The usual form of the clause in these later
treaties is that the freedom of the ship shall extend to per-
sons on board, even if they be enemies, "unless they are
officers or soldiers in the actual service of the enem3^"
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•90 TRANSPORTATION OF MILITARY PERSONS NOTES.
These clauses obviously imply that officers and soldiers
in the actual service of the enemy may be taken out of a
neutral ship without judicial proceedings. In this respect
they bear the trace of their origin in a time when the
authority and necessity of prize adjudication were not so
well settled and understood as now; and when the claims
of belligerents to interdict neutral intercourse with their
enemies, and neutral carrying trade of persons and goods,
were almost unlimited, and their practices loose and
irregular.^ Although they must be conceded to possess,
in existing treaties, the force of law as between the con-
tracting parties, their perpetuation is perhaps to be
ascribed rather to the habit of employing ancient forms
than to intelligent design, and it would therefore be unsafe
to assume that the act which they authorize would be
admitted to-day in the absence of an express treaty stipu-
lation. Nevertheless, they clearly exemplify the opinion
that the transportation on the high seas of military persons
in actual service is an act the consummation of which the
adverse belligerent has a right to prevent.
Frequent reference is made to certain decisions of Sir
William Scott in cases involving the carriage of militarj^
persons or of official dispatches. These cases are reviewed
by Dana, in a note to his edition of Wheaton (pp. 640-643).
His summaries are generally accurate^ but in a few par-
ticulars they do not appear to be borne out by the printed
record, while in the cases relating to official dispatches he
iails to disclose certain points of crucial importance.
The principal cases decided by Sir William Scott in re-
lation to the carriage of military persons are those of the
Carolina, 4 C. Rob., 256, April 30, 1802; the Friendship,
6 C. Rob., 420, August 20, 1807; and the Orozenibo, 6 C.
Rob., 430, September 24, 1807. In each of these cases the
vessel was condemned as a transport of the enemy, en-
gaged, either under contract or under duress, in the car-
riage of military persons. In the case of the FriendsJiip,
Sir William Scott said: ''It is asked, Will you lay down a
principle that may be carried to the length of preventing a
military officer, in the service of the enemy, from finding
» Bernard, Case of The Trent, 14-20, cited by Dana, Note to
Wheaton, 657.
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SIR w. scott's opinions. 91
his way home in a neutral vessel from America to Europe ?
If he was going merely as an ordinary passenger, as other
passengers do, and at his own expense, the question would
present itself in a very different form. Neither this court,,
nor any other British tribuniil, has ever laid down the
principle to that extent. This is a case differently com-
posed."
The question of a military officer in the service of the
enemy ''finding his way home in a neutral vessel" was
thus expressly reserved. In the same case, however, Sir
William Scott, referring to the transportation of military
persons for a belligerent, observed: ''Shall it be said
then that this is an innoxious trade, or that it is an inno-
cent occupation of the vessel? What are arms and ammu-
nition in comparison with men, who may be going to be
conveyed, perhaps to renew their activity on our shores V^
Discussing, in the case of the Orozembo^ the question of
the number of the persons carried, he declared: "Number
alone is an insignificant circumstance * * *^ since
fewer persons of high quality and character may be of
more importance than a much greater number of persons
of lower condition. To send out one veteran general of
France to take the command of the forces at Batavia,
might be a much more noxious act than the conveyance of
a whole regiment. The consequences of such assistance
are greater; and therefore it is what the belligerent has a
stronger right to prevent and punish."
With regard to Sir William Scott's decisions as to the
carriage of official dispatches, it is to be observed (1) that,
in cases in which the vessel, or the vessel and cargo, were
condemned, he proceeded not upon the ground of govern-
mental employment, but simply upon that of the aid
rendered, knowingly or fraudulently, to the enemy; and
(2) that, in cases in which, knowledge or fraud not being
proved, the vessel was restored, the claimants were re-
quired to pay the captors' expenses. Thus, in the case of
The Bapid, Edward's Adm. 228, 1810, Sir William Scott,
in pronouncing sentence of restitution, declared that "in
this, as in every other instance in which the enemy's dis-
patches are found on board a vessel," the master had, "by
failing to exercise the utmost jealousy," and in spite of
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92 TRANSPORTATION OF MILITARY PERSONS NOTES.
the fact that his voyage was to terminate in a neutral
country, "justly subjected himself to all the inconveni-
ences of seizure and detention, and to all the expenses
of those judicial inquiries which they have occasioned."
Moreover, in reference to the nature and importance of
the act in question, Sir William Scott on another occasion
said: "The carrying of two or three cargoes of stores is
necessarih^ an assistance of a limited nature; but in the
transmission of dispatches ma}^ be conve^^ed the entire
plan of a campaign, that may defeat all the projects of the
other belligerents in that quarter of the world." *
The practical f utilitj^ of attempting to base a final solu-
tion of the question under consideration upon the mere
form of the agreement under which military persons in
the service of the enemy are transported — whether they
are carried under a contract with the government or merely
as "passengers" — may be vividly illustrated by a cor-
respondence which took place during the revolution in
Chile in 1891.
In a dispatch to Lord Salisbury of Aug. 12, 1891, Mr.
Kennedy, British minister at Santiago, reported that on
the 26th ultimo he had learned from the agent of the
Pacific Steam Navigation Company, a British concern, at
Valparaiso, that the company's steamer Iheria had been
detained by the authorities two days at Coronel, in order
to embark soldiers for the Government, and that the com-
pany's agent at Coronel, in explanation of his action, which
was contrary to his instructions, stated that his objections
were overruled by the governor of Coronel, who satisfied
him that the soldiers were embarked under Mr. Kennedy's
authority and by his orders. On August 3rd Mr. Ken-
nedy wrote to Senor Zanartu, the minister for foreign
affairs, and requested an explanation of this statement of
the governor, at the same time denjnng that he had given
any orders or authorit}'- in the matter.
Accompanying the dispatch there was a note of Mr.
Kennedy to Senor Zanartu, of Jul}^ 15, 1891, acknowledg-
^ The Atalanta, 6 C. Rob. 440, March 4, 1808. See also The Caro-
line, 6 C. Rob. 461, April 1, 1808; The Constantia, ibid.; The SusaUj
ibid.; The Hope, ibid.; The Madison, Edward's Adm., 224 (1810); The
Riqnd, Edward's Adm., 228 (1810).
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CHILEAN INCIDENT. 93
ing the receipt of a note of the latter, stating that the
Government desired immediately to ship, by the Iheria^
400,000 silver dollars to Montevideo, and also a certain
number of individuals, not possessed of any special char-
acter, to Punta Arenas, and inquiring whether the money
and the passengers could count, in case of seizure by the
revolutionary squadron, on the protection of the British
flag, in the sense of exacting the release of the individuals
and the restitution of the specie. Mr. Kenned}^, in reply,
referred to similar assurances given by hhn in regard to
British vessels cariying wheat to Europe, and to the con-
currence of Her Majesty's senior naval officer on the station
in them.
There was also a letter of Mr. Prain, the company's
agent at Valparaiso, to Mr. Kennedy of Jul}^ 25, 1891,
expressing surprise at the reports from Coronel, especiall}"
as Mr. Kennedy had warned him in a private letter not to
receive ''fighting men" on board as passengers, since b}^
so doing the steamers would run the risk of getting into
trouble in which Her Majestj^'s representatives would not
be able to help them.
In a letter to Mr. Prain of August 8, 1891, Mr. Ken-
ned}^ said:
''I privately conveyed to you, in the interests of your
company, the opinion expressed to me by Admiral Hotham
on the general question of conveyance of troops, stores,
etc., but I abstained from concurring officiall}^ in that opin-
ion as regards the Pacific Steam Navigation Company."
In his dispatch of August 12, Mr. Kennedy, referring
to this correspondence, said:
''As regards the alleged illegalit}^ of the above ship-
ments as asserted by the Oppositionists and their sympa-
thizers, I beg to state that the Pac'ific Steam Navigation
Company are bound under their contract to carry soldiers,
militaiy stores, etc., excepting in the case of war between
two republics on this coast; but, as the Chilean Govern-
ment are now engaged in the suppression of a rebellion,
the above exemption, I venture to think, does not apply.
It is true that in reply to Mr. Prain's private and confi-
dential inquiry I privately reminded him that Admii'al
Hotham had given a general opinion against the transport
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94 TRANSPORTATION OF MILITARY PERSONS NOTES.
of soldiers and stores by British ships; but I did this to
help Mr. Prain in his efforts to induce the authorities to
send their soldiers on board his ship as private passengers^
so as not to compromise his position with the Opposition,
for whom he has strong sympathies, and in the success of
whose cause he is an enthusiastic believer. But, as your
lordship will perceive, I decline to commit mj^self officially
to the opinion that the Pacific-Steam Navigation Company
would, under present circumstances, commit a breach of
neutrality in transporting troops for the Chilean Govern-
ment."' ^
The pui'port of Mr. Kennedy's suggestion appears to
be that, if the persons in question were transported as -
''troops for the Chilean Government,'' the act might be
considered culpable; but that if the same persons, who
were in fact soldiers in the service of that Government,
were taken on board as ''private passengers," the ship
would not be '"compromised" b}^ their transportation.
Perhaps a touch of irony may be detected in Mr. Ken-
nedy's suggestion, since it was not entirely harmonious
with the private advice which he gave on the strength of
Admiral Hotham's opinion.
In the neutrality proclamation issued b}^ the British
Government April 28, 1898, in respect of the war between
the United States and Spain, the acts against which Brit-
ish subjects were warned as being in derogation of their
duty as neutrals, or in contravention of the law of nations,
comprised the '"carrying" of " officers, soldiers, dispatches,
arms, amunuiition, militarv stores or materials, or any
article or articles considered and deemed to be contraband
of war according to the law or modern usages of nations,
for the use or service of either of the said powers."^
In the late controversy between Germany and Great
Britain growing out of the seizure and detention by Brit-
ish cruisers of the Genuan East African mail steamers
Bnnde^rath, Genetud^ and Herzog it appears that one of the
grounds on which the steamer first mentioned was seized
was that she carried "twenty Dutch and Germans and
two supposed Boers, three Germans and two Austrians
1 Chile, No. 1 (1892), 236-242.
2 Proclamations and Decrees during the War with Si)ain, 85.
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BRITISH-GERMAN DISCUSSION. 95
believed to be officers, all believed to be intending com-
batants, although shown as civilians." In repl}'^ to the
request of the German Government for the vessel's re-
lease Lord Salisbury stated, among other things, that she
"had on board a number of passengers believed to be vol-
unteers for service with the Boers." It was subsequently
stated that the search of the ship was expected to disclose
"arms among baggage of Germans on board, who state
openly they are going to the Transvaal." The German
Government declared that it had no knowledge of more
than two of its officers having proceeded to the Transvaal,
where they were unable to obtain commands. The British
Government subsequently directed that every facility for
proceeding to his destination should be afforded "to any
passenger whom the court considers innocent." The
steamer and her cargo were afterwards discharged. In
the case of the Herzog it was alleged, among other things,
that she had on board "a considerable number of male
passengers, many in khaki, apparently soldiers." It
turned out that she had among her passengers three Red
Cross expeditions. The General was said to have on
board a considerable number of Dutch and German pas-
sengers for the Transvaal in plain clothes, but "of mili-
tary appearance," some of whom were believed to be
trained artillerymen. Lord Salisbury afterwards stated
that "there was no sufficient evidence as to their destina-
tion to justify further action on the part of the officers
conducting the search."
In none of these cases was it alleged that the suspected
persons were soldiers in the actual service of the enemy.
They seem rather to have been looked upon as contra-
band, as material immediately useful in war. In this
relation it is to be obsei'ved that Count von Biilow, in a
speech in the Reichstag, Januarj^ 19, 1901, laid down cer-
tain propositions of international law, one of which was
that by the term contraband of war, "only such articles
or persons are to be understood as are suited for war, and
at the same time are destined for one of the belligerents."
By this definition Count von Biilow seems to have concur-
red in the opinion apparently entertained by Lord Salis-
bury, that the transportation of persons suited for war
6482—01 7
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96 TRANSPORTATION OF MILITARY PERSONS NOTES.
and destined for a belligerent may be dealt with as a case
of contraband, without regard to the question whether
such persons are in the actual service of the enemy.
This opinion accords with that of Bluntschli, who says:
" § 815. The transportation of troops or of general
oflScers forming part of belligerent armies, on neutral
ships, is assimilated to'the transportation of materials of
war and is regarded as contraband. The troops or oflScers
may be made prisoners."
By troops he means not only a large force, but a small
number of soldiers with an underoflScer, for example;
and he considers the same principle applicable to a mili-
tary general oflBcer without his command.^
Perels considers as prohibited the transportation of sub-
jects of a belligerent power who are in the actual military
service or who are liable to such service. (Das Interna-
tionale Oflfentliche Seerecht, Berlin, 1882.)
Marquardsen thinks it an essential condition of seizure
that the persons are in the actual military service of the
enemy; and he holds that if Mason and Slidell had been
military persons the question of the legality of their cap-
ture would have been one for the determination of the
prize courts, although the Trent was not under contract
with any government.^
Rivier, in his late work, says;
''Another application of the principles laid down con-
cerns the transportation at sea, by neutral ships, of soldiers
and sailors destined to a belligerent. According to a just
opinion this transportation is forbidden to the neutral
state, but not to its private citizens. The latter undertake
it at their peril and risk. If, as we assume, the owner or
the master of the ship is cognizant of the nature of the
transportation, and that it is of suflScient importance,
which is a question of fact, the injured belligerent may
seize and confiscate the ship.^
See also Fiore, Droit International Public, III, 514,
§ 1602; Field, International Code, § 853; Creasy, First
Platform of International Law, §§ 595, 596.
iLe Droit Int. Codifi^, Lardy's ed., Paris, 1881.
2 Der Trent-Fall, 1862, chap. 10.
^ Principes du Droit des Gens, II, 388.
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INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. 97
The question of the transportation of military persons
has been discussed and has formed the subject of resolu-
tions by the Institute of International Law, not as a
question of contraband, but as a question of prohibited
transportation. In accordance with this view, the Insti-
tute, at its session in Venice in 1896, adopted the follow-
ing resolutions:
" §6. It is forbidden to attack or oppose the transporta-
tion of diplomats or diplomatic couriers: 1st, neutrals;
2nd, those accredited to neutrals; 3rd, navigating under
the neutral flag between neutral ports, or between a neu-
tral port and the port of a belligerent.
"On the contrary, the transportation of the diplomats
of an enemy accredited- to his ally is, except it be in the
course of regular and ordinary traflSc, prohibited: 1st, on
the territories and waters of the belligerents; 2nd, between
their possessions; 3rd, between the allied belligerents.
' ' §7. The transportation of troops, military men, or mili-
tary agents of an enemy is forbidden: 1st, in the waters
of the belligerents; 2nd, between their authorities, ports,
possessions, armies, or fleets; 3rd — when the transporta-
tion is made on account of or by the order or mandate of
the enemy, or to conduct to him (pour lui amener) either
his agents with a commission for the operations of the
war, or military persons already in his service, or auxil-
iaries or troops enrolled in violation of neutrality — between
neutral ports, between those of a neutral and those of a
belligerent, from a neutral point to the army or the fleet
of a belligerent.
"The prohibition does not extend to the transportation
of individuals who are not yet in the military service of
a belligerent, even though their intention is to enter it, or
who make the voyage as simple passengers without mani-
fest connection with the military service.
" § 8. The transportation of despatches (official commu-
nications between official authorities), between two author-
ities of an enemy, who are on land or ships belonging to
or occupied by him, is prohibited, save in regular or ordi-
nary traffic.
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98 TRANSPORTATION OF MILITARY PERSONS NOTES* '
"The prohibition does not extend to transportation
either between neutral ports or from or to some neutral
territory or authority." ^
In connection with the resolutions of the Institute, ref-
erence should be made to the work of M. Kleen, entitled
"De la Contrebande de Guerre et des Transports Interdits
aux Neutres," Paris, 1893, which he prepared especially
for the elucidation of the questions before the Institute.
While the controversy between Germany and Great
Britain, as to the seizure of the German mail steamers,
was in its early stages. Prof. T. E. Holland, editor of the
British "Admiralty Manual of the Law of Prize," in a
letter dated Jan. 2, 1900, and published in the London
Times of the next day, said:
"The carriage by a neutral ship of enemy troops, or of
even a few military officers, as also of enemy dispatches,
is an ' enemy service ' of so important a kind as to involve
the confiscation of the vessel concerned, a penalty which,
under ordinary circumstances, is not imposed upon car-
riage of 'contraband' properly so called. See Lord
Sto well's luminous judgments in Orozembo (6 Rob., 430)
and Atalanta (id. , 440). The alleged offense of the ship
BuTidesratK would seem to be of this description."
When this letter was written, the facts in the case of the
Bundesrath had not been definitely ascertained; but, with-
out regard to any particular case, it is obvious from the
passage quoted that, where the transportation of military
persons is in question, Professor Holland considers the car-
riage of the persons, and not the special letting out of the
ship to a belligerent government for that purpose, as the
gravamen of the charge of "enemy service," and that he
interprets the decisions of Sir William Scott as authority
for this view.
1 Annuaire, XV, 231-232.
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NEUTRALS AND ENEMY CONVOY. 99
SITUATION IV.
A United States naval force falls in with and subdues a
naval force of the enemy engaged in convoying a fleet of
merchant vessels. Among the latter is found a neutral
vessel, bound to an unblockaded port, with a cargo con-
taining nothing of a contraband character.
Should the vessel be released, or be brought before a
prize court?
SOLUTION.
The question whether the acceptance by a neutral vessel
of the convoy of a belligerent man-of-war is an illegal act,
which in itself affords good ground for condemnation if
such vessel be captured by the other belligerent, is one
which has been much discussed and which has given rise
to not a little divergence of opinion. The affirmative of
the question is maintained by the English courts and
English writers, and also by leading publicists of the
United States, among whom may be mentioned Kent,
Duer, Woolsey, and Dana.^
On the other hand, the Government of the United States
on one occasion took the opposite ground, maintaining, in
a controversy with Denmark which arose in 1810, that so
long as the association of the neutral vessel with the bellig-
erent convoy was not attended with any attempt at con-
cealment or deceit, nor with any participa-tion in the actual
resistance of the convoying force, she did not lose her
neutral character. In this controversy the United States
was ultimately represented by Mr. Wheaton, who thus
became committed to that view. But, while it was con-
tended by Mr. Wheaton that the mere association, though
voluntary, of the neutral vessel with the belligerent con-
voy did not justify condemnation, yet it was not denied
by him that such association afforded ground for bringing
in the vessel for adjudication, although he intimated in the
course of his argument that in at least some of the cases
before him there was no other association than that which
' Dana's Wheaton, 708, note 245.
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100 SITUATION IV NOTES.
resulted from an accidental and temporary coincidence of
routes.
Mr. William Beach Lawrence, referring to the negotia-
tion with Denmark, says: "That the success of the nego-
tiation was, in a great degree, to be attributed to the
personal character and special qualities of Mr. Wheaton
can not be doubted by anyone who reads the passages
which we have cited from eminent publicists."^ In the
passages thus referred to the view opposite to that ex-
pounded by Mr. Wheaton is maintained, and it appears to
be supported by the preponderance of recent opinion.
Snow, referring to the question " whether neutral vessels
who place themselves under the convoy of a belligerent
cruiser are liable to capture and confiscation," states that
"the weight of opinion favors the doctrine that such acts
are sufficient to condemn the vessel."^ Says Rivier: "A
neuti'al merchant vessel which sails under enemy convoy
violates neutrality; its seizure and confiscation would be
legitimate."^
Upon full consideration of the subject in all its aspects,
including the discussions between the United States and
Denmark, it seems to be unquestionable that the vessel
should not be released, but should be sent in for adjudi-
cation.
NOTES ON SITUATION IV.
The controversy between the United States and Den-
mark, mentioned in the foregoing solution, grew out of
the enforcement of certain revised instructions which were
issued to the Danish men-of-war and privateers, March 28,
1810. By one clause of these instructions all vessels were
declared to be good prize which had " made use of British
convoy either in the Atlantic or the Baltic."* Under this
clause 18 American vessels were seized in 1810, out of a
total of 122 captures of American vessels by Danish
cruisers in that year.
The convoy cases were first discussed, on the part of the
United States, by Mr. George W. Erving, who was sent
as special minister to Copenhagen in 1811. In the course
of a comprehensive general report of June 23, 1811, on
^Wheaton's Elements, Lawrence's ed. of 1863, p. 871.
''Stockton's Snow, 163.
3Principes du Droit des Gens, II, 424: Paris, 1896.
*Am. State Papers, For. Rel., Ill, 329, 524.
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CONTROVERSY WITH DENMARK. 101
the Danish captures, he thus referred to the convoy cases:
"The ground on which they stand, I am aware, is not
perfectly solid, yet I did not feel myself authorized to
abandon them, and therefore have taken up an argument
which may be diflScult, but which I shall go as far as pos-
sible in maintaining."^ The Danish Government, how-
ever, contended " that neutral vessels that make use of the
convoy or protection of the vessels of war of Great Brit-
ain are to be considered as good prize if the Danish
privateers capture them under convoy." Such was the
construction given by Denmark to the convoy clause,
which, as thus interpreted, that Government refused to
modify. The principle on which the clause was justified
was, as stated by Mr. de Rosenkrantz, Danish minister of
foreign affairs, "that he who causes himself to be pro-
tected, by that act ranges himself on the side of the pro-
tector, and thus puts himself in opposition to the enemy
of the protector, and evidently renounces the advantages
attached to the character of friend to him against whom
he seeks the protection. If Denmark should abandon this
principle the navigators of all nations would find their
account in carrying on the commerce of Great Britain
under the protection of British ships of war, without run-
ning any risk. We every day see this done, the Danish
Government not being able to place in the way of it any
obstacles."^
After May, 1811, few American vessels were molested
by the Danes, and between May, 1812, when Mr. Christo-
pher Hughes' special mission ended, and 1827, when Mr.
Wheaton was sent as minister to Denmark, little serious
effort was made to effect a settlement of any of the claims
against that Government.
Mr. Wheaton's principal argument in relation to the
convoy cases was embraced in a note of Nov. 24, 1829.*
He assumed the following grounds:
1. That under the convoy clause vessels and cargoes
were condemned by the high court of admiralty, although
in most, if not in all, such cases there was satisfactory
proof that the vessels had been compelled to join the Brit-
ish convoy, and although the Danish prize ordinance was
^ Am. State Papers, For. Rel., Ill, 521.
2 Am. State Papers, For. Rel., Ill, 526.
3 H. Doc. 249, 22 Cong., 1 sess., 34-38.
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102 ENEMY CONVOY NOTES.
not known at St. Petersburg when they sailed from that
port. Whoever considered the geographical position of
the Baltic Sea, its outlets into the ocean, and the winds
and currents by which its navigation was affected would,
said Mr. Wheaton, readily perceive how diflScult it must
have been for neutrals passing during the war through
the narrow and sinuous channels to avoid becoming entan-
gled in the numerous convoys of the enemy of Denmark,
even supposing that there was no disposition on the one
side to receive or on the other to impart protection against
the multiplied perils of those times. To make the protec-
tion accidentally received by or forcibly obtruded upon
the neutral under these circumstances a ground of confis-
cation was an injustice strikingly apparent.
Comment, — ^This ground, it ma}^ be observed, was in the
nature of a confession and avoidance, since, while admit-
ting the presence of the vessels with the convoy, it sug-
gested as excuses want of notice and coercion.
2. But it was, said Mr. Wheaton, less material to dwell
on this aspect of the case, since the United States wholly
denied the principle on which the clause in question was
founded. This clause, as construed by the Danish tri-
bunals, involved, so Mr. Wheaton declared, "the applica-
tion of a principle (to say the least) of doubtful authority,
to the confiscation of neutral property for a supposed
offence committed, not by the owner, but by his agent,
without the knowledge or orders of the owners, under a
belligerent edict, retrospective in its operation, because
unknown to those whom it was to affect." As interpreted
by the Danish tribunals, it made '' the fact of having nav-
igated under the enemy's convoy * * * pe7' se2i justi-
fiable cause (not of capture merel}^ but) of condemnation
in the tribunals of the opposite belligerent, and that with-
out inquiring into the proofs of proprietary^ interest or the
circumstances and motives under which the captured vessel
had joined the convo}^ or into the legality of the voj^age,
or the innocence of her conduct in other respects." A
belligerent pretension so harsh, apparently so new, and so
important in its consequences, said Mr. Wheaton, must,
before neutral nations could consent to it, be rigorously
demonstrated on the authority of writers and the usage of
nations; yet no expounder of the law of nations ev^en men-
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MR. wheaton's argument. 108
tioned it, and still less could it be asserted that any neutral
nation had ever acquiesced in it. Even the records of the
British courts might be searched in vain for any support
of the pretension that the fact of having sailed under bel-
ligerent convoy was in all cases and under all circumstances
conclusive cause of condemnation. Being found in com-
pany with an enemy's convoy might, indeed, furnish a pre-
sumption that the captured vessel and cargo belonged to
the enemy, but it was a slight presumption only, which
would readily yield to countervailing proof, and for this
purpose the vessel should have been permitted to show,
for example, that she had been compelled to join the con-
voy, or that she had joined it to protect herself not from
examination by Danish cruisers but against others whose
notorious conduct and avowed principles rendered it cer-
tain that captures by them would be followed by con-
demnation.
Comment. — From this argument it is to be inferred that
the Danish tribunals gave to the clause in question a more
extensive effect than that ascribed to it b}^ the Danish Gov-
ernment. The construction of that Government, expressed
in the correspondence with Mr. Erving, was, as has been
seen, that vessels seized on the ground of accepting British
protection were '' good prize if the Danish privateers cap-
ture them under convoy;" while, as stated by Mr. Whea-
ton, " the fact of having navigated under the enemy's con-
voy " was held by the tribunals to be in itself a cause of
condemnation.
3. Mr. Wheaton also contended that as Denmark had,
when neutral, asserted the right to protect her commerce
against belligerent visitation and search b}^ means of armed
convoys of her own public ships, she was a fortiori pre-
cluded from asserting a right to condenm neutral vessels
for sailing under belligerent convoy. Great Britain treated
navigating under the convoy of a neutral ship as a ground
of condemnation, because it tended to defeat the lawful
right of belligerent search and render every attempt to
exercise it a contest of violence. But the belligerent, con-
tinued Mr. Wheaton, had a right to resist; and the mas-
tei's of vessels under his convo}^ not participating in his
resistance, could no more be involved in the legal conse-
quences of resistance than could the neutral shipper of
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104 E^^EMY CONVOY NOTES.
goods on a belligerent vessel or the neutral owner of goods
found in a belligerent fortress. If the vessels in question
had been armed, and had thus contributed to augment the
force of the belligerent convoy, or if they had actually
participated in battle with the Danish cruisers, they would
justly have fallen by the fate of war. They were, how-
ever, unarmed merchantmen, whose junction with the con-
voying squadron, by expanding the sphere of its protection,
tended to weaken it; and instead of participating in the
enemy's resistance, there was in fact no battle and no
resistance, and they fell a defenceless prey to the force of
the assailants.
Comment. — ^This branch of Mr. Wheaton's argument
embraces the questions of (1) neutral convoy and (2) neu-
tral goods shipped on an armed enemy vessel. As to the
first question, it may be observed that the conception of
neutral convoy by nations which recognize and practise it
is not that of resistance to search, but of the substitution
for the process of search of a responsible governmental
guarantee. This idea is conveyed in Stockton's Naval War
Code:
"Art. 30. * * * Convoys of neutral merchant ves-
sels, under escort of vessels of war of their own state, are
exempt from the right of search, upon proper assurances,
based on thorough examination, from the commander of
the convoy."
As to the second question, Mr. Wheaton's contention
was drawn from the case of the Net^eide^ in which the
goods were held to be exempt, Mr. Justice Story and one
other justice dissenting, while two others were absent.^
From this decision Mr. Wheaton reasons by analogy, and
to a great extent draws his language on this point. It is,
however, to be noticed that in a subsequent case the Su-
preme Court sharply distinguished the case of lading goods
on an armed enemy vessel from that of the acceptance of
belligerent convoy.^ Mr. Wheaton himself, in his treatise
on international law, thus summarizes the court's reason-
ing on the subject of belligerent convoy: ''A convoy was
an association for a hostile object. In undertaking it a
State spreads over the merchant vessels an immunity from
search which belongs only to a national ship; and by joining
1 9 Cranch, 388. ^ The Atalanta, 3 Wheaton, 409.
2 Dana's Wheaton, 698, note 243.
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ME. wheaton's aegument. 105
a convoy, every individual vessel puts off her pacific char-
acter, and undertakes for the discharge of duties which
belong only to the militarj'^ marine. If, then, the associ-
ation be voluntary, the neutral, in suffering the fate of the
entire convo}^, has only to regret his own folly in wedding
his fortune to theirs; or if involved in the resistance of the
convoying ship, he shares the fate to which the leader of
his own choice is liable in case of capture."^
4. Mr. Wheaton further contended that, in view of the
multiplied ravages to which American commerce was then
exposed on every sea, from the sweeping decrees of con-
fiscation fulminated by the great belligerent powers, the
conduct of the vessels in question might be sufficiently
accounted for without resorting to the supposition that
they nieant to resist, or even to evade, the exercise of the
belligerent rights of Denmark. Even admitting that the
neutral American had no right to put himself under con-
voy in order to avoid the exercise of the right of visitation
and search by a friend^ as Denmark professed to be, he
had still a perfect right, said Mr. Wheaton, to defend him-
self against his enemy ^ as France had shown herself to be,
by her conduct, and the avowed principles upon which she
had declared open war against all neutral trade. Denmark
had a right to capture the commerce of her enemy, and
for that purpose to search and examine vessels under the
neutral flag, whilst America had an equal right to protect
her commerce against French capture by all the means
allowed by the ordinary laws of war between enemies.
The exercise of this right was wholly unaffected by the
circumstance of the war existing between Denmark and
England, or by the alliance between Denmark and France.
America and England were at peace. The alliance between
Denmark and France was against England, not against
America; and the Danish Government, which refused to
adopt the decrees of Berlin and Milan as the rule of its
conduct towards neutrals, surely could not consider it
culpable, on the part of American shipmasters, to have
defended themselves against the operation of those decrees
by every means in their power. If the use of any of these
means conflicted in any degree with the belligerent rights
of Denmark, that was an incidental consequence, which
^ Dana'H Wheaton, 698.
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106 ENEMY CONVOY NOTES.
could not be avoided by the parties without sacrificing
their rights of self-defence.
Comment, — ^With regard to this particular contention,
it may be suggested that, while it assumes that the British
convo}'^ was accepted for protection against French and not
against Danish cruisers, and therefore (contrary to conten-
tion 1) deliberately, it also assumes that a neutral vessel
may, at the expense of the rights of one belligerent, seek
from another that protection which its own Government
may fail to give against the exorbitant pretensions of a
third belligerent. In order to support this contention, it
should seem that the facts would in any event have to be
clearly established.
5. But, finally, even supposing that it was the intention
of the American shipmaster, in sailing with the British
convoy, to escape from Danish as well as French cruisers,
that intention had, Mr. Wheaton further contended, failed
of its efl^ect; and it might be asked what belligerent right
of Denmark had been practically injured by such an abor-
tive attempt? '^If any," said Mr. Wheaton, ''it must be
the right of visitation and search. But the right of visita-
tion and search is not a substantive and independent right,
with which belligerents are invested by the law of nations
for the purpose of wantonly vexing and interrupting the
commerce of neutrals. It is a right growing out of the
greater right of capturing enemy's property or contraband
of war, and to be used as a means to an end to enforce the
exercise of that right. Here the exercise of the right was
never, in fact, opposed, and no injury has accrued to the
belligerent. But it may be said that it might have been
opposed, and entirely defeated, had it not been for the
accidental circumstance of the separation of these vessels
from the convoying force, and that the entire commerce of
the world with the Baltic Sea might thus have been effectu-
ally protected from Danish capture. And it might be
asked in reply, what injury would have resulted to the
belligerent rights of Denmark from this circumstance ? If
the property be neutral, and the voyage lawful (as the}" were
in the present instance), what injur}" would result from the
vessels escaping from examination ? On the other hand,
if the property was that of the enemy, its escape must be
attributed to the superior force of the enemy,which, though
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MR. wheaton's argument. 107
a lo88^ would not be an injury of which Denmark would
have a legal right to complain."
Comment, — With regard to this special phase of the
case it may be observed that the contention that whether
or no the vessel was enemy's property or otherwise sub-
ject to capture, no injury Was done to the belligerent
whose exercise of the right of search was prevented, may
be accepted merely as a reassertion of one view of the
controversy, since it obviously assumes the point at issue,
viz, whether such prevention was an injury of which the
belligerent had a right to complain, or in other words, a
substantial injury.
Considering Mr. Wheaton's argument as a whole, it
appears (1) that it was directed against the condemnation
and not against the capture of the vessels; (2) that it was
chiefly designed to show that the condemnations were,
under the special circumstances of the case, improper; (3)
that it alleged that the condemnations proceeded upon a
construction of the instructions of 1810 which was, as has
been pointed out, more extensive in its effect than that
which was originally given to them by the Danish Gov-
ernment; (4) that it nowhere suggests that the acceptance
of belligerent convoy did not create an adverse presump-
tion which justified the sending in of the vessels for
adjudication.
On March 28, 1830, a convention was signed by which
the King of Denmark, while renouncing all claims against
the United States, agreed to pay a lump sum of 650,000
Spanish milled dollars "on account of the citizens of the
United States, who have preferred claims relating to the
seizure, detention, condemnation, or confiscation of their
vessels, cargoes, or property whatsoever, by the public or
private armed ships, or by the tribunals of Denmark, or
in the States subject to the Danish sceptre," during the
maritime war in question. And it was further stipulated
that "the intention of the two high contracting parties
being solely to terminate, definitely and irrevocably, all
the claims which have hitherto been preferred, they
expressly declare that the present convention is only appli-
cable to the cases therein mentioned, and, having no other
object, can never hereafter be invoked by one party or
the other as a precedent or rule for the future."
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SITUATION T.
Hostilities have broken out in a certain country between
the titular government and its opponents. These hostil-
ities are carried on only to a slight extent on land, where
the government for the most part successfully maintains
its authority. The opponents of the government have not
been recognized by foreign governments as belligerents.
Their force is derived chiefly from the national navy,
which, with the exception of two or three vessels, took
an original part in the insurrection. The ships in
revolt, without attempting to maintain a blockade, en-
deavor to control and interrupt the commerce of one of
the principal ports of the countr3^ On one occasion they
arrest, within the limits of the port and in territorial waters,
a neutral ship laden with arms and munitions of war and on
its way to a wharf to deliver its cargo to agents of the titular
government. The master appeals to the commander of a
naval force of his own country for protection. Naval ves-
sels of several foreign countries are then lying in the
harbor, and there has been a general cooperation among
them for the protection of commerce from unlawful inter-
ference. The foreign governments, however, all profess
an attitude of nonintervention in the conflict.
What action should be taken on the appeal of the master?
SOLUTION.
On the situation above stated the reports of the various
committees exhibited a divergence of views. This diver-
gence may be explained as follows:
On the one hand, the view was taken that, as the trade
in arms and munitions of war is not prohibited by the
neutrality laws, and as the insurgents had not been recog-
nized as belligerents, foreign governments might, in their
discretion, according to the measure of privilege which
they should accord to the insurgents, protect or decline to
protect their citizens in furnishing arms and munitions of
war to the titular government, even in the territorial
waters of the country where the insurrection prevails.
108
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SITUATION V SOLUTION. 109'
In support of this view the following well-known pas-
sage, in an instruction of Mr. Fish, as Secretary of State,
in relation to certain vessels in the service of insurgents
against the Government of Haiti, was cited:
"Regarding them simply as armed cruisers of insurgents
not yet acknowledged by this Government to have attained
belligerent rights, it is competent to the United States to
deny and resist the exercise by those vessels or any other
agents of the rebellion of the privileges which attend
maritime war, in respect to our citizens or property enti-
tled to our protection. We may or may not, at our
option, as justice or policy may require, treat them as
pirates in the absolute and unqualified sense, or we may,
as the circumstances of any actual case shall suggest,
waive the extreme right and recognize, where facts war-
rant it, an actual intent on the part of the individual
offenders, not to depredate in a criminal sense and for pri-
vate gain, but to csLptnre jure hellL It is sufficient for the
present purpose that the United States will not admit any
commission or authority proceeding from rebels as a justi-
fication or excuse for injury to persons or property enti-
tled to the protection of this Government. They will not
tolerate the search or stopping by cruisers in the rebel
service of vessels of the United States, nor any other act
which is only privileged by recognized belligerency."^
On the other hand, the view was maintained that the
solution in the present case does not depend upon the rec-
ognition or nonrecognition of belligerency, nor upon the
extent of the obligations which neutral governments are
obliged to perform; that Mr. Fish, in denying to the
insurgents "the privileges which attend maritime war,"
evidently referred to the exercise of the rights of war on
the high seas, and not to the conduct of hostilities within
the jurisdiction of Haiti; that the acts, the commission of
which within their jurisdiction neutral governments are
obliged to prevent, b}^ no means comprise all acts of an
unneutral character, against which the parties to an armed
conflict are permitted to exercise, within proper limits,
measures of prevention ; and that, as the supply of arms
and munitions of war is a direct military aid, foreign gov-
ernments, though they abstain from recognizing the insur-
gents as belligerents and from thus acknowleding their
1 Wharton's Int. Law Digest, III, 466.
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110 INSURGENTS AND CONTRABAND NOTES.
right to interrupt even unneuti-al commerce on the high
seas, are not, so long as they profess an attitude of non-
intervention, justified in interfering at the domestic scene
of hostilities to protect their citizens in furnishing such
materials to either party. *
It may be observed that the instructions issued by the
United States in the case of the insurrection in Brazil, in
1893-1894, although they explicitly concede the right of
the insurgent fleet to carry on hostilities within Brazilian
jurisdiction, do not expressly cover the present situation;
nor does it appear to have been involved in any protective
action taken by the naval representatives of the United
States on that occasion. The question was, however, sug-
gested in correspondence, and as the record leaves it in an
unsatisfactory position, it appears to be a proper subject
for official elucidation.
NOTES ON SITUATION V.
Revolution in Chile ^ 1891. — This situation is suggested
by events which took place in Chile during the revolution
of 1891, and by certaiin occurrences in the harbor of Rio
de Janeiro during the revolt of the Brazilian squadron in
1893-1894. It involves the question of the rights of insur-
gents, who have not been recognized as belligerents, when
such insurgents are carrying on hostilities within the
jurisdiction of the disturbed state. The question of hos-
tilities on the high seas, discussed in the case of the
Amhrose Licjht^ is not embraced in it, though it may
now and then incidentally appear in the narrative.
The revolution in Chile grew out of a controversy
between President Balmaceda and the Congress as to the
power of the former to maintain in office a cabinet upon
which Congressional censure had been pronounced. Under
the Chilean constitution of 1833 the President possessed
the power to appoint and remove public officials; but it
had been the practice for the ministry, on a vote of cen-
sure by Congress, to resign. This custom President Bal-
maceda essayed to break. On the night of January 6,
1891, a number of the leaders of the opposition, including
the vice-president of the Senate and the president of the
Chamb^' of Deputies, went on board the national fleet
lying at Valparaiso, and in the name of the Congress pro-
125 Fed. Rep., 408.
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REVOLUTION IN CHILE, 1891. Ill
claimed a revolution. The ships taking part in the move-
ment were the Blanco JEncalada^ Almirante Cochrane^
Esmeralda^ Haascar^ O^Higgins^ and Magdlanes^ the
command of which when they revolted was assumed by
Capt. Jorge Montt, of the Chilean navy.^
The principal incident in which the United States was
concerned during the continuance of hostilities, was the
recover}^ of the Itata^ the insurgent transport, which
escaped from the custody of United States officials at San
Diego, California, while under arrest on a charge of
violating the neutrality laws. This incident, however,
does not fall within the purview of the present discussion.
Report of Admiral McCann, — In a report to the Secre-
tary of the Navy, February 9, 1891, Rear- Admiral McCann,
U. S. flagship Pensa^ola^ stated that the insurgents had
seized Chilean coast steamers for use as transports, but
had not interfered with foreign steamers; that merchant
vessels were asked for supplies, which were refused in
order not to incur trouble with the shore authorities; that
the insurgent ships were stationed off the port for observa-
tion rather than blockade, vessels being allowed to pass in
and out freely; but that in some instances lighters loaded
with supplies had been taken from alongside merchant
steamers.^
Instructions to Admiral Brown, — March 26, 1891, Mr.
Tracy, Secretary of the Navy, gave to Rear-Admiral
Brown, who had been sent out to relieve Admiral McCann,
the following instructions:^
^'(1) To abstain froni any proceedings which shall be in
the nature of assistance to either party in the j)resent dis-
turbance, or from which sympathy with either party could
be inferred.
" (2) In reference to the ships which have been declared
■ outlawed by the Chilean Government, if such ships attempt
to commit injuries or depredations upon the persons or
property of Americans, you are authorized and directed
to interfere in whatever wa}? may be deemed necessary to
prevent such acts; but you are not to interfere except for
the protection of the lives or property of American citizens.
^H. Ex. Doc. 91, 52 Cong., 1 sess., 2-3.
*H. Ex. Doc. 91, 52 Cong., 1 sess., 235.
»H. Ex. Doc. 91, 52 Cong., 1 sess., 245-246.
6482—01 8
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112 INSURGENTS AND CONTRABAND NOTES.
' ' (3) Vessels or other property belonging to our citizens
I which may have been seized by the insurgents upon the
high seas and for which no just settlement or compensa-
tion has been made are liable to forcible recover}^; but the
. facts should be ascertained before proceeding to extreme
measures and all effort made to avoid such measures.
''(4) Should the bombardment of any place, by which
the lives or property of Americans may be endangered,
be attempted or threatened by such ships, you will, if and
when your force is sufficient for the purpose, require them
to refrain from bombarding the place until sufficient time
has been allowed for placing American life and property
in safety.
''You will enforce this demand if it is refused, and if it
is gmnted, proceed to give effect to the measures neces-
sary for the security of such life or property. * * *
''6th. Referring to paragraph 18, page 137, of the Navj^
Regulations of 1876, which is as follows:
" 'If any vessel shall be taken acting as a vessel of war
or a privateer without having proper commission so to
act, the officers and crew shall be considered as pimtes,
and treated accordingly.'
''You are informed that this paragraph does not refer
to vessels acting in the interests of insurgents and direct-
ing their hostilities solely against the state whose authority
they have disputed. It is only when such vessels commit
piratical acts that they are to be treated as pirates, and
unless their acts are of such a character or are directed
against the persons or property of Americans you are not
authorized to interfere with them.
"7th. In all cases where it becomes necessary to take
forcible measures, force will only be used as a last resort,
and then only to the extent which is necessary to effect
the object in view."
British Correspondence. — A fuller report of the acts of
the insurgent fleet may be found in the correspondence of
the British Government, under whose supervision the
commercial and shipping interests of the country, being
largely in English hands, immediately fell. Questions
were raised (1) as to blockade, (2) as to seizures of coal
and other cargoes, and (3) as to the payment of duties.
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REVOLUTION IN CHILE, 1891. 113
Questions of, hlockade, — When the revolution was an-
nounced, the British naval forces in Chile were instructed
by the Admiralty to '^take no part except protection of
British interests."^ Early in the conflict, the Congres-
sional deputation on the insurgent fleet notified the Gov-
ernment authorities and the' foreign representatives that
Iquique and Valparaiso would be blockaded on February
1, 1891. The Government declared that the blockade
would be illegal, and urged the diplomatic corps to protest
against it. At the request of the minister for foreign
affairs, the diplomatic representatives of France, Germany,
Great Britain, and the United States met at the foreign
office to discuss the subject. On consulting they agreed
that the blockade would be illegal, but that they could not
directly protest against it, as this would involve a recog-
nition of the insurgent fleet, which the Government had
declared to be piratical. As a compromise they instructed
the consuls to protest at their respective ports. A protest
was made by the consular body at Iquique, January 18,
1891, to the captain of the ALmirante Cochrane ias follows:
"The consular body being of opinion that the blockade
notified to them will cause considerable damage to the per-
sons and property of neutrals represented by them, pro-
test against the act, and reserve the right to claim compen-
sation for losses incurred." A similar protest was made
by the consular corps at Valparaiso.*
At the same time Mr. Kennedy, then British minister at
Santiago, telegraphed for instructions as to the course
which should be pursued in the event of a blockade being
established. The views of the foreign office on the sub-
ject may be found in a telegram to a firm in Glasgow, Jan-
uary 24, 1891, as follows: "Assuming effective blockade
to exist, escort through it can not be given." '
In consequence of certain incidents the original notice
was changed by the insurgents and it was announced that
a blockade of Valparaiso would begin on the 18th of Jan-
uary, and of Iquique on the 20th of the same month. In
reality neither blockade was actually established. Captain
1 Blue Book, Chile, No. 1 (1892), 2. » Blue Book, 8.
'Blue Book, 25-41.
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114 INSURGENTS AND CONTRABAND NOTES.
St. Clair, of H. B. M. S. Champion^ expressed the belief
that the nonenf orcement of the blockade at Valparaiso wa&
the result of an interview which he held with Captain
Montt, January 16, 1891, on board the Blanco Encalada
at that port, and in which he pointed out "the illegality of
any captures he might make." ^
It appears that when Captain St. Clair, on the 20th of
January, delivered to the commander of the O^Higgins the
protest of the consular corps against the proposed blockade
of Valparaiso, he was assured that only vessels carrying
contraband of war would be interfered with.''^
Eear- Admiral Hotham arrived at Iquique in H. B. M. S.
Warspite^ January 26, 1891. He found the Almirante
Cochrane ''blockading" the port. She saluted his flag
with 13 guns, "and," said Admiral Hotham, "as it was a
personal salute I returned it with the same number." The
blockade was merely nominal. The Almirante Cochrane
permitted free access to the shore by British vessels, and
also allowed the mails, after examination, to be landed,
and in some cases passengers from English steamers. *
Admiral Hotham arrived at Valparaiso January 31.
There were then no Chilean men-of-war in the harbor,
and vessels were going in and out and loading as usual.
On the night of February 1 a man-of-war was seen in the
"oflSng showing a searchlight." Next day the JEsmeralda
and two transports were observed some distance off the
har]bor and later were seen by a British man-of-war 25
miles away standing to the northward. The British
steamer Arica arrived February 2, and reported that she
had been stopped off the port by an officer from the
Esmeralda^ who took out of her some dispatches for the
Government authorities and searched the ship, but did not
interfere with any other mails.
Seizures of coal and other cargoes, — As to seizures of
coal and other cargoes, it appears that early in January,
1891, Captain St. Clair asked of the Congressionalists an
assurance that neutral propert}^ would not be interfered
with in its transit from ship to shore or shore to ship.
Captain Montt replied that until the blockade should be
1 Blue Book, 41. ^ Blue Book, 47-50. » Blue Book, 45.
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REVOLUTION IN CHILE, 1891. 115
established free transit would be allowed to all foreign
merchandise not contraband of war.^
The British steamer Arica^ on her arrival at Valparaiso
on the 2d of February, reported that on January 21 she
was boarded 6 miles from land by an officer from the
insurgent transport Cachapol and was ordered not to go to
certain ports to which she was bound, but to go to Pisagua.
The master protested, but had to go. On his arrival there
the captain of the insurgent ship Magdlanes ordered him
to deliver up his cargo of bullocks. He protested, but,
on the advice of the British consul, delivered up the cattle
and obtained a receipt for them. He was then ordered to
go to Coquimbo to get more bullocks. He declined to
comply with this demand and declared that he would, on
his arrival at Coquimbo, place himself under the protection
of H. B. M. S. Acorn, On hearing of the incident. Ad-
miral Hotham dispatched Captain St. Clair in the Chrnn-
jnon with a letter to Captain Montt denouncing the act of
the commander of the Magellanes as "a piece of presump-
tion " inconsistent with assurances given to Captain St.
Clair, and requesting Captain Montt to convey to his
officers "the necessity of the discontinuance of such
proceedings."^
Early in February, 1891, the insurgent fleet sought to
take coal from certain English and German ships and send
it to Iquique. A guard from a British man-of-war was
placed on board each of the British ships and a protest
made to the commander of the Chilean squadron. The
latter accepted the protest as to the British ships, but pro-
ceeded to coal from the German collier BajaK^ which was
towed out to sea. Admiral Hotham gave notice that he
was charged with the protection of German, French, and
Italian vessels as well as of British, and that he desired to
impress upon the commander of the squadron ''the abso-
lute necessity of the ships of war under your orders re-
fraining from any interference with the merchant vessels
of the above-named nations trading with a friendly power.
Cargoes of coal, provisions, etc. , hona fide consigned to
noncombatants, can not be considered as contraband of
1 Blue Book, 47-50. ^ glue Book, 45-47.
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116 INSURGENTS AND CONTRABAND, 1891.
war; knd any seizure or detention of vessels carrying such
cargoes is a gross breach of their neutral rights." It
appears that besides the JRajah^ a British collier, the Kil-
morey^ was seized by a Chilean transport under the orders
of the Esmeralda, Admiral Hotham sent for the master
of the Kilmorey and an arrangement was made with the
insurgent fleet to purchase the coal on terms with which
the master expressed himself as satisfied. Captain Montt
offered in satisfaction of the seizure of the Rajah and Kil-
inorey (1) a salute of 21 guns to the English and German
flags, and (2) a promise of indemnity for any damages
which either the ships or the consignees of the cargoes
might have sustained in consequence of the seizure. This
offer was accepted by Admiral Hotham and the incident
treated as closed. The ships on arriving at Iquique were
fully compensated.^
February 17, 1891, Mr. Kennedy wrote to Lord Salis-
bury that the operations of the insurgent fleet up to that
time had been limited to attempted landings on the coast,
to the stoppage on the high seas of neutral ships chiefly
for purposes of information, and to the seizure in various
ports of launches laden with coal or provisions. For
these articles payment had been made or promised and no
serious complaint had reached him of violent acts com-
mitted against British shipping.^
April 10, 1891, the foreign office sent to the Admiralty
a draft of a telegi'am to Admiral Hotham, drawn up in
consultation with the law offices of the Crown, saying:
''Information has been received that the Congressional
Party threaten that if steamers omit to call at the ports
at which they usually touch such omission will be con-
sidered a hostile act, and will render them liable to be
seized. You should state to the heads of the party that
their right to dictate to British vessels which ports they
shall visit can not be admitted by Her Majesty's Govern-
ment, and that you have received instructions to protect
such vessels from molestation on this account if necessary. " *
Payment of duties, — Various questions arose as to the
payment of duties, especially on the exportation of
1 Blue Book, 13, 59-62, 73, 113. 'Blue Book, 70.
2 Blue Book, 51-52.
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REVOLUTION IN CHILE, 1891. 117
nitrates, in consequence of the claim of the Government
io exercise authority over ports and places of which the
insurgents, in the progress of the revolution, obtained
possession. The British foreign office at first declined
to take the responsibility of advising merchants as to the
course they should pursue, but suggested that if duties
were exacted by insurgent authorities in actual possession,
payment should be made on compulsion and under pro-
test, and better still, that a bond should be given for the
amount if the insurgent authorities would accept it. On
the other hand, it was declared that Her Majesty's Gov-
ernment did not admit the right of the Chilean Govern-
ment to require the payment over again of duties when
there was evidence that they had already been paid on
compulsion and under protest to the authorities in actual
and complete possession of the port of export. Should the
claim be persisted in, a bond might be given for the amount
pending a settlement between the two Governments.^
In June, 1891, a gunboat belonging to the Balmaceda
Government entered the port of Tocopilla, then in posses-
sion of the insurgents, and exacted payment of duty on
1,600 tons of nitrate loading for a British company on the
British steamship Chepica. The foreign office advised
that if the Congressional authorities insisted on the pay-
ment of any further and separate duties, as a condition of
the vessel's leaving the port, the best course would be to
give a bond for the amount of such duties under protest.
At the same time Mr. Kennedy was instructed that in the
opinion of Her Majesty's Government the action of the
gunboat in exacting duties was "altogether wrongful and
irregular, such dues being ordinarily and properly pay-
able to the customs authorities at the port of clearance,''
and that the amount exacted would be claimed back from
the Chilean Government. On arriving at the port Cap-
tain Parr, of H. B. M. S. Mdpomene^ found that the pay-
ment of the duties a second time was claimed by the
revolutionary authorities, and that in default of their pa}"-
ment the shipment of the cargo had been stopped. Cap-
tain Parr remonstrated with the intendente and requested
him to telegraph the provisional government at Iquique
^ Blue Book, 69, 71, 75.
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118 INSUEGENTS AND CONTRABANP, 1891.
for instructions, which he did. The provisional govern-
ment replied that ^' solely out of deference to the comman-
dante of the Melpomene^ and as an act of respect to the
British navy," they would accept payment of the duties in
drafts on London, at ninety days' sight, thus giving the
company four months and a half grace, as the term of the
drafts would not begin to run till they were accepted. On
receipt of this reply the manager of the nitrate firm agreed
to sign the drafts as required.^
By this review it appears —
1. That the British Government admitted the right of
the insurgents to establish a blockade on the usual con-
dition of effectiveness.
2. That the British naval officers recognized the right
of the insurgents to intercept contraband of war, and
allowed them to a limited extent, but not as of right, to
obtain coal and supplies for their fleet from neutral vessels.
3. That the right to collect duties was acknowledged to
belong to the insurgents wherever they maintained com-
plete and effective possession of the place.
Insurrection in Brazil^ 1893-9 Jf,. — September 6, 1893,
Mr. Thompson, the minister of the United States at Kio
de Janeiro, reported that the navy of Brazil had revolted,
assumed complete control over the harbor, and seized all
the war vessels, and that it threatened, unless the vice-
president resigned, to bombard the city. The revolted
squadron, comprisingthe war ships J^^ir/^feJaTz,, Jupiter^ and
Bepublica^ together with a number of Brazilian merchant
vessels which had been seized in the harbor, was under the
command of Admiral Jose Custodio de Mello, of the Bra-
zilian navy. The Government held possession of Fort
Santa Cruz, which commands the entrance to the harbor,
and retained the loyalty of the army. The squadron con-
trolled the inner harbor to within a limited distance of the
shoi*e line, which was defended by artillery, infantry, and
the police force. ^
Question of homhardment, — ^Toward the end of Septem-
ber much firing took place between the squadron and
^Blue Book, 144, 157, 219-220. ^Yox. Rel., 1893, 45-46.
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INSURRECTION IN BRAZIL, 1893. 119
loyal forts and batteries on shore, and many shots from
the ships fell in the city, causing much damage to property
and some loss of life, while business houses remained
closed because of rumors that the city would be bom-
barded. Under these circumstances, the commanders of
the naval forces of the United States, Great Britain,
France, Italy, and Portugal, then present in the harbor,
informed Admiral Mello that they would oppose, by force
if necessary, an attack upon the city; and the diplomatic
representatives of those powers, " continuing in the line
of conduct followed up to this time, not to interfere in
the internal affairs of Brazil, but to assure the protection
and safety of their fellow-countrymen and the higher
interests of humanity," urgently requested the Brazilian
Government, in view of the action of the foreign com-
manders, '"to deprive Admiral de Mello of all pretext for
hostile action" against the city. In the event of a refusal
of this request, they stated that they would communicate
the reply to their Governments and ask for instructions.*
The Brazilian Government promised to deprive Admi-
ral Mello of every pretext for hostilities against the city;
but a misunderstanding immediately arose between the
Government on the one hand and the foreign diplomatic and
naval officers on the other as to whether this promise
included the removal of cannon from some of the batteries
and whether the work of strengthening the batteries was
not actually continued; and in view of this misunder-
standing the diplomatic representatives declared that they
could not accept ''any other responsibility than that
which may result from the necessity of protecting the
general interests of humanity and the lives and property
of their countrymen."*
Question of Recognition, — On the 23d of October, 1893,
Admiral Mello informed Mr. Thompson, through the
officer in command of the United States naval forces, that
the insurgents had established a provisional government
at Desterro, the capital of the State of Santa Catharina,
and asked that they be recognized as belligerents. This
request the Government of the United States refused, on
»For. Rel., 1893, 56. ^For. Rel., 1893, 58-59.
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120 INSURGENTS AND CONTRABAND NOTES.
the ground that its concession ''would be an unfriendly
act toward Brazil and a gratuitous demonstration of moral
support to the rebellion, the insurgents having not, appar-
ently, up to date established and maintained a political
organization which would justify such recognition;" but
Mr. Thompson was instructed "to observe, until further
advised, the attitude of an indifferent spectator."^
Conduct of Commercial Operations. — On the 30th oi
October, Mr. Thompson inq^uired by telegraph whether
he was "authorized to protect American merchandise on
Brazilian barges against the insurgents, using force if
necessary. " He explained that cargoes could not be landed
in Kio de Janeiro unless barges were used.
Mr. Gresham, then Secretary of State, replied: "There
having been no recognition by United States of the insur- .
gents as belligerents, and there being no pretense that the
port of Kio is blockaded, it is clear that if an American
ship anchored in the harbor employs barges and lighters
in transferring her cargo to the shore in the usual way and
in doing so does not cross or otherwise interfere with
Mello's line of fire and he seizes or attempts to seize the
barges or lighters, he can and should be resisted. You
will deliver a copy of this telegram to the commander of
the insurgents."^
December 1, 1893, Admiral Mello left Rio de Janeiro in
his flagship, the Aquidaban^ going south, and was suc-
ceeded in the command of the naval forces in the harbor
by Rear-Admiral Luis Felippe de Saldanha da Gama, who,
after having maintained an apparent neutrality, announced
in a proclamation his espousal of the cause of the revo-
lution and of the restoration of the Empire, subject to rati-
fication by the people.*
December 25, 1893, threats of a bombardment having
again been made, the commanders of the naval forces of
the United States, France, Great Britain, Austria-Hun-
gary, Italy, and Portugal replied that, in case such a
measure should become inevitable, they would, while not
committing themselves to any course of action, require a
previous notice of at least two days to be given in order
^For. Rel., 1893, 63. ''For. Rel., 1893, 64. ^For. Rel., 1893, 77, 83.
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UNITED STATES INSTRUCTIONS. 121
to insure the safety of the persons and property of their
fellow-countrymen. ^
Meanwhile an effort was made by the foreign represen-
tatives to secure a safe place for the discharge of foreign
shipping. This action was taken in consequence of an
understanding that it was Admiral da Gama's intention to
prevent all merchandise from reaching either the custom-
house or the shore. November 6, 1893, the American^"
English, French, German, Italian, and Portuguese naval
commanders, by a general communication, had infoiined
Admiral Mello (1) that they did not recognize the right of
the insurgent forces to interfere with commercial opera-
tions conducted anywhere '^ except in the actual lines of
fire of the batteries of the land fortifications," and that
they would protect merchandise not only on board vesseLs^
of their respective countries, but also on lighters, barges,
and other transports, whatever might be their nationality,
employed by those vessels in commercial operations, and
(2) that such transports or their tugs would carry at their
prow the flag of the country under whose protection they
might at the time be.^ Difficulties and uncertainties, by
reason of acts of the Government as well as of the insur-
gents, having arisen in the interpretation and enforcement
of this plan, the question as to what constituted a ''line
of fire" being shifting and unsettled, Mr. Gresham, Jan-
uary 6, 1894, directed Mr. Thompson "to induce, by coop-
eration with the commanding officer of the forces of the
United States, and if possible with others, the insurgents
to designate a place, if such a place can be found, at
which vessels of neutral nations may, without interfering
with military operations, take and discharge cargoes in
safety."^
United States instructions. — January 11, 1894, Mr.
Gresham addressed to Mr. Thompson, by mail, full instruc-
tions, as follows:*
"Under date of the 5th instant Captain Picking reports
the effective fortification and armament of strategic posi-
tions within the limits of the city, adding that the naval
1 For. Rel., 1893, 89. » For. Rel., 1893, 98.
^ For. Rel., 1893, 95-96. * For. Rel., 1893, 99.
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122 INSURGENTS AND CONTRABAND NOTES.
commanders in conference had thereupon agreed that in
view of this action they could no longer maintain their
intention to prevent bombardment. The facts reported
appear to justify this conclusion.
"An actual condition of hostilities existing, this Govern-
ment has no desire to intervene to restrict the operations
of either party at the expense of its effective conduct of
systematic measures against the other. Our principal and
obvious duty, apart from neutrality, is to guard against
needless or illegitimate interference, by either hostile
party, with the innocent and legitimate neutral interests
of our citizens. Interruption of their commerce can be
respected as a matter of right only w«hen it takes one of
two shapes — either by so conducting offensive and defen-
sive operations as to make it impossible to carry on com-
merce in the line of regular fire, or by resort to the expe-
dient of an announced and effective blockade.
'^ Vexatious interference with foreign merchant ship-
ping, at a designated anchorage, or with the lighterage of
neutral goods between such anchorage and a designated
landing, by random firing not necessary to a regular plan
of hostilities and having no other apparent object than
the molestation of such commerce, is as illegitimate as it
is intolerable. Hence, we have a right to expect and
insist that safe anchorage and time and place for loading
and unloading be designated, if practicable, to be inter-
rupted onl}^ by notice of actual intention to bombard, or
by notification and effective enforcement of blockade.
"The insurgents have not been recognized as belliger-
ents, and should they announce a blockade of the port of
Kio the sole test of its validity will be their ability to make
it effective. '
"Our naval commander at Rio has been instructed as
above with regard to the protection of neutral commerce
under our flag, which it would seem represents only a
small part of the foreign commercial interests afloat in the
harbor of Rio. The British ships there are said to out-
number those of the United States nine to one, but no sub-
.stantial interference with our vessels, however few, will
be acquiesced in, unless made effective with regard to all
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PBOTECTION OF COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS. 12?-
foreign shipping, and, moreover, so made effective in pur-
suance of some tangible plan of orderly military opera-
tions."
The substance of these instructions may be stated thus —
1. That, in view of the creation of fortified and armed
strategic positions within the limits of the city, the foreign
naval forces would not be justified in forcibly preventing
its bombardment.
2. That, while an effective blockade of the port by the
insurgents would be respected, they would not be permitted \
to accomplish indirectly the ends of a blockade by employ-
ing, either openly or under the guise of military operations,
acts of force against foreign vessels engaged in commercial
transactions.
These instructions recognized the right of the insur-
gents to carry on hostilities even by means of a commer-
cial blockade of the port, a measure the enforcement of
which might involve the extension of the insurgent opera-
tions to the high seas. They denied to the insurgents the
right, after allowing foreign commerce to enter the port,
to seek to accomplish .the objects of a blockade either by
seizing particular vessels or by firing upon them when they
were engaged in discharging or receiving cargo.
Question as to coal. — January 12, 1894, Mr. Thompson
reported that the insurgents had taken possession of an
island in the harbor, used as a coal depot, and with it had
captured large quantities of coal belonging to the Royal
Mail Steamship Compan}'^ of England. It seems that Admi-
ral da Gama issued orders to prevent the landing of coal,
apparently with the object of preventing the Government
from obtaining it for its ships. The subject was discussed
by the diplomatic corps; and the British minister, with
the concurrence of his Belgian, French, Italian, and
Portuguese colleagues, declared that all other means would
be exhausted, perhaps even that of recognition, before a
resort to force to prevent the execution of the order. ^
JProteetion oj^ American vessels, — January 12, 1894, Mr.
Thompson reported that since the advent of Admiral da
Gama several American vessels had gone to the docks on
iFor. Rel., 1893, 115, 116.
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124 INSURGENTS AND CONTRABAND NOTES.
their own responsibility^ and with the consent of the
Government had discharged and taken in cargo without
interference; that some German and other foreign ships
had also proceeded with their operations without interrup-
tion; and that the Germans had maintained independently
the position taken by all the powers in regard to com-
merce, in the communication to Admiral Mello.^
On the 26th of January Mr. Thompson wrote that com-
mercial operations in the harbor continued to be carried
on "without any serious interference with American in-
terests." Three days later, however, he telegraphed:
''American vessels will be convoyed to the dock by the
U. S. S. Detroit^ and a general engagement maj'^ follow if
she is fired upon, as she is ready to return the fire." A
telegram having also been received from Admiral Benham,
who had succeeded Captain Picking in command of the
United States naval force, indicating a serious situation,
Mr. Gresham directed Mr. Thompson to make a full
report, and particularly to state whether any, and if any
what, change had taken place in the attitude of the United
States naval force; whether Admiral Benham disagreed
with the other naval commanders, and if so on what points;
whether United States merchant vessels were enjoying any
protection not previously given, and ''whether a blockade
is enforced by the insurgents or any attempt made by
them to that end."
Mr. Thompson telegraphed January 31, 1894, the fol-
lowing reply:
''Mr. Thompson telegraphs that he is informed by Ad-
miral Benham, with whom he had an interview on this
day, that a full report of his action was sent on the pre-
ceding morning to the Navy Department. After notify-
ing the insurgents and the city that he intended to protect
by force, if necessary, and to place all American vessels
who might wish to go to the docks alongside the wharves,
the war vessels of the United States got under way and
cleared for action. The Detroit^ which was stationed in
the best position for the ends of protection, had orders to
fire back if the merchant vessels were fired upon. A shot
»For. Rel., 1893, 105-106.
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PROTECTION OF COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS. 125
from one of the insurgents' vessels was fired at, but missed,
the boat of one of the American vessels that was making
preparations for hauling in by means of a line running to
the shore. The Detroit replied with a shot from a
6-pounder, which struck under the insurgent's bows.
The latter then fired one shot to leeward from her broad-
side battery and subsequently another over the merchant
vessel. The Detroit answered with a musket shot, which
struck the sternpost of the insurgent vessel. The latter
was hailed by the commander of the Detroit^ as he passed
by, who declared that he would return the fire and sink
her, if necessary, in the event of her again firing. By
this time one of the American vessels was moored near
the dock in her new berth, and a tug came up offering to
discharge without cost the cargoes of all the vessels.
Notice was then given to the commander of the insurgent
forces that the cargoes would be taken out of the vessels
in the berths they then occupied, but that it was deter
mined, as theretofore, that if American vessels wished to
have berths in the docks they would be placed there and
given full protection by the squadron of the United States.
The Detroit was afterwards withdrawn and the war vessels
anchored. He states that the naval or military operations
of either side were not in the least interfered with by
Admiral Benham, who entertains no such intention. What
he proposes to do is to fulfill his duty of protecting the
citizens and trade of the United States, and of this the
insurgents have been notified by him. Admiral Benham
declares that if American vessels get in the line of fire
during the actual course of legitimate hostilities they
must take the consequences, but their freedom of move-
ment must be respected. The insurgents are denied the
right to search neutral vessels or to seize any part of their
cargoes, even though such cargoes should comprise such
articles as would, in case of war between two independent
Governments, come within the class of merchandise de-
fined as contraband of war. The insurgents, in their
present status, would commit an act of piracy by forcibly
seizing such merchandise.
"He adds that, to the best of his information, all the
foreign commanders agree with Admiral Benham, and that
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126 INSURGENTS AND CONTRABAND NOTES.
the effective action of last Monday has restored complete
tranquillity, broken the attempted blockade of commerce
and trade, and placed everything in even motion."
Mr. Gresham, in acknowledging, on February 1, the
receipt of this telegram, said ' ' that Admiral Benham has
acted within his instructions."^
On the 2nd of February Mr. Thompson telegraphed that
the insurgents had ''withdrawn their restrictive orders,"
that ships of all nationalities were ' ' no longer kept from
coming to the shore," and that a favorable progress was
noticeable in commerce, all of which was due "to the
influence of the war vessels of the United States having
stopped the insurgents' fire against American merchant
vessels. " ^
When Admiral Benham took the action which has been
narrated, Mr. Gresham's instructions to Mr. Thompson of
the 11th of January had not reached Rio de Janeiro.
Those instructions seem, however, to have been intended
merely as an amplified and explanatory restatement of the
position held by the United States from the beginning;
and there is no reason to suppose that Mr. Gresham, when
he telegraphed that the Admiral had "acted within his
instructions," contemplated any departure from that posi-
tion. On the contrary, his first inquiry, when advised of
a serious situation, was whether any "change" had taken
place in the attitude of the United States naval forces,
and "whether a blockade is enforced by the insurgents or
any attempt made by them to that end." As reported.
Admiral Benham's action did not appear to have involved
any question as to the right of the insurgents to prevent
the supply of contraband of war to their antagonist; but
it must be admitted that the intention to deny them such
a right was declared in Mr. Thompson's telegram, and it
was explicitly announced by Admiral Benham to Admiral
da Gama in a letter of January 30, 1894, a copy of which
could not, however, have reached Washington in the regu-
lar course till the insurrection was practically at an end.
With regard to what had taken place. Admiral Benham
in that letter said: "In no case have I interfered in the
iFor. Rel., 1893, 115-117. ^For. Rel., 1893, 120.
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PROTECTION OF COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS. 127
slightest way with the military operations of either side
in the contest now going on, nor is it my intention to do
so. * * * My duty is to protect Americans and Ameri-
can commerce, and this I intend to do to the fullest extent.
American vessels must not be interfered with in any
way in their movements in going to the wharven or about
the harbor, it being understood, however, that they must
take the consequences of getting in the line of fire where
legitimate hostilities are actually in progress."
So much as to what had actually been done. Admiral
Benham added, however, that there was '^ another point,''
of which it might be " well to speak.'' This was: " Until
belligerent rights are accorded you, you have no right to
exercise an^^ authority whatever over American ships or
property of any kind. You can not search neutral vessels
or seize any portion of their cargoes, even though they be
within the class which may ])e clearly defined as contra-
band of war, during hostilities between two independent
governments. The forcible seizure of anv such articles
by those under your command would ])e, in your present
status, an act of piracy.'- ^
Mr. Thompson, in a telegram of February 1, 1894, stated
that as the situation was understood by him Admiral Ben-
ham had maintained the same attitude as was from the first
assumed by the United States forces, "except perhaps
by refusing to recognize da Gama's authority.'"^ This
statement, read in connection with Admiral Benham's letter
to Admiral da Gama, seems to refer, at least inclusively,
to the question of preventing the supply of contraband.
This question, which may at any moment become a prac-
tical one to the naval officer, is left by the record in a posi-
tion that can hardly be deemed satisfactory. It may be
argued that, as the intention to prevent the insurgents
from interfering with the supply of contraband articles to
the government was clearly declared and not expressly
disapproved, it was impliedly approved. On the other
hand, it may be argued that, as the question was appar-
ently not involved in the case that had arisen, the approval
of what was done does not necessarih^ imply approval of
^For. Rel., 1898, 122. 'For. Rel., 1893, 118.
6482—01 9
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128 INSURGENTS AND CONTBABAND NOTES.
all that was said; that the question of vexatiously inter-
rupting commerce by firing upon or seizing innocent neu-
tral ships, which is not permissible in any case, and that
of preventing the supply of contraband are radically dif-
ferent; that by Mr. Gresham's instructions of January 11,
1894, the right to carry on hostilities, even by means of a
blockade, was expressly admitted to belong to the insur-
gents, and that this necessarily implied that they possessed
the right to prevent within the national theater of hostili-
ties the supply of contraband of war to their adversary.
The record being thus inconclusive, the question may be
considered in the light of elementary principles.
1. The right of insurgents to carry on hostilities against
the titular government and the recognition of them as
belligerents are different things and are not interdepend-
ent. When we speak of the ''^recognition" of .belliger-
ency, we necessarih^ imply the preexistence of the condi-
tion of things which we in that form acknowledge. It
would not be difficult to cite instances in which insurgents
have overthrown the titular government and established
one of their own in its place without having received from
an}^ foreign power ••* recognition " as belligerents. Where
such a contest exists foreign powers, if they profess to bo
neutral in the conflict, acknowledge, with or without rec-
ognition of belligerenc3% the duty of noninterference.
So clearly is this the case that in recent times, the word
"insurgency" has found its way into the terminology of
law and diplomacy, as a term denoting the existence of
a state of domestic hostilities, without recognition of
belligerency.
2. The existence of domestic hostilities does not confer
upon foreign powers any legal authority within the juris-
diction of the nation within which the insurrection pre-
vails; nor is such authority gained either by conceding or
withholding recognition of belligerency. As regards rela-
tions with foreign powers, the nonrecognition of belliger-
ency has two results. The first is that the parties to the
conflict are denied the right to interfere with neutral ves-
sels on the high seas. There all nations are, in time of
peace, equal, none possessing any authority over another;
it is only in the abnormal condition of recognized belliger-
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GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 129
i?ncy that authority to interfere with such vessels on the
high seas is conceded. The second result is, that the titu-
lar government remains presumptively responsible for the
redress of injuries done to neutral aliens within the national
jurisdiction. Should a foreign government recognize the
insurgents as belligerents, it would thereby elect to look
to the insurgent authorities for the redress of injuries
which they may commit, and would to that exten^i-elieve
the titular government. But while responsibility may
thus shift from one set of authorities to another, the
national sovereignty remains supreme and the national
jurisdiction inviolate. Within such jurisdiction foreign
powers can set up no claim to equality with the titular
sovereign as a ground on which to oppose the exercise by
either party of the rights of war. Their right of inter-
ference is limited to acts of necessary self-defense, under
circumstances such as justify a disregard of the rule of
territorial sovereignty.
Of these distinctions an illustration ma}^ be found in a
case which occurred in Colotnbia in 1885. During the
insurrection which prevailed in that 3'ear certain vessels
belonging to the United Magdalena Steam Navigation
■Compan}^ an American corporation, were seized b}^ the
insurgents. The case having been laid by the company
before the Government of the Uqited States, Dr. Francis
Wharton, who was then Solicitor of the Department of
State, made, April 21, 1885, a report, in the course of
which he said:
'' When vessels belonging to citizens of the United
States have been seized and are now navigated on the high
seas by persons not representing any government or
belligerent power recognized by the United States, such
A^essels may be captured and rescued by their owners, or
by United States cruisers acting for such owners."^
In a later report of May 18, 1885, referring to the same
question. Dr. Wharton repeated this opinion, and recom-
mended that the Secretary of the Navy be requested to
give instructions "that the vessels thus unlawfully seized
and now possessed by the insurgents be retaken when on
^For. Rel., 1885, 212.
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130 INSURGENTS AND CONTRABAND NOTES.
the high seas by any force the United States may be able
to use for that purpose." He added that, while it might
be conceded that the insurgent crews manning the vessels
unlawfully seized could not be regarded as pirates, yet
"vessels belonging to citizens of the United States so
seized by them may be rescued by our cruisers acting for
the owners of such vessels in the same way that we could
reclaim vessels derelict on the high seas." May 19, 1885,
Mr. Bayard, Secretary of State, inclosed copies of these
reports to Mr. Scruggs, then minister of the United States
at Bogota, and referred to the Department's recommenda-
tion ''that proper instructions be immediately issued to
the commander of the naval authorities in Colombia for
the recapture, when on the high seas, by any force the
United States may be able to use for that purpose, of the
vessels of the Magdalena Steam Navigation Compan}^ thus
unlawfull}" seized and possessed by the insurgents." ^
It is to be observed that in this case the assertion of
the right of the United States naval forces to recapture
the vessels was uniformly limited to the high seas. Al-
though it by no means follows that the Government might
not, under different circumstances, have gone further,
this limitation is to be particularly noted, since the seizure
of the vessels by the insurgents appears to hav^e been an
unlawful .act of violence.
The position taken by the Department of State in 1885
has lately been reaffirmed, it being stated — in a case pre-
senting similar conditions — that the vessel "' could be re-
captured for the benelit of its lawful owners on the high
seas by our naval force. "''^
With regard to the instructions of Mr. Fish, as quoted
in the solution,^ touching certain vessels in the service of
insurgents against the Government of Haiti, it may be
pointed out that no right to seize such vessels within the
territorial waters of that country is asserted. The general
»For. Rel., 1885, 211.
2 Mr. Hay, Secretary of State, to Mr. Merry, March 3, 1899, :MS.
Tnstr. to Central America, XXI, 427, citing Mr. Bayard to Mr. Scruggs,
May 19, 1885, For. Rel., 1885, 211; also, Mr. Hay, Secretary of State,
to the Secretary of the Navy, March 13, 1899, 235 MS. Dom. Let., 416.
=* Supra, p. 109.
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HAITIAN EEV0LUTI0NIST8. 131
police power which all nations possess to seize and punish
pirates obviousty does not extend to that part of the sea
which lies within the jurisdiction of particular nations.
In the case before Mr. Fish the vessels in question had
beefl declared by the Haitian Government to be piratical,
and on the strength of this declaration the secretary of
foreign affairs had addressed to the several members of
the diplomatic corps at Port au Prince a note requesting
that each Government whose representative was thus
addressed would give, by means of its naval forces, ^' an
adequate and efficacious cooperation in maintaining for
the marine of the civilized world the securities of the
seas," and "guarantee the protection of private prop-
erty." Replying to this request, Mr. Fish, in a passage
which immediately follows that quoted in the solution,
but which has not heretofore been printed, said:
"No facts have been presented to this Government to
create a belief that the operations of the vessels in ques-
tion have been with a view to plunder or had any other
than a political object. That object is hostile to a govern-
ment with which the United States have maintained a
friendship that it requires no fresh manifestation to evince.
We deem it most decorous to leave it to that government
to deal with the hostile vessels as it may find expedient,
reserving the consideration of our action in- respect to
them till some offense, actual or apprehended, to the United
States shall render it impei*ative."*
In a recent case the Department of State discussed a
suggestion which had been put forward in a country in
which an insurrection prevailed, that the acts of insur-
gents were to be considered as mere "lawlessness" against
the established authority, and that any injury which they
might do to the persons or property of foreign noncom-
batants should be " looked upon as outlawry on mankind,"
for the prevention of which the naval forces of foreign
powers might be employed. With regard to this sugges-
tion the Department of State expressed the opinion that
it failed to discriminate between the right of a foreign
1 Mr. Fish, Sec. of State, to Mr. Bassett, Sept. 14, 1869, MS. Instr.
to Haiti, I, 150.
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132 INSURGENTS AND CONTRABAND NOTES.
naval force to extend protection against "wanton injury
by whatever aggressor," and the supposed obligation to
treat the acts of insurgents as outlawry; that this supposed
obligation, since it proceeded upon the theory that the^
insurrection itself was to be treated as an act of lawless-
ness, would imply the duty of siding with the titular au-
thorities against the insurgents; that this would obviously
be incompatible with the dictates of neutrality; and that
the only duty of foreign naval forces was to shield the
persons and property of alien neutrals placed under their
protection against " acts of wanton injury," to w^hich end
they might ''in extreme need be rightfully employed."*
3. We have seen (1) that the right of parties to a domes-
tic conflict to carry on hostilities does not depend upon the
recognition of belligerency, and (2) that, as the existence
of domestic hostilities confers no authority upon foreign
powers within the jurisdiction of the nation in which the
insurrection prevails, such powers are not allowed to inter-
fere there except upon the ground of necessary self-def erine
against acts of wanton injury. The question therefore
arises whether the act of insurgents in preventing the
supply of contraband, such as arms and munitions of war,,
to the government against which they are carrying on
hostilities is such an injury, or whether it can be consid-
ered as an injury at all. In order to answer this question
it is necessary to consider the nature of the act which the
insurgents seek to prevent.
Much misapprehension as to the quality of the act of sup-
plying contraband articles, such as arms and munitions of
war, to the parties to an armed conflict, has arisen from
the statement so often made that the trade in contraband
is lawful and not prohibited. This statement, when used
with reference to the preventive duties of neutral govern-
ments, is quite correct, but if applied to the duties of
individuals it is quite incorrect. The acts which indi-
viduals are forbidden to commit and the acts which neu-
tral governments are obliged to prevent are by no means
the same; precisely as the acts which the neutral govern-
ment is obliged to prevent and the acts which it is f orbid-
^Mr. Hay, Sec. of State, to Sec. of the Navy, Oct. 17, 1899, 240 MS.
Dom. Let., 534.
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OPINIONS OF PUBLICISTS. 133
den to commit are by no means the same. The supply of
materials of war, such as arms and ammunition, to either
party to an armed conflict, although neutral governments
are not obliged to prevent it, constitutes on the part of
the individuals who engage in it a participation in hostili-
ties, and as such is confessedly an unneutral act. Should
the government of the individual itself supply such arti-
cles it would clearly depart from its position of neutrality.
The private citizen undertakes the business at his own
risk, and against this risk his government can not assure
him protection without making itself a part}^ to his unneu-
tml act.
These propositions are abundantly established by au-
thority'.
Maritime states, says Heffter, have adopted, ''in a com-
mon and reciprocal interest, the rule that belligerents have
the right to restrict the freedom of neutral commerce so
far as concerns contraban4 of war, and to punish viola-
tions of the law in that regard. * * * This right has
never been seriously denied to belligerents." ^
Says Kent: ''The principal restriction which the law of
nations imposes on the trade of neutmls is the prohibition
to furnish the belligerent parties with warlike stores and
other articles which are directly auxiliary to warlike pur-
poses.'- "^
"If the neutral [governmentj,-' says Woolse^^, "should
send powder or balls, cannon or rifles, this would be a
direct encouragement of the war, and so a departure from
the neutral position. '"' * * Now, the same wrong is
committed when a private trader, without the privity of
his government, furnishes the means of war to either of
the warring parties. It ma}^ be made a question whether
such conduct on the part of the private citizen ought not
to be prevented by his government, even as enlistments
for foreign armies on neutral soil are made penal. But it
is diflScult for a government to watch narrowly the opera-
tions of trade, and it is annoying for the innocent trader.
Moreover, the neutral ought not to be subjected by the
quarrels of others to additional care and expense. Hence
^Heffter, Droit Int., Bergson*s ed., by Geffcken, ISaS, p. 384.
2 Kent, Int. Law, 2d ed., by Abdy, 330.
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134 INSURGENTS AND CONTRABAND NOTES.
by the practice of nations he is passive in regard to viola-
tions of the rules concerning contraband, blockade, and
the like, and leaves the police of the sea and the punishing
or reprisal power in the hands of those who are most inter-
ested, the limits being fixed for the punishment by com-
mon usage or law. * * * It is admitted that the act
of carrying to the enemy articles directly useful in war is
a wrong, for which the injured party may punish the neu-
tral taken in the act."^
Says Manning: ''The right of belligerents to prevent
neutrals from carrying to an enemy articles that may serve
him in the direct prosecution of his hostile purposes has
been acknowledged by all authorities, and is obvious to
plain reason. * * * The nonrecognition of this right
* * * would place it in the power of neutrals to inter-
fere directly in the issue of wars — those who, by defini-
tion, are not parties in the contest thus receiving a power
to injure a belligerent, which even if direct enemies they
would not possess."^
''A belligerent," says Creasy, "has b}^ international law^
a right to seize at sea, and to appropriate or destroy,
articles, to whomsoever they ma}^ belong, which are
calculated to aid the belligerent's enemy in the war,
and which are being conveyed b}' sea to that enemy's
territory."^
''The neutral power," says Holland, "is under no obli-
gation to prevent its subjects from engaging in the run-
ning of blockades, in shipping or carrying contraband, or
in carrying troops or dispatches from one of the belliger-
ents; but, on the other hand, neutral subjects so engaged
can expect no protection from their own government
against such customary penalties as may be imposed upon
their conduct b}^ the belligerent who is aggrieved b}^ it."*
"B}' this term [contraband] we now understand," says
Baker, "a class of articles of commerce which neutmls
are prohibited from furnishing to either one of the bellig-
erents, for the reason that by so. doing injur^^ is done to
1 Woolsey, Int. Law, §§ 178, 179.
'^ Manning's Law of Nation, Amos' s edition, 352.
» Creasy, First Platform of Int. Law, 604.
* Holland, Studies in International Law, 124-125.
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STATE PAPERS. 135
the other belligerent. To carry on this class of commerce
is deemed a violation of neutral duty, inasmuch as it nec-
essarily interferes with the operations of the war b}^
furnishing assistance to the belligerent to whom such
prohibited articles are supplied."^
It may be observed that in some of the foregoing quota-
tions the question is discussed as one affecting the rights
of "belligerents." But the question of belligerency is
important only as affecting the question of the right of
seizure on the high seas. The circumstance that the par-
ties, in consequence of the nonrecognition of their belliger-
ency, are not permitted to exercise visitation and search
on the high seas does not alter the nature or detract from
the unneutral character of the act of suppljnng arms and
munitions of war to the parties to an armed conflict.
The fact that the supplying of such articles is considered
as a participation in the hostilities is shown not only by
the authority of writers, but also b}^ numerous state
papers.
President Washington, in his' famous neutmlity procla-
mation of April 22, 1793, countersigned by Mr. Jefferson,
as Secretary of State, announced "that whosoever of the
citizens of the United States shall render himself liable to
punishment or forfeiture under the law of nations, by
committing, aiding, or abetting hostilities against any of
the said powers, or by carrying to any of them those arti-
cles which are deemed contraband b}- the modern usage of
nations, will not receive the protection of the United
States against such punishment or forfeiture."^
Mr. Jefferson, in the subsequent note to the British
minister, quoted in Wharton's Digest (I, 510), observes
that in the case of contraband the law of nations is satis-
fied with the "external penalty" pronounced in the Presi-
dent's proclamation.
President Grant, in the proclamation issued by him
August 22, 1870, during the Franco-German war, de-
clares, in the most precise terms:
"While all persons may lawfully, and without restric-
tion, by reason of the aforesaid state of war, manufacture
^Baker's First Steps in International Law, 281.
-Am. State Paperj^, For. Rel., I, 140.
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136 INSURGENTS AND CONTRABAND NOTES.
and sell within the United States arms and munitions of
war, and other articles ordinarily known as ' contraband
of war,' yet they can not carry such articles upon the
high seas for the use or service of either belligerent,
* * * without incurring the risk of hostile capture
and the penalties denounced by the law of nations in that
behalf. And I do hereby give notice that all citizens of
the United States, and others who may claim the protec-
tion of this Government, who ma}'^ misconduct themselves
in the premises, will do so at their peril, and that they
can in no wise obtain any protection from the Govern-
ment of the United States against the consequences of
their misconduct."^
In the neutrality proclamations, issued during the war
between the United States and Spain, the following pro-
visions are found, in which the furnishing of arms and
munitions of war to either party to the conflict is expressly
treated as an act of unneutrality.
The Brazilian Government, by a circular of April 29,
1898, declared to be "absolutely prohibited" the ''expor-
tation of material of war from the ports of Brazil to those
of either of the belligerent powers, under the Brazilian
flag or that of any other nation.'"^
The King of Denmark issued April 29, 1898, a procla-
mation prohibiting Danish subjects ''to transport contra-
band of war for any of the belligerent powers."^
Great Britain's proclamation of April 23, 1898, warned
British subjects against doing any act "in derogation of
their duty as subjects of a neutral power," or "in viola-
tion or contravention of the law of nations," among which
was enumerated the carrying of "arms, ammunition, mili-
tary stores or materials;" and declared that "all persons
so ofl'ending, together with their ships and goods, will
rightfully incur and be justly liable to hostile capture,
and to the penalties denounced by the law of nations."*
The governor of Curasao, acting under instructions of
the minister of the colonies of the Netherlands, issued a
1 Wharton's Dig., Ill, 607-^8.
'^ Proclamations and Decrees during the War with Spain, 13.
^ Proclamations, 22.
* Proclamations, 35.
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DOCTRINE OF INFECTION. 137
decree prohibiting 'Hhe exportation of arms, ammunition,,
or other war materials to the belligerents."^
Portugal, while stating, in Article IV of her neutrality
decree of April 29, 1898, that "all articles of lawful com-
merce" belonging to subjects of the belligerent powers
might be carried under the Portuguese flag, and that such
articles belonging to Portuguese subjects might be carried
under the flag of either belligerent, yet declared: ''Articles-
that may be considered as contraband of war are expressly
excluded from the provisions of this article."*
Were further proof needed of the unneutral and noxious
character of contraband trade, it might be found in the
doctrine of infection, under which innocent cargo is con-
demned when associated with contraband merchandise of
the same proprietor, and the transportation penalized by
loss of freight and expenses, and, under various circum-
stances, by confiscation of the ship.^
From what has been shown it may be argued that,
without regard to the recognition or. nonrecognition of
belligerency, a party to a civil conflict who seeks to pre-
vent, within the national jurisdiction and at the scene of
hostilities, the supply of anus and munitions of war to his
adversary commits not an act of injury, but an act of self-
defense, authorized by the state of hostilities; that, the
right to carry on hostilities being admitted, it seems to fol-
low that each party possesses, incidentally, the right to
prevent the other from being supplied with the weapons of
war; and that any aid or protection given by a foreign
government to an individual to enable him with impunity
to supply either party with such articles is to that extent
an act of intervention in the contest.
^Proclamations, 27.
'^Proclamations, 61. (See algo, the proclamation of the toatai of
Shanghai, id., 20, and the instructions of the Haitian Government,,
id., 89.)
* Walker's Science of Int. Law, 511-512.
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APPENDIX.
Maritime Law in the War with Spain.
By reason of the nature and incidents of the conflict,
the predominant features of the recent war between the
United States and Spain, from the legal as well as from
the military point of view, were maritime. Important
rules were announced, and many interesting questions were
determined, as to the conduct of hostilities at sea, particu-
larly with reference to (jommercial intercourse and the
treatment of merchant ships and other private property.
In order, however, to present the subject in its proper
relations it is necessary to make certain observations as
to the position of the parties prior to the outbreak of
hostilities.
I. situation prior to the war.
By international law up to the present time the ships of
an enemy are lawful prize, but their cargoes may or may
not be subject to condemnation. On the other hand, ships
of a neutral are not in themselves good prize, but may
become so as the result of unneutral conduct — such as the
attempt to break a blockade; and their cargoes, like those
of enemy ships, may or may not be subject to confiscation,
according to circumstances. As to the treatment of cargo,
the following rules have been acted upon:
1. The goods of an enemy may be seized and confiscated
whether found in an enemy or in a neutral ship.
2. Goods of an enemy, contraband of war excepted, are
exempt from seizure and confiscation when on board of a
neutral ship. This is known as the rule of ''free ships,
free goods."
139
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140 MARITIME LAW IN THE SPANISH WAR.
3. The goods partake of the chai^acter of the ship: If
the ship is neutral, they are free; if the ship belongs to
un enem}^, they are condemned. This is known as the
rule of ''free ships, free goods; enemy ship, enemy
goods."
As the last rule is enforced onl}" under special treat}'
stipulations, it does not at the moment concern us. The
great contest has been waged between the first and second
rules. The first, that the fate of the goods is determined
by the belligerent or neutral character of the owner, with-
out regard to whether the ship is enemy or neutral, was
at one time the common law of Europe. It was laid down
in the Consolato del Mare and was universally accepted.
But about the middle of the seventeenth century a new
rule began to be introduced, and it was stipulated in vari-
ous treaties that the goods of an enemy should be free
when on board a neutral ship. This rule was in time
embodied in the marine ordinances of France. It was
strenuously advocated by the Dutch. It was embraced in
the declaration of the Empress of Russia of 1780, which
formed the basis of the first armed neutrality. Great
Britain generally adhered to the old rule, and in the mari-
time wars of the eighteenth century the new rule was little
observed. Eventually, however, Great Britain came to
accept the new rule. When the Crimean War broke out,
^he joined France in proclaiming that enemy property on
board a neutral ship would be respected. Then, at the
■close of the war, came the famous Declaration of Paris of
April 16, 1856, by which the signatory powers (France,
Great Britain, Russia, Prussia, Austria, Sardinia, and the
Ottoman Porte), with a view ''to establish a uniform rule
on a point so important," announced their adherence to
the rule and engaged to invite other powers to adhere to
it. The declaration contained in all four rules, which
were as follows:
''1. Privateering is and remains abolished.
"2. The neutral flag covers an enemj^'s goods, with the
exception of contraband of war.
•'3. Neutral goods, with the exception of contmband of
war, are not liable to capture under the enemy's flag.
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POSITION OF UNITED STATES. * 141
''4. Blockades in order to be binding must be eflFective;
that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to
prevent access to the coast of the enemy."
These rules, in accordance with the resolution of the
Congress of Paris, were brought to the notice of the pow-
ers for acceptance or rejection as a whole, and were ac-
cepted by all the German States, b}^ the Two Sicilies and
the Papal States, and, indeed, by all the powers except
the United States, Mexico, Spain, and Venezuela. The
United States, whose objection was based upon the fact
that while privateering was to be abolished the capture of
enemy ships and of enemy property on board such ships
was still to be permitted, offered to adhere to the declara-
tion on condition that it be so amended as to exempt pri-
vate property at sea altogether from capture, save in the
case of contraband or of blockade. This offer, which was
made in the closing days of the administration of Presi-
dent Pierce, was withdrawn by President Buchanan before
any definite action upon it was taken. On the outbreak
of the civil war the United States offered to accept the
declaration in its entirety, but this offer came to naught,
since it was found to involve the recognition of the right
of the United States to bind the Confederacy, which had
authorized the issuance of privateering commissions.
As the United States had not become a party to the
Declaration of Paris, it is important to ascertain what was
its actual position with respect to the rules therein laid
down, prior to the war with Spain. As to the first and
fourth rules, this question may readily be answered. The
rule that blockades in order to be binding must be effect-
ive, had always been maintained by the United States as
a principle of international law. On the other hand, the
United States, while seeking on various occasions to estab-
lish the exemption of private property at sea from capture,
had maintained the right, so long as such an exemption
was not established, to employ privateers, although dur-
ing the civil war the Government issued no commissions
for that purpose. But, as to the second and third rules,
the position of the United States has often been imper-
fectly apprehended. The rule that neutral goods, with
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142 MilrRITIME LAW IN THE SPANISH WAK.
the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to cap-
ture under the enemy's flag, has alwa^'s been acted upon
by the United States, save in case of special treaty stipu-
lations to the contrary; but, with the rule that free ships
make free goods, the case is different. Mr. Seward,
referring to this rule, as embodied in the Declaration of
Paris, once said: "We have always practiced on the prin-
ciples of the declaration."^ Similar expressions may be
found in the works of publicists, but they are inaccurate.
Our courts, except where a tieat}- prescribed a different
rule, had uniformly confiscated enemy property, even
when it was seized under a neutral flag. And what is to
be said as to our treaties? In only ten of them, made
with seven powers — Algiers, 1816; Morocco, 1787 and
1836; Prussia, 1785 and 1828; Spain, 1795; Tripoli, 1796
and 1805; Tunis, 1797; and Venezuela, 1860 — had the rule
of "free ships, free goods" been stipulated for uncondi-
tionally, contraband always excepted. In six treaties —
Russia, 1851; Two Sicilies, 1855; Peru, 1856; Bolivia,
1858; Hayti, 1861, and the Dominican Republic, 1867—
the principle of ''free ships, free goods" was recognized
as "permanent and immutable," but the contracting par-
ties engaged to apply it onl}^ to the commerce and naviga-
tion of such powers as should ''consent to adopt" it as
"'permanent and immutable." Of these treaties those
with the Dominican Republic and the Two Sicilies had
ceased to be in force, and that with Peru had been super-
seded. In our treaty with Spain of 1819 the principle of
"free ships, free goods" was acknowledged, but only in
regard to the propertv of enemies whose governments
recognized it. Similar stipulations ma}' be found in our
treaties with Italy of 1871 and Peru of 1887, and indeed
in the first treat}^ ever concluded by the United States —
the treaty of amity and commerce with France of Febru-
ary 6, 1778. But in the treaty with France they were
coupled with yet another stipulation restrictive of neutral
commerce — namely, that the goods of the citizens of the
contracting parties should be confiscated, if laden on the
ship of an enemy, unless they were shipped before the
* Instruction to Mr. Dayton, minister to France, September 10,
1861, Dip. Cor., 1861, 233, 235.
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DECLARATIONS OF WAR. 143
declaration of war, or within a certain time afterwards in
ignorance of the declai*ation. These associated stipula-
tions are found more generally than any others in ouv
treaties relating to neutral rights, as may be seen by the
following list: Brazil, 1828; Central America, 1825; Chile,
1832; Colombia, 1824 and 1846; Ecuador, 1839; France,
1800; Guatemala, 1849; Mexico, 1831; the Netherlands,
1782; Peru, 1851; Peru-Bolivia, 1836; Salvador, 1850 and
1870; Sweden, 1783; Sweden and Norway, 1816 and 1827;
and Venezuela, 1836. But at the outbreak of the war
with Spain all these treaties, except those with Colombia
(1846), Salvador (1870), and Sweden and Norway (1827),
had ceased to, be in force. With Great Britain we had
had no engagement on the subject except that embodied
in the treaty of 1794, which acknowledged the rule of the
common law.
Such was the situation on the eve of the war with Spain.
II. DECIiARATIONS OF WAR.
April 20, 1898, the President approved a joint resolution
of Congress, by which it was declared (1) that " the people
of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and indepen-
dent;" (2) that it was the duty of the United States to
demand, and that the United States did thereby demand,
that Spain at once relinquish her authority and govern-
ment in Cuba and withdraw her land and naval forces from
the island and its waters; (3) that the President was directed
and empowered to use the land and naval forces of the
United States and to call into actual service the militia, to
such extent as might be necessar^'^ to carry these resolutions
into effect; and (4) that the United States disclaimed any
disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdic-
tion, or control over the island except for the pacification
thereof, and asserted its determination, when that was ac-
complished, to leave the government and control of the
island to its people.
On the same da}^ the Spanish minister at Washington
asked for and obtained his passports, and the text of the
joint resolution was cabled by the United States to its min-
ister in Madrid for communication to the Spanish Govern-
6482—01 10
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144 MARITIME LAW IN THE SPANISH WAR.
ment. But before it could be so communicated the Amer-
ican minister, on April 21, received from the Spanish
Government a note, in which it was stated that the joint
resolution was considered as an obvious declaration of war,
and that all diplomatic relations consequently were severed. ^
On April 22 the President issued a proclamation, in which,
referring to the joint resolution of Congress, he declared
a blockade of ports on the north coast of Cuba from Car-
denas to Bahia Honda, and of the port of Cienfuegos on
the south coast. The blockade was instituted on the same
day. By an act of Congress approved April 25, 1898, war
was declared to have existed since April 21, inclusive, and
the President was directed and empowered to use the en-
tire land and naval forces of the United States, and to call
into actual service the militia for the purpose of carrjdng
it on.
III. ADOPTION OF THE ADDITIONAL ARTICLES OF THE
GENEVA CONVENTION.
By the convention signed at Geneva, August 22, 1864,
commonly called the Red Cross convention, various hu-
mane regulations were adopted for the amelioration of the
condition of the wounded in the field. In 1868 a second
international conference was held at Geneva, and fifteen
articles, known as the "additional articles of 1868," were
proposed, of which Articles VI to XV related exclusively
to marine warfare. During the Franco-German war the
additional articles were adopted as a modus vivendi be-
tween the belligerents. On March 1, 1882, they were
acceded to by the United States, but the accession was
subject to a genei-al exchange of ratifications, which the
powers failed to effect. Nevertheless, although the addi-
tional articles had not become internationally operative,
the United States, on the breaking out of hostilities, at
once commissioned the ambulance ship Solace to accom-
pany the Atlantic fleet as a noncombatant hospital ship,
and, in the spirit of those articles, to render aid to the
sick, wounded, and dying. April 23, 1898, the Swiss
minister at Washington proposed the formal adoption of
1 H. Ex. Doc. 428, 55 Cong., 2 sess.
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DECLARATIONS OF NEUTRALITY. 145
the additional articles, with certain amendments or eluci-
dations, by the United States and Spain as a modus vivendi
pending hostilities. This proposal was accepted by both
Governments.^
IV. DECLARATIONS OF NEUTRALITY.
On the outbreak of the war, announcements of neutrality
were made by numerous powers. These announcements
in some cases were brief and informal, and in others took
the shape of proclamations and decrees, in which various
rules, more or less comprehensive in their nature, were
laid down.* Before tne commencement of hostilities, the
United States purchased two warships then building in
England — a torpedo boat, and the Brazilian cruiser Almi-
rante Ahreu, When war was announced, the British
Government promptly prohibited the departure of the
nearly completed torpedo boat, which had been named
the Somers^ and stopped work on the cruiser. This action
appeared to be in conformity with the obligations of neu-
trality, and was acquiesced in by the United States.' The
war ships were purchased about the middle of March, 1898.*
Permission for the departure of the Somers^ which had
been stored at Falmouth, was granted on the practical
conclusion of the peace negotiations at Paris, the United
States having, besides, assured the British Government
that in the event of the renewal of hostilities with Spain
the vessel would not be made use of.*^
An interesting question arose as to the U. S. S. Mono-
<i<icy in China. By communications of the tsungli yamfen
iFor. Rel., 1898, 1148-1159.
^ Proclamations and Decrees during the war with Spain: Washing-
ton, Government Printing Office, 1899.
3 Mr. Hay, Sec. of State, to Mr. House, Feb. 15, 1900, 243 MS. Dom.
Let, 70.
* Mr. Sherman, Sec. of State, to Mr. White, charg^ d'affaires at Lon-
don, telejjrams, March 7 and 9, 1898, MS. Instr. to Gr. Br., XXXII, 423,
424; Mr. Day, Acting Sec. of State, to Mr. White, March 13, 1898, Id.
* Mr. Hay, Sec. of State, to Mr. White, Nov. 19, 1898, MS. Instr. to
Gr. Br., XXXIII, 33; Mr. White to Mr. Hay, tel., Dec. 9, 1898 (stating
that permission was granted), MS. Desp., Gr. Br.; Mr. Hay to the Sec.
of the Navy, Dec. 10, 1898, 233 MS. Dom. Let, 175; Mr. Hay to Mr.
White, Dec. 13, 1898, MS. Instr. Gr. B., XXXIII, 45.
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146 MARITIME LAW IN THE SPANISH WAR.
to Mr. Denby, United States minister at Pekin, of May 2
and May 9, 1898, official announcement was made that the
yam^n had telegraphed the viceroys, governors, and
taotais-general of the Yangtze and maritime provinces to
instruct their subordinates to observe the laws of neu-
trality. In the communication of the 9th of May it was
stated that, in due observance of international law, vessels
of war of the belligerents would not be allowed to ''anchor
in Chinese ports." In the proclamation of the taotai of
Shanghai, issued May 22, 1898, it was more precisely
declared that such vessels must not use Chinese-controlled
waters and ports for anchorage or fighting purposes, or
anchor there for lading war supplies; and that, should
any such vessel enter a Chinese port, except under stress
of weather or for necessary food or repairs, it must not
remain over twenty -four hours. ^ A question having arisen
as to the applicability of these provisions to the Monocacy^
an antiquated ship of war of light draft, which had, because
of her adaptation to river service, for years been kept in
Chinese waters for the protection of American citizens,,
tte Government of the United States maintained (1) that,
as the circumstances of her long-continued[ employment
and her unfitness for service at sea rendered it apparent
that her presence was not connected with the war, she did
not come within the operation of rules designed to pre-
vent the use of neutral waters as a base of hostilities, and
(2) that the existence of war between the United States
and a third power could not deprive the former of the
right to take the customary measures for the protection
of its citizens in China.*
In the latter part of August, 1898, ten days after the
signature of the preliminary peace protocol, the British
Government granted permission for Admiral Dewey to
dock, clean, and paint the bottoms of the vessels under his
command at Hongkong. In making the application for
this privilege the United States observed that such an
operation could not, under the existing circumstances, be
considered as connected with actual hostilities, but was in
* Proclamations and Decrees during the War with Spain, 18-20.
*Mr. Day, Sec. of State, to Mr. Denby, June 7, 1898, MS. Instr. to
China, V, 566.
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ASYLUM. 147
the nature of repairs affecting the preservation of the
vessels.*
An incident of the early stages of the conflict suggests
the need of an amplification of the rule by which a bellig-
erent man-of-war is required, except in case of stress of
weather or of need of provisions or repairs, to leave a
neutral port within twenty-four hours after her arrival.
On May 11, 1898, Captain Cotton, of the auxiliary cruiser
Harvard^ cabled from St. Pierre, Martinique, to the Sec-
retary of the Navy that the Spanish torpedo-boat destroyer
Furor had touched during the afternoon at Fort de France,
Martinique, and had afterwards left, destination unknown,
and that the governor had ordered him not to sail within
twenty- four hours from the time of the Furores departure.
At noon on the 12th of May Captain Cotton was informed
by the captain of the port, at St. Pierre, that the Furor
had about 8 a. m. again called at Fort de France and would
leave about noon, and that he might go to sea at 8 p. m. ;
but that, if he did not do so, he would be required to give
the governor twenty-four hours' notice of his intention to
leave the port. On the same day Captain Cotton received
information which led him to telegraph to the Secretary of
the Navy that he was closely observed and blockaded at
St. Pierre by the Spanish fleet, and that the Spanish tor-
pedo-boat destroyer Terror was at Fort de France. Later,
Captain Cotton cabled that the Spanish consul protested
against his stay at St. Pierre, and that he had requested
permission to remain a week to make necessary repairs to
machinery. Replying to these reports, the Secretary of
the Navy telegraphed to Captain Cotton ns follows: '' Vig-
orously protest against being forced out of the port in the
face of superior blockading force, especially as 3'^ou were
detained previously in the port by the French authorities
because Spanish men-of-war had sailed from another port.
Also state that United States Government will bring the
matter to the attention of the French Government. Urge
United States consul to protest vigorously." It proved to
be unnecessary to take further action. Captain Cotton's
request for time was granted. The governor showed no
^ Mr. Day, Sec. of State, to Mr. Hay, Ambassador at London, Aug. 22,
1898; Mr. Hay to Mr. Day, Aug. 23, 1898: For. Bel., 1898, 1002.
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148 MARITIME LAW IN THE SPANISH WAR.
disposition to force him out of port, only requiring twenty -
four hours' notice of an intention to sail; and the dangers
to which the Harvard seemed to be exposed soon disap-
peared.^ It may be observed, however, that as the enforce-
ment, under circumstances such as were described, of the
twenty-four hours' limit, would constitute a negation of
the admitted privilege of asylum, it is not likely that it
would be held to be applicable in such a situation.
The Spani&h torpedo-boat destroyer Te^nerario^ which
was reported to have been sent down the coast of South
America to intercept the U. S. S. Oregon on her way
around Cape Horn to Cuba, was p^^rmitted by the Para-
guayan Government to lie up during the war at Asuncion^
in a condition of disability unfitting her for service.
A number of the neutrality proclamations contained a
clause limiting the supply of coal which a belligerent ves-
sel might obtain to a quantity suflScient to take such vessel
to the nearest port of its own country, or, in other words^
to its nearest national port. In the decree of the Nether-
lands, the provision read that '* the store of coal shall onl}"
be supplemented sufficiently to allow the ship or vessel to
reach the nearest port of the country to which it belongs,,
or that of one of its allies in the war." When the Spanish
fleet, which was afterwards destroj^ed at Santiago, arrived
off Curasao on the 14th of May, 1898, the commander
sought from the Dutch colonial authorities permission to
await there 5,000 tons of coal which had been sent thither.
This request was denied, as well as a request for permission
to ship the coal whenever it should arrive. A request that
each vessel be allowed to take 700 tons was likewise re-
fused. Finally, permission was asked and granted for two
of the vessels, the Maria Teresa and the Yizcaya^ to enter
the harbor and each to take 200 tons, the rest of the ships
meanwhile to remain at anchor in the roads. The 400 tons^
thus obtained were said to be of ''very poor quality."^
1 Naval Operations of the War with Spain, 383-389 ,407-410.
^ Mr. Newel, minister at The Hague, to the See. of State, May 20,
1898, MSS. Dept. of State; Mr. Moore, Assistant Sec. of State, to the
Sec. of the Navy, June 2, 1898, 229 MS. Dom. Let., 93; Mr. Smith,
consul at Curasao, May 16 and May 18, 1898, MSS. Dept. of State.
There was at one time a rumor, which proved to be erroneous, that
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COAL. 149
When, in the latter part of Ma}', 1898, it was rumored
that the Spanish armored squadron had sailed or was about
to sail to the United States and might stop at the Azores
for coal, the minister of the United States at Lisbon was
instructed to protest against its coaling at those islands, on
the ground that, as they lay entirely outside the route from
Spain to the Spanish West Indies, such an act would convert
the Portuguese territory into a base of hostile operations
against the United States/ The squadron did not in fact
sail westward, but afterwards proceeded on the way to the
East as far as the Suez Canal and then returned to Spain.
Before the outbreak of hostilities, the Pacific Mail Steam-
ship Company was permitted, under its agreement with
the Mexican Government, to furnish supplies of coal to
United States men-of-war at Acapulco. During the war,
the Mexican Government placed limitations on the supply
of coal to belligerent vessels in its ports, and made no
exception as to United States vessels at Acapulco. The
Department of State abstained from addressing any repre-
sentation to Mexico on the subject, on the ground that as
it had ' ' on numerous recent occasions asked of Mexico the
strict execution of its neutral duties," it was '' not disposed,
upon the strength of an agreement between the Pacific
Mail Steamship Company and the Mexican Government,
made before the war, to insist that public ships of the
United States may now be allowed to take coal without
limit in a Mexican port."*
By an act of Congress of April 22, 1898, the President
was ''authorized, in his discretion and with such limita-
tions and exceptions as shall seem to him expedient, to
prohibit the export of coal or other material used in war
the Maria Teresa and the Vizcaya each obtained at Curasao 600 tons
of coal, which was far more than enough to take them to Porto Rico,
the nearest Spanish possession, or to Cuba. By such a transaction
Curasao would have been "converted into a base of hostile operations
for Spanish vessels in violation of neutrality." (Mr. Day, Sec. of
State, to Mr. Newel, tel.. May 17, 1898, MS. Inst, to the Netherlands,
XVI, 357.)
^Mr. Day, Sec. of State, to Mr. Townsend, tel.j May 20, 1898, MS.
Inst. Portugal, XVI, 146.
2 Mr. Day, Sec. of State, to the Sec. of the Navy, Aug. 5, 1898, 230
MS. Dom. Let, 541.
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150 MARITIME LAW IN THE SPANISH WAR.
from any seaport of the United States until otherwise
ordered " by himself or by Congress. For the purpose of
enforcing the provisions of this act, as well as of regula-
ting the subject of exportations generally during the con-
tinuance of the war, a circular was issued by the Treasury
Department, April 27, 1898, Under the regulations and
practice of that Department, the interested persons were
required to apply to the proper collector of customs for
permission to clear the coal, stating who were the shippers
and who the consignees. They were also required to make
affidavit that the coal was not destined directly or indi-
rectly for the enemies of the United States, and to agree
to advise the Treasury Department by telegraph of the
arrival of the coal at its destination immediately upon such
arrival. The Treasury Department reserved the right to
require the shipper to give bond for the transportation of
the coal to the port for which clearance was asked, and
from this bond he was not released till the cargo had
arrived at that port or had been satisfactorily accounted
for. This requirement was designed to prevent collusive
captures, and was not as a rule exacted where the collector
recommended the clearance and the standing of all the par.-
ties concerned was such as to convince the Treasury that
the additional safeguard might be dispensed with. In this
and in other particulars the action of the Treasury was
largely governed by the circumstances of the case.^ The
restrictions on exportation naturally resulted in a real or
apprehended scarcity of coal at places which depended on
the United States, in whole or in part, for their supply.
At Vera Cruz, for example, where there is a considerable
demand for the article for railways, double freight rates
were offered for cargoes in the latter part of May.^
V. DECLARATIONS AS TO MARITIME LAW.
April 22, 1898, the Department of State, in a telegraphic
instruction to the diplomatic represensatives of the United
States, declared among other things that, in the event of
1 Mr. Bay, Sec. of State, to Mr. Andrade, June 6, 1898, MS. Notes
to Venez. Leg., II, 22.
^Mr. Moore, Assist. Sec. of State, to the Treasury Dept., May 25,
1898, 227 MS. Dom. Let., 641.
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AUXILIARY CRUISERS. 151
hostilities with Spain, the ^^ policy" of the United States
''will be not to resort to privateering." The Spanish
Government, by a royal decree of April 23, 1898, embody-
ing the rules which it proposed to observe during the war,
reserved the right to issue letters of marque. Of this res-
ervation Spain afterwards took no advantage. The decree
also declared that the Government would, for the purposes
of cruising, organize a service of ''auxiliary cruisers of
the navy," composed of "ships of the Spanish mercantile
navy" and "subject to the statutes and jurisdiction of the
navy."
The United States organized an auxiliary force, under
the command of officers of the Navy. The conditions
under which this service. was established are set forth
in the case of Ths Rita^ relating to the distribution of
prize money among the officers and crew of the auxiliary
cruiser Yale^ formerly the steamer City of Paris of the
International Navigation Oompany , commonly called the
American Line.
The City of Paris was one of a olass of steamers which
were, under the provisions of the mail-subsidy act of
March 3, 1891, subject to be taken by the United States
as cruisers or transports upon the payment of their actual
value. By a charter part}" and supplementary agreement
entered into April 30, 1898, between the company and the
Secretary of the Navy, possession of the ship was trans-
ferred to the Government, by which she was heavily
armed and converted into an auxiliary cruiser. The char-
ter party provided that the ship should be "manned,
victualled, and supplied at the expense of the charterer."
The charterer was also to pay all other expenses, and at
the termination of the charter, which was to be at the
charterer's will, was to return the ship in good repair, less
ordinary wear and tear. The supplementary agreement
provided that the ship was "to be manned by her regular
officers and crew, and in addition thereto was to take on
board two naval officers, a marine officer, and a guard of
thirty marines, and was to be victualled and supplied with
two months' provisions and about four thousand tons of
1 89 Fed. Rep., 763.
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152 MAEITIME LAW IN THE SPANISH WAR.
coal, the actual cost to the owner of such additional equip-
ment and services to be reimbursed by the charterer upon
bills to be certified by the senior naval officer on bosCrd."
There were also stipulations protecting the owner against
all expenses and liability, and a provision that during the
continuation of the supplementary agreement the steam-
ship was to be "under the entire control dt the senior
naval officer on board." Under these agreements the Gov-
ernment of the United States placed on board the ship a
captain and a lieutenant of the Navy and a marine guard
of 25 enlisted men. There were also on board 269 other
persons, not commissioned by or regularly enlisted in the
service of the United States, but comprising the ship's
company, both officers and men, who were doing duty on
board and were borne on the books of the ship. On a
question that arose as to the distribution of prize money it
was held that the Yale was neither a "vessel of the Navy "
nor a privateer, but came within the statutory class of
vessels " not of the Navy, but controlled by either Execu-
tive Department," and was, as an " aimed vessel in the serv-
ice of the United States," "entitled," in the words of the
statute, " to an award of prize money in the same manner
as if such vessel belonged to the Navy." ^
In the telegram of April 22, above cited, the Govern-
ment of the United States, besides announcing its policy
in regard to privateering, stated that it would adhere to
the second, third, and fourth rules of the Declaration of
Paris, as "recognized rules of international law."
On April 26, the President issued a proclamation more
fully defining the pojrition of the Government on questions
of maritime law. By this proclamation the announcement
that it would not be the policy of the United States to
resort to privateering was repeated; and following this
announcement, six rules were promulgated for the observ-
ance of officers of the United States during the conflict.
^ See, as to the ** volunteer navy" organized by Prussia during the
Franco-German war, Hall, Int. Law, 4th ed., 547-550.
By the act of March 3, 1899, for the reorganization of the U. S. Navy
and Marine Corps, all provisions of law authorizing the distribution
among captors of prize money or providing for the payment of bounty
are repealed. (30 U. S. Statutes at Large, 1004, 1007.)
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PROCLAMATIONS AND DECREES. 15$
These rules, the first three of which embodied the sub-
stance of the second, third, and fourth rules of the Declara-
tion of Paris, were as follows:
''1. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the
exception of contraband of war.
"2. Neutral goods, not contraband of war, are not liable
to confiscation under the enemy's flag.
''3. Blockades in order to be binding must be effective.
"4. Spanish merchant vessels, in any ports or places^
within the United States, shall be allowed till May 21,
1898, inclusive, for loading their cargoes and departing
from such ports or places; and such Spanish merchant
vessels, if met at sea by any United States ship, shall be
permitted to continue their voyage, if, on examination of
their papers, it shall appear that their cargoes were taken
on board before the expiration of the above term: Pro-
vided, that nothing herein contained shall apply to Spanish
vessels having on board any oflicer in the military or naval
service of the enemy, or any coal (except such as may be
necessary for their voyage), or any other article prohibited
or contraband of war, or any despatch of or to the Spanish
Government.
" 5. Any Spanish merchant vessel which, prior to April
21, 1898, shall have sailed from any foreign port bound
for any port or place in the United States, shall be per-
mitted to enter such port or place, and to discharge her
cargo, and afterwards forthwith to depart without molesta-
tion; and any such vessel, if met at sea by any United
States ship, shall be permitted to continue her voyage ta
any port not blockaded.
''The right of search is to be exercised with strict
regard for the rights of neutrals, and the voyages of mail
steamers are not to be interfered with except on the
clearest grounds of suspicion of a violation of law in
respect of contraband or blockade."
The rules to be observed by the Spanish Government
were embodied in the royal decree of April 23, 1898.
This decree allowed only five days from the date of its
publication for the departure of American ships from
Spanish ports. It did not in terms prohibit the capture
of such ships after their departure, nor' did it provide for
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154 MARITIME LAW IN THE SPANISH WAR.
the entrance and discharge of American ships sailing for
Spanish ports before the war.
As no captures were made by Spain, no opportunity
•occurred for the judicial construction of the rules which
that Government announced for its guidance. In respect
of some of the captures made by the United States, there
arose interesting questions which became the subject of
judicial decision.^
VI. VESSELS IN PORT BEFORE OR AFTER THE OUTBREAK
OF THE WAR.
In the case of the Buena Ventura an important applica-
tion was made of rule 4 of the proclamation of April 26.
The Btcena Ventura was a Spanish merchant steamship,
which was captured by the United States steamship JVash-
ville^ eight or nine miles oflP the Florida coast. On the
27th of May she was condemned by the United States
district court for the southern district of Florida as enemy
property.^ This sentence was reversed by the Supreme
Court of the United States.^ It appeared that the Buena
Ventura was, at the time of her capture, on a voyage from
JShip Island, in the State of Mississippi, to Rotterdam, by
way of Norfolk, Virginia, with a cargo of lumber. She
arrived at Ship Island March 31, 1898, and sailed for Rot-
terdam on April 19, with a permit, obtained in accordance
with the laws of the United States, to call at Norfolk for
a supply of bunker coal. She was captured on the morn-
ing of April 22. She made no resistance, had on board
no military or naval officer, and carried no arms or muni-
tions of war. It was undisputed that when captured she
was on her way to Norfolk, and that her papers for that
purpose were in due form. The opinion of the Supreme
Court was delivered by Mr. Justice Peckham. The ques-
tion at issue was whether she could be brought within the
exemption of the fourth rule of the proclamation of April
^ A list of all tjae prizes made by the United States naval forces on
the North Atlantic stations may be found in the Naval Operations
•of the War with Spain, 316-325.
^Bttena VerUura et al.y 87 Fed. Rep., 927. The cargo, being the prop-
erty of neutrals and not contraband of war, was restored.
'The Buena Ventura, 175 U. S., 384.
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VESSELS IN PORT. 155
26 as to "Spanish merchant vessels, in any ports or places
within the United States." In the course of his opinioa
Mr. Justice Peckham observed that the vessel in question,
as a merchant vessel of the enemy carrying on an. inno-
cent commercial enterprise at or just prior to the time
when hostilities began, belonged to a class which the
United States had always desired to treat with great lib-
erality, and which civilized nations had in their later prac-
tice in fact so treated. The President's proclamation
should therefore receive '^'the most liberal apd extensive
interpretation " of which it was capable, and, where two
or more interpretations were possible, the one most favor-
able to the belligerent in favor of whom the proclamation
was issued. The provision that ''Spanish merchant ves-
sels in any ports or places within the United States shall
be allowed until May 21, 1898, inclusive, for loading their
cargoes and departing," might, said the learned justice, be
held to include (1) only vessels in port on the day when
the proclamation was issued, namely, April 26, or (2) those
in port on April 21, the day on which war was declared
by Congress to have begun, or (3) not only those then in
port, but also any that had sailed therefrom on or before
May 21, whether before or after the commencement of
the war or the issuing of the proclamation. The court
adopted the last interpretation. While the proclamation
did not in so many words include vessels which had sailed
from the United States before the commencement of the
war, such vessels were, said Mr. Justice Peckham, clearly
within its " intention," under the liberal construction which
the court felt bound to give it. In view of the fact, how-
ever, that, at the time of the capture, the proclamation of
April 26, without which the vessel would have been liable
to condemnation, had not been issued, restitution was
awarded without damages or costs. ^
The effect of the fourth rule of the proclamation of April
26 was again considered in the case of the Spanish steam-
ship Panama. This vessel was condemned by the court of
original jurisdiction as enemy property,* and the decree
^ The Chief Justice and Justices Gray and McKenna dissented frorii
the decision of the court.
^Buena Ventura el ah, 87 Fed. Rep., 927.
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156 MAEITIME LAW IN THE SPANISH WAR.
was confirmed hy the Supreme Court. ^ The Panama^ a
steamship of 1,432 tons register, owned by the Compania
Transatlantiea, a Spanish corporation of Barcelona, Spain,
and carrying the Spanish flag, sailed from New York on
April 20, 1898, for Havana, Cuba, and certain Mexican
ports, with a geneml cargo and passengers and mails.
April 25, when about twenty-five miles from Havana, she
was captured by a United States man-of-war. The Panama
had a commission as a royal mail ship from the Spanish
Government and a crew of seventy -one men, who had
been shipped at various times at Havana, and she carried
twenty-nine passengers, all of whom, with the exception
of one Frenchman, were Spaniards. Mr. Justice Gray,
who delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court, said that
the case of the Buena Ventura would be decisive of that of
the Panama^ but for the mails and the arms carried by the
latter vessel and the contract under which she sailed.
Under that contract, which was entered into in 1886, the
Spanish Government had the right to take possession of
the steamer in case of war; and it was required that the
ships belonging to the line should be specially adapted to
use in war, and that every mail steamer should carry a
certain armament "for her own defense." The oflScers
and crew, and so far as possible the engineers, were to be
Spaniards. When captured the Panama carried two
breech-loading Hontoria guns of nine centimeter bore, one
mounted on each side of the ship; one Maxim rapid-fire
gun on the bridge; twenty Remington and ten Mauser
rifles, with ammunition for all the guns and rifles; and thirty
or forty cutlasses. The guns had been put on board three
years before, and the small arms or ammunition a year or
more; and all her armament was carried in compliance
with the mail conti*act, except the Maxim gun and the
Mauser rifles. It might be assumed, said the court, that
the primary object of the steamer's armament, and in time of
peace its only object, was that of defense. The armament,
however, was not in itself inconsiderable, and after the
capture of the vessel her arms and ammunition were
delivered over for the use of the United States Navy.
^The Panama, 176 U. S., 535.
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SAILING FOR AN ENEMY PORT. 157
The ship was therefore enemy property, bound to an
enemy port, carrying an armament susceptible of use for
hostile purposes, and herself liable, on arriving in that
port, to be appropriated by the enemy for such purposes.
The intent of the proclamation, continued the court, was
to exempt for a time from capture peaceful commercial
vessels, and not to assist the enemy in obtaining weapons
of war; and it could not be reasonabW construed as exempt-
ing from capture ''a Spanish vessel owned by a subject of
the enemy; having an armament fit for hostile use; intended,
in the event of war, to be used as a war vessel; destined
to a port of the enemy; and liable, on arriving there, to
be taken possession of by the enemy and employed as an
auxiliary cruiser in the enemy's navy."
VII. VESSELS SAILING FOR AN ENEMY PORT BEFORE THE WAR.
The proper application of the fifth rule of the proclama-
tion of April 26 was considered by the Supreme Court in
the case of the Spanish merchant steamer Ped/ro^ which
was condemned by the court below as enem^^ property.*
The Pedro^ which was a British-built ship and for several
years sailed under a British registry, "was transferred in
1887 to a Spanish corporation of Bilbao, Spain, and was
duly registered as a Spanish vessel. Thereafter she sailed
under the Spanish flag and was oflScered and manned by
Spaniards, though she was employed for the transportation
of merchandise for hire under the management of a Liver-
pool firm. Her usual course was to take cargo in Europe
for Cuban ports and, after discharging there, to proceed
to the United States and obtain cargo for Europe, the round
trip occupying about three months. On March 18, 1898,
while she was loading in Antwerp for Cuba, she was char-
tered by an American firm to proceed to Pensacola, Florida,
or Ship Island, Mississippi, for a cargo of lumber for Rot-
terdam or Antwerp. Soon afterwards she left Antwerp
with about two thousand tons of merchandise of various
1 The Pedro, 175 U. S., 354. The case of the Guido, 175 U. S., 382,
is similar, and was decided on the strength of that of the Pedro, with-
out an extended opinion.
^ Buena Ventura et at., 87 Fed. Rep., 927.
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158 MARITIME LAW IN THE SPANISH WAR.
kinds for Havana and Cienf uegos. She arrived at Havana
on April 17 and, after discharging most of her cargo, sailed
on the 22d for Santiago, Cuba, with a small quantity of
general merchandise taken at Havana. On the same day-
she was captured a few miles off Havana by a cruiser of
the United States blockading fleet. Her condemnation
was resisted on the ground, among others, that her true
destination was a port in the United States, so that she fell
within the exemption contained in rule five. The court.
Chief Justice Fuller delivering the opinion, declined so to
hold. The Chief Justice observed that the Pedro remained
at Havana from the 17th of April to the 22d, and left on
the latter day, which was the day after the war began;
that she then had no cargo for any port in the United
States, but only for Santiago and Cienfuegos, in Cuba.
She had not left a foreign port in ignorance of the "peril-
ous condition of afl'airs," but must be assumed to have been
advised of the imminency of hostilities; nor was she bring-
ing a cargo to the United States for the increase of its
resources and the convenience of its citizens. On the con-
trary, she was captured while trading from one enemy
port to another, being herself an enemy vessel. Under
these circumstances, the fact that she was under contract
ultimately to proceed to a port of the United States to take
cargo for Europe did not, sajd the Chief Justice, bring her
within the exemption of the fifth rule; and he declared
that the doctrine of continuous voyages, as laid down by
the court on various occasions, did not apply to the case.^
The decree of condemnation was therefore affirmed.
Mr. Justice White delivered a strong dissenting opin-
ion, in which Justices Brewer, Shiras, and Peckham con-
curred. In this opinion it was argued that the principal
voyage of the vessel was from Antwerp to the United
States, the calling at Cuban ports being merely incidental,
that, although Congress afterwards declared that war
should be considered as having existed on and after April
21, it was neither conceived nor known, when she left
^The Chief Justice discussed and distinguished the following cases:
The Circassiany 2 Wall., 135; the Bermuda^ 3 Wall., 514; the Spring-
boky 5 Wall., 1; the Josephj 8 Cranch, 251; the ^r^ro, Spinks's Prize
Cases, 53.
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QUESTIONS OF ENEMY OWNERSHIP. 159
Havana on the 22d, that a state of war existed; that, just
before her departure from Hav^ana, one American ship
was allowed to sail from that port, and, shortly after her
departure, another; and that the reference to the fact that
the Pedro had no cargo for. the United States ignored the
enlightened moral purpose of the proclamation, and par-
ticularly the provisions of the fourth rule, which allowed
enemy ships not only to depart from the United States
hut also to load and take away cargo either for a neutral
port or for a port of the enemy not blockaded.^
VIII. QUESTIONS OF ENEMY OWNERSHIP.
In three well-considered cases, two of which related to
vessels and the third to cargo, the question was raised as
to whether the captured property, whose condemnation
was demanded as enemy property, legally bore that char-
acter. The first case was that of the Pedro^^ to which I have
already adverted. After the preparatory proofs were
taken, the master appearing on behalf of the owners made a
claim to the vessel and moved for leave to take further
proof on the ground that although a majority of the stock
of the Spanish corporation, to w^hich the vessel ostensibly
belonged, was registered in the names of Spanish subjects
and only a minority in the names of British subjects, one
of the latter had possession of all the certificates of stock,
in consequence of which he was, under the charter of the
company, the sole beneficial owner of the steamer; that
the tmnsfer from British to Spanish registry was made
solely with a view to facilitate her engaging in commerce
with the Spanish colonies; that it was the intention of the
British stockholders to restore her to the British registry
and flag whenever the trade might be disturbed; and that
^ Mr. Justice White also contended that the decision of the Argo,
Spinks's Prize Cases, 53, was a decision in consimili ccu^u, and should
be treated as an authority for the restoration of the Pedro.
A Spanish vessel which sailed from England April 9, 1898, touched
at Corunna, Spain, April 16, and then sailed for ports in Porto Rico,
did not come within the proclamation of April 26, but was, after the
outbreak of war, subject to capture as enemy property. (The i?i7a, 87
Fed. Rep. 925; S. P., the Maria Dolores, 88 Fed. Rep. 548.
''175 U. S. 354; supra, p. 157.
6482—01 — 11
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160 MARITIME LAW IN THE SPANISH WAR.
the steamer was insured by British underwriters, by whoni^
if she should be condemned, the loss would be borne.
The court below refused to allow further proof to be
taken, and this ruling was aflSrmed b}^ the Supreme Court.
The vessel, said the Supreme Court, belonged to a Spanish
corporation, had a Spanish registry, was sailing under the
Spanish flag and a Spanish license, and was officered and
manned by Spaniards. Nothing was better settled than
that she must, under such circumstances, be deemed a
Spanish ship and treated accordingly.^ When the stock-
holders elected to take the benefit of the Spanish naviga-
tion laws, they must be held also to have elected to reh'
on the protection of the Spanish flag. The alleged inten-
tion to restore the vessel to British registry, if war should
render the change desirable, could not be regarded, since
it had not been carried into effect when she was captured.
The Spanish ownership having been made out, the facts
that the stock of the coiporation belonged legalh^ or equi-
tably to British subjects, and that the loss would eventually
be borne by British underwriters were, said the court in
conclusion, immaterial.
In the .case of the Betiito Estenger^ a question was raised
as to the validity of the transfer of a vessel from a Span-
ish subject to a neutral during the w^ar. The Benito
Estenger was captured by the United States steamship
Ihrniet eTune 27, 1898, off Cape Cruz, on the south side of
the island of Cuba. December 7, 1898, she was condemned
by the United States district court for the southern dis-
trict of Florida as enem}^ property. The claimant ap-
pealed on the ground (1) that she was a British merchant
ship, duly documented and entitled to the protection of
the British flag, and lawfully owned and registered by
a British subject domiciled in Great Britain, and (2)
that she was engaged in a voyage in behalf of the local
Cuban Junta in Kingston, Jamaica, allies of the United
States, and was thus captured in the service of the
United States, in the performance of friendlv oflSces to
the United States forces.
^Citing Story, Prize Courts (Pratt's ed.) 60, %%\ the Friendschaft, 4
AVheat. 105; the Ariadne, 2 Wheat. 143; the Cheshire, 3 Wall. 231;
Hall, Int. Law,
'' 176 U. S., 568.
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QUESTIONS OF ENFMY OWNERSHIP. 161
It appeared that prior to June 9, 1898, the vessel was
the property of Enrique de Messa, a Spanish subject resi-
dent in Cuba, and that on that day a bill of sale was made
b}^ de Messa to the claimant, Beattie, a British subject,
and the vessel registered as a British vessel, at Kingston,
in accordance with the requirements of British law. She
had been engaged in trade with the island of Cuba, and
more particularly between the ports of Kingston and
Montego, Jamaica, and the port of Manzanillo, Cuba.
She left Kingston June 23, and proceeded with a cargo of
flour, rice, corn meal, and coflfee to Manzanillo, where the
cargo was discharged. She cleared from Manzanillo on
June 27 for Montego, and thence for Kingston, and was
captured on the same day off Cape Cruz.
The opinion of the court, which was delivered by Chief
Justice Fuller, contains various observations on the enemy
character, illegal intercourse with the eneni}^, blockade,
and other matters; but it may be said that the onl}'^ real
questions in the case were (1) whether de Messa, though a
Spanish subject, was to be treated as an enemy, and (2)
whether the transfer of the ship from him to Beattie was
an actual transfer made in good faith.
As to the first point, there was, said the court, '' evidence
tending to show that Messa sympathized with the Cuban
insurgents, but no proof that he was himself a Cuban rebel
or that he had renounced his allegiance to Spain." The
cargo of the vessel when captured consisted chiefly of flour,
and there was evidence to show that this flour, when landed
at Manzanillo, was immediately transferred to the Spanish
Government warehouse. The court referred to Manza-
nillo as a ''Spanish stronghold," and observed that the
deliver}^ of the provisions to the Spanish Government con-
stituted, under the laws of war, illicit intercourse with
the enemy. It was alleged, however, that de Messa had
rendered important service to the United States, that he
was the friend and not the enemy of the United States,
and that there was an agreement between him and the
United States consul which operated to protect the vessel
from capture. It appeared that de Messa had endeavored
to cultivate friendly relations with the United States con-
sul at Kingston and had given him an old Govei:nment
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162 MARITIME LAW IN THE SPANISH WAR.
plan of the province of Santiago and an especially pre-
pared chart of the harbor, in return for which he endeav-
ored to obtain from the consul a letter of protection for
the voyage which he was about to undertake. The consul
declined to furnish the letter, but on June 23 wrote to
Admiral Sampson that de Messa offered to give certain
information that might be valuable and proposed to be off*
Cape Cruz on June 30, adding: '^You quite understand
that in dealing with those people, one is more or less liable
to imposition. I therefore make no recommendation of
Messa to you." The claimant asserted, while the consul
denied, that protection was given to the voyage by this
letter. With reference to this contention, the court said
that there was nothing to show that the voyage was under-
,taken on the strength of the letter, or that it in any way
contributed to the capture; nor that the admiral intended
to avail himself of the suggestion made in it; ''but," said
the court, ''we do not go at length into this matter,
because we think that no engagement with the United
States nor any particular service to the United States was
made out in that connection, and so far as appears the ves-
sel was captured in the ordinary course of cruising duty
at a time and under circumstances when her liability was
not to be denied. Moreover, a United States consul has
no authority by virtue of his oflScial station to grant any
license or permit the exemption of a vessel of an enemy
from capture and confiscation."^ Referring to the same
subject in another place, the court said: '' Messa's status
was that of an enemy, as already stated, and this must be
held to be so notwithstanding individual acts of friend-
ship, certainly since there was no open adherence to the
Cuban cause, and allegiance could have been shifted with
the accidents of war."
As to the question of the validity of the sale, the court said
that de Messa's story of the transfer was that he was com-
pelled to sell the steamer inorder to get money to live on,
and that he made the sale for $40,000, for the whole or a
*The court cited and discussed Rogers v. The Amado, Newberry,
400; The Hope, 1 Dodson, 226, 229; The Joseph, 8 Cranch, 451; Les
Cinq Frhres, 4 Lebau's Nouveau Code de Prises, 63; The Maria, 6 C.
Rob., 201.
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QUESTIONS OF ENEMY OWNERSHIP. 163
large part of which credit was given on an indebtedness to
the firm of which Beattie was a member, and that he was
employed b}^ Beattie to go on the vessel as his representa-
tive and business manager. Beattie in his testimony said
that the sale was Ixma fide^ but declined to state of what
the payment of the purchase money consisted. The consul
of the United States at Kingston testified that Beattie in
conversation, while insisting that the transfer was abso-
lute, admitted that it was effected for the purpose of pro-
tecting the vessel. Apparentl}^ no money passed. The
Spanish master and crow remained in charge. De MessT?
went on the voyage as supercargo; and in the brief of the
claimant's counsel it was declared that the transfer was
obviously made to protect the steamer as neutral property
from Spanish seizure, while it was adipitted that de Messa
"'still retained a beneficial interest after this sale and trans-
fer of flags. " On this statement of facts the court observed
that "transfers of vessels ^^a^ra^^^ei J^/fo were originally
held invalid,-' but that the rule had been ''modified." The
court quoted from Hall's Internatwnal Law^ 4:th edition,
page 525, as containing the correct rule of law, the follow-
ing passage: ''In England and the United States, on the
contrary, the right to purchase vessels is in principle
admitted, the}" being in themselves legitimate objects of
trade as fully as any other kind of merchandise, but the
opportunities of fraud being great, the circumstances
attending a sale are severely scrutinized, and the transfer
is not held to be good if it is subjected to any condition or
even tacit understanding b}" which the vendor keeps an
interest in the vessel or its profits, a control over it, a
power of revocation, or a right to its restoration at the
conclusion of the war." ^ The burden of proof, said the
court, was on the claimant. In conclusion, the court held
that the requirements of the law of prize were not satisfied
^ The court also cited Story's Notes on the Principles and Practice of
Prize Courts (Pratt's ed.), 63; 2 Wheat. App., 30; The Seeks Gesch-
mMem, 4 C. Rob., 100; The Jemrmj, 4 C. Rob., 31; The Omnibuft, 6 C.
Rob., 71; The Island Belle, 13 Fed. Cases, 168; The Baltica, Spinks's
Prize Cases, 264; Tlie Soglasiey Spinks's Prize Cases, 104; The Ernst
Merck, Spinks's Prize Cases, 98.
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164 MARITIME LAW IN THE SPANISH WAR.
by the proofs in question, and that the condemnation wa»
proper.^
In the case of the Carlos F. Roses^ in which the con-
demnation of the cargo was demanded as enemy property,
a question was raised as to the effect of the indorsement
of the bills of lading to neutrals. The vessel itself, a
Spanish bark, was condemned as enem}" property. The
cargo was claimed by Kleinwort Sons & Co., British mer-
chants, of London. It consisted of jerked beef and garlic,
and was shipped at Montevideo in March, 1898, by Giber-
nau & Co., merchants of that place but citizens of the
Argentine Republic. The invoices stated that the goods
were shipped '' to order for account and risk and by order
of the parties noted below."" In the invoice of jerked beef
the consignees noted below were ''the expedition or voy-
age of the CarloH F, Roses'''' and ''Mr. Pedro Pages of
Havana,*" all concerned being Spanish subjects; the con-
signees of the garlic were " Mr. Pedro Pages'' and " the
undersigned," Gibernau & Co. There were three sets of
bills of lading issued by the master to Gibernau & Co. —
one for that part of the shipment of jerked beef made for
account of the vessel, another for that part made for ac-
count of Pages, and the third for the shipment of garlic
for the joint account of Pages and Gibernau & Co. All
the bills set forth that the goods were taken for the account
and at the risk of whom it might concern. In the ship's
manifest the destination of the cargo was stated thus:
' ' Shipped by Pla Gibernau Co. To order. " The vise of
the Spanish consul read: '' Good for Havana, with a cargo
of jerked beef and garlic." There was no charter party.
On the face of the papers the court held that the goods,
when delivered to the vessel, became the property of the
consignees named in the invoices, and that, as Gibernau &
Co. had not appeared and claimed any interest, the whole
cargo, which the claimants in fact admitted to be '' ulti-
mately^ destined for Don Pedro Pages of Havana," must
^Justices Shiras, White, and Peckhaiii dissented. The President
did "not find himself justified in exercising clemency" in this case.
(Mr. Hill, Acting Sec. of State, to the Attorney-General, Feb. 13, 1901,
250 MS. Dom. Let, 651.)
n77U. S., 655.
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CASE OF THE FISHING SMACKS. 165
be condemned as enemy property unless cause to the con-
trary was shown. Such cause Kleinwort & Co. endeavored
to establish, on the ground that after the shipment of the
cargo they made advances upon it to the amount of about
$30,000, in consideration of which the bills of lading,
indorsed in blank by Gibernau & Co., were delivered to
them with the intent that they should take title to the bills
and the cargo, and on the arrival of the latter at its desti-
nation hold it as security, with the right to dispose of it
and reimburse themselves with the proceeds. They con-
tended that in this way they became the lawful owners
both of the bills and of the cargo. It appeared, however,
that in neither of the two bills of exchange, which were
drawn on Kleinwort & Co. for the amount of the advances,
was any reference made to the cargo, and that while two
of the bills of lading were alleged to have been delivered
to the firm at the time of its acceptance of the bills of ex-
change, the third, for the greater part of the jerked beef,
was not delivered till long afterwards. On these and other
circumstances the court held that the cargo never ho7}a
iide passed to Kleinwort & Co., but remained the prop-
erty of Spanish subjects, and was liable to condemnation.^
It should be noticed that safe conducts were given by the
President to the Alicante^ and other Spanish steamships,
while proceeding under contract with the Government of
the United States to Santiago de Cuba, and sailing there-
from to Spain, with Spanish prisoners of war surrendered
to the ITnited States army in Cuba.
IX. CASE OF THE FISHIN(3 SMACKS.
But, from the point of view of the development of law,
the most important opinion delivered by the Supreme
Court on the question of the liability of enemy property
to condemnation was that in the case of the Spanish fishing-
smacks, the Paquei(' Ilahana and the Lola,^ The particu-
lar point decided was that '^coast-fishing vessels, with
their implements and supplies, cargoes and crews, unarmed
^ Mr. Justice Shiras (lelivere<l a dissenting opinion, in which Mr.
Justice Brewer concurred.
^The Paqwte Hahana, 175 V. S., 677.
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166 MARITIME LAW IN THE SPANISH WAR.
and honestly pursuing their peaceful calling of catching
and bringing in fresh fish, are exempt from capture as
prize of war." In reaching this conclusion, however, the
court, through Mr. Justice Gray, who delivered the opinion,
announced and applied a principle which, though often
recognized b}^ publicists, has perhaps never before been
so clearly and precisely enunciated by a judicial tribunal —
that is, the principle of the progressive development of
international law. Referring to a decision of Lord Stow-
ell, in which it was said that the exemption of vessels,
such as those in question, was ''a rule of comity only, and
not of legal decision," Mr. Justice Gra}^ said:
•'The word 'comit}"' was apparent^ used by Lord
Stowell as synonymous with courtesy or good will. But
the period of a hundred years which has since elapsed is
amply sufficient to have enabled what originally meij have
rested in- custom or comity, courtesy or concession, to
grow, by the general assent of civilized nations, into a
settled rule of international law. As well said by Sir
James Mackintosh: 'In the present century a slow and
silent but very substantial mitigation has taken place in
the practice of war; and in proportion as that mitigated
practice has received the sanction of time, it is raised from
the rank of mere usage and becomes part of the law of
nations.' — Discourse on the Law of Nations, 38; 1 Miscel-
laneous Works^ 360."
It ma}" be hoped that this enlightened declaration will
lead our courts to abandon the repetition of the unfortu-
nate dicta in Brown v. United States,^ based upon the
theory that it was the peculiar prerogative of a remote
age to fix by its customs, however rude and barbarous
they may have been, an immutable law, in comparison
with which the customs of modern times are merely
''comit}^" or '"courtesy," which may be discarded at will.
X. QUESTIONS OF BLOCKADE.
The first hostile act of the United States, on the outbreak
of the war, was the blockade of the ports of the north coast
of Cuba from Cardenas to Bahia Honda, inclusive, and of
^8 Cranch, 110. See, also, Political Science Quarterly, XVI (Sept.,
1901), 409.
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BLOCKADE. 167
the port of Cienfuegos on the south coast. Subsequently^
a governmental blockade was proclaimed of all ports on
the south coast of the island from Cape Fmnces to Cape
Cruz, inclusive, and of the port of San Juan, Porto Rico.
Various blockades de facto were also maintained. The
object of a blockade being to cut off all intercourse between
the inhabitants of the blockaded place and the world out-
side, it is a general rule that while a period is allowed —
usuall}^ of fifteen days — during which vessels may depart
either in ballast, or with cargo bought and shipped before
the commencement of the blockade, no cargo is permitted
to be shipped after the blockade is instituted. In the first
proclamation of blockade by the United States, which was
issued April 22, a period of thirtj^ days was allowed for
the departure of neutral vessels from the blockaded ports,
but nothing was said as to the cargo. The natural infer-
ence would therefore have been that no cargo could be
taken on board after the blockade was instituted. But in
applying the proclamation to the cases that arose under it,
the United States construed it as permitting the taking of
cargo during the thirt}^ days, and when the next procla-
mation was issued, the point was expressly covered by a
clause in which it was stated that neutral vessels lying in
any of the ports to which the blockade was then extended
would be allowed ''thirty days to issue therefrom with
cargo." The same rules were applied in the case of the
de facto blockades established by Admii-al Dewey in the
Philippines.* These and other features of the law of
blockade were included in General Orders, No. 592, entitled
"'Instructions to blockading vessels and cruisers," which
were issued b3^the Navy Department, with the cooperation
of the Department of State, on June 20, 181)8, for the
information and guidance of the naval service.
On several occasions vessels were, for special reasons
and for special purposes, allowed to enter blockaded places.
After the first proclamation of blockade, the French mail
steamer Lafayett^^ was permitted to enter the port of
Havana for the purpose of landing mails and passengers.
This concession was granted on the request of the French
' Naval Operations of the War with Spain, 99.
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108 MARITIME LAW IN THE SPANISH WAR.
embassy, coupled with the representation that the vessel
sailed from St. Nazaire, in France, for Havana before the
proclamation was issued. A similar privilege was extended
to the German steamer Polaria on the request of the
German embassy, with the qualification that she should
first obtain a formal permit from the U. S. naval com-
mandant at Key West, that her entrance into Havana was
for the sole purpose of . landing her Hamburg passengers
and mails, and that she should not land cargo of any kind,
nor, with the exception of certain articles intended for the
Emperor, take away any,^ though permission was granted
to bring away '"any American or neutral passengers that
may desire to depart in her, but no others.""
Early in the war special permission was given to certain
neutral vessels to enter specified blockaded ports in Cuba
in order to bring away Americans and any neutrals who
might desire to leave. The United States consul at Kings-
ton, Jamaica, was instructed to give certificates for the
purpose of passing the blockade to the designated vessels.^
Permission was also granted, on the request of the proper
diplomatic representatives, for the British steamer Myv-
tledeiie and the Norwegian steamer FoUjo to reenter the
port of Cardenas, both vessels appearing to have left that
port on notification of the institution of the blockade. In
each case it was stated that the steamer was not only noti-
fied of the blockade, but was also ordered to go away.
The allegation that the vessels were ordered away was
afterwards denied in the case of at least one of them; but,
without regard to this question, there seemed to be an oh-
vious implication that when notice of the blockade was
given they were not informed of the provision in the
President's proclamation allowing to neutral vessels lying
^ Mr. Day, Sec. of State, to Mr. von HoUeben, May 10 and May 18,
1898, MS. Notes to German Leg., XII, 132, 134; Mr. Moore, Assist.
Sec. of State, to the Sec. of the Navy, May 13, 1898, 228 MS. Dom.
Let., 460. In harmony with the conditions imposed in these cases,
permission was refused to neutrals to pass the blockade merely for the
purpose of taking on board and bringing away neutral property.
(Mr. Day, Sec. of State, to Mr. von HoUeben, Aug. 8, 1898, MS. Notes
to German Leg., XII, 177.)
'^Mr. Moore, Acting Sec. of State, to Messrs. E. A. Atkins & Co.,
May 3 and May 5, 1898, 228 MS. Dom. Let., 227, 269.
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BLOCKADE. 169'
in any of the blockaded ports thirty days' grace, and that^
if they were not expressly ordered away, they at any rate
construed the notice as an order to depart. The Folsjo
had actually taken on board a part of her cargo, and in
each case the cargo which was abandoned appeared to be
the property of citizens of the United States. Under these
circumstances instructions were given to allow the vessels
in question to reenter the port and take on board, with all
possible expedition, the cargoes of sugar which they had
abandoned, it being understood that the permission was
granted subject to the exigencies of any active military
operations; that both vessels were strictly to observe the
duties of neutrality, and particularly that neither of them
was to carry more men or provisions than were necessary
for the voyage.^ Subsequently, on the representation of
the minister of Sweden and Norway that the Folsjo^ after
lying for some days at Key West, had proceeded to New
York, and that in consequence of the delay she was re-
quired under a previous charter part}^ to proceed to Eu-
rope, the Norwegian steamer Tito was allowed to take her
place, with the additional condition that before proceeding
to Cardenas she was to call at Key West and obtain from
the commandant of the United States Naval Station a for-
mal letter of peniiission.^
An attempt was made near the close of hostilities to es-
tablish a de facto blockade of the port of Sagua le. Grande,
on the north side of Cuba, but the attempt was abandoned
under orders from Washington, and certain vessels which
had been seized, ostensibl}' in connection with it, were re-
leased. The French steamer Manouhia was supposed to
fall within this category, but in reality she appears to have
been seized, not for an}^ breach of blockade, but on sus-
iMr. Day, Sec. of State, to Mr. Grip, May 11, 1898, MS. Notes to
Swedish Leg., VIII, 88; Mr. Moore, Assist. Sec. of State, to the Sec.
of the Navy, May 11, 1898, 228 MS. Dom. Let., 404.
'^ Mr. Day, Sec. of State, to Mr. Grip, May 13, 1898, MS. Notes to
Swedish Leg., VIII, 89; Mr. Moore, Assist. Sec. of State, to the Sec.
of the Navy, May 13, 1898, 228 MS. Dom. Let., 461. It seems that
the Spanish authorities at Cardenas refused to allow the Myrtlede7ie to
reenter the port. (See Mr. Day, Sec. of State, to Sir J. Pauncefote,
May 20, 1898, MS. Notes to Br. Leg., XXIV, 200.)
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170 MARITIME LAW IN THE SPANISH WAR.
pic'ion of "'acting in the interest of the enemy." ^ August
10. 1898, the Navy Department telegraphed that it was
considered best for a few days not to extend the blockade
bej^ond what had been proclaimed, and added: '' Bej^ond
these limits be very careful not to seize vessels, unless
Spanish or carrying contraband of war, as neutrals have a
right to trade with ports not proclaimed blockaded/' ^
July 15, 1898, the Department of State addressed to all
the foreign representatives in Washington a circular in
relation to the entrance of neutml men-of-war into block-
aded ports. In this circular it was stated that while there
was no disposition on the part of the Government ''to
restrict the courteous permission heretofore accorded to
neutral . men-of-war to enter blockaded ports, it is advisa-
ble that all risk of error or mischance should be avoided
by due attention to the rules prescribed by prudence as
well as b}^ courtesy. To this end a neutral man-of-war
desiring to enter or to depart from a blockaded port
should communicate with the senior officer of the block-
ading force." As to the port of Havana, it was said to
be " advisable that neutral men-of-war * * * should,
besides observing the above suggestions, approach the
port from points between north b}^ west and north by
east and follow the same general course in departing," for
the reason that, as the commanding officer was stationed
north of Morro, "such a course would enable vessels
readil}^ to communicate with him, and thus not only attend
^ Commander C. H. Davin, U. S. S. Dixie, July 26, 1898, Naval Opera-
tions of the War with Spain, 280. See, also, as to the case of the Manouhia,
note of French ambassador to the Secretary of State, Aug. 8, 1898, MS.
Notes from French Leg. ; Mr. Day, Sec. of State, to the Attorney-Gen-
eral, Aug. 3, 1898, 230 MS. Dom. Let., 501; Mr. Hay, Sec. of State, to
Sec. of the Navy, May 22, 1900, 245 MS. Dom. Let., 211. As to the
British vessels E, R. Nickerson and Pilgrim, see Mr. Hay, Sec. of State,
to the Attorney-General, Jan. 5, 1900, 242 MS. Dom. Let., 133, enclos-
ing copy of a note of the British ambassador of Dec. 30, 1899; Mr. Hay,
*Sec. of State, to the Attorney-General, March 2, 1899, 235 MS. Dom.
Let., 237. As to the Mexican steamer Tab(mjneno, see Mr. Day, Sec. of
State, to the Attorney-General, Aug. 8, 1898, 230 MS. Dom. Let. 573;
Mr. Day, Sec. of State, to Sec. of Navy, Aug. 8, 1898, id. 581; Mr. Day,
Sec. of State, to the Attorney-General, Aug. 11, 1898, id. 633.
2 Naval Operations of the War with Spain, 298; also, 259.
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BLOCKADE. l7l
to a matter of proper naval ceremonial, hut also to avoid
the danger of a neutral man-of-war being mistaken for an
enemy in the dusk or in thick weather."
The receipt of this circular was acknowledged by the
different members of the diplomatic corps, and in no
instance was objection then or subsequently made to its
contents. On the contrary, the German Government pre-
sented certain counter suggestions, of a more stringent
nature, which were accepted by the United States as em-
bodying an arrangement for the future. The rules thus
agreed on were as follows:
1. That the consent of the blockading Government, ob-
tained through the usual diplomatic channels, should, un-
less in a case of exceptional urgency, be a prerequisite to
the entrance of a neutral man-of-war into a blockaded port.
2. That approach to the blockaded port should be made
in such manner that the senior officer of the blockading
squadron would with certainty identify the neutral vessel,
on her appearance in the blockaded belt, as the vessel of
whose coming he had been notified.
3. That, in exceptional cases, such as prevented the ob-
taining of previous permission through the usual diplo-
matic channels, the decision should rest with the senior
officer present of the blockading squadron.
4. That, in the departure from a blockaded port, no
special formalities were requisite other than might be
necessary to identify the departing neutral, such formali-
ties to be agreed on by her commander and the officer in
command of the blockade.^
Three cases involving the law of blockade were adjudi-
cated by the Supreme Court. The first of those was the
case of the French steamer 01 hide Rodnguez^ a steamer
belonging to the Compagnie Generale Transatlantique.
She sailed from Havre June 16, 1898, on her regular voy-
age, under her mail contract with the French Government,
for the West Indian ports of St. Thomas, San Juan (Porto
Rico), Puerto Plata, Cape Haytian, St. Marque, Port au
Prince, Gonaives, and return, calling at the same ports.
The proclamation declaring San Juan blockaded was issued
1 For. Rel., 1898, 1159-1169. '' 174 U. S. 510.
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172 MARITIME LAW IN THE SPANISH WAR
June 27, 1898. The Olinde Rodriguez arrived at St.
Thomas July 3, and on July 4 entered the port of San
Juan. The United States steamship Yosem.ite^ which was
lying three miles southwestward of the port, on blockade
dut3^ gave chase, but was unable to reach the steamer be-
fore she had turned in and come under the protection of
the shore batteries. When on the following morning she
came out, the commander of the Yosemlte^ accepting the
master's statement that he did not know that the port was
blockaded, endorsed on her log an oflScial warning and
permitted her to proceed. She duly completed her out-
ward itinerary and had left Puerto Plata on her return
voyage when, on July 17, she was captured by the United
States steamship Ne\G Orleans off San Juan, on the charge
of attempting to enter that port. Questions were raised
(1) as to the existence of the intent to enter, and (2) as to
the existence of a lawful blockade. The court below
doubted the validity of the blockade, because it was main-
tained by only one cruiser.^ The Supreme Court ob-
served that the test was whether the blockade was '' prac-
tically effective;" that this, though a mixed question, was
one ''more of fact than of law;" that, by General Orders,
No. 492, ''a blockade to be effective and binding must be
maintained by a force suflScient to render ingress to or
egress from the port dangerous;" that, while it was not
practicable to define the degree of danger that should
constitute a test, it was enough that the danger was '* real
and apparent;" and that the question of effectiveness was
not controlled b}^ the number of the blockading force.
The position could not, said the court, be maintained, that
one modern cruiser, though sufficient in fact, was not
sufficient in law; nor could a vessel, actuall}^ captured in
attempting to enter a blockaded port, after a warning
entered on her log by a cruiser off that port only a f^w
days before, dispute the efficiency of the force to which
she was subjected. The blockade was therefore held to be
effective and binding. On the other hand, the court decided
that the intent to break the blockade was not sufficientl}^
established; but, in view of circumstances of suspicion,
^ Olinde Rodriguez, 89 Fed. Rep., 105; 91 Fed. Rep., 274.
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BLOCKADE. 173
ordered that restitution should be awarded without dam-
ages, and that the costs and expenses of her custody and
preservation, and all costs in the cause except the fees of
counsel, should be imposed on the ship.
The British steamship Neirfonndland was seized off the
coast of Cuba July 19, 1898, b}^ a United States cruiser,
on a charge of attempt to violate the blockade of Havana.
After the preparatory testimony was taken, an order was
made for further proof; ^ and on the subsequent hearing
the vessel and cargo were condemned.'^ This sentence
the Supreme Court reversed.'* The case was one chiefl}^
of fact. It was alleged that the vessel was loitering with
intent to seize an opportunity to run into Havana, that
her usual lights were not displayed and that she was out
of her proper course. These allegations were disputed;
and the court was unwilling, upon the mere concurrence
of a number of '* suspicious circumstances," each one of
which ^' standing alone ■' could be ^"explained," to hold that
guilt was established. The court below, in discussing the
proof of loitering, observed that it fell ''very far short"
of the inculpatory evidence in the cases of certain sailing-
vessels, which the Government had cited as precedents for
condemnation; but suggested that proof less full and pre-
cise might be accepted in the case of steam vessels, owing
to their superior power of movement. ''Undoubtedly
there is a difference," said the Supreme Court, ''but if
steam has increased the power of blockade runners, it has
increased in greater degree, when conjoined with the range
of modern ordnance, the power of blockade defenders.
We recently had occasion to consider their power, and
decided that a single modern cruiser might make a block-
ade effective."* It was ordered that the vessel and cargo
be restored, but without costs or damages.
June 29, 1898, the steamer Adula, 372 tons, belonging
to the Atlas Steamship Company, a British corporation,
Avas captured b}^ the United States steamship Marhlehead^
on the charge of an attempt to run the blockade established
1 89 Fed. Rep., 99.
89 Fed. Rep., 510.
^ The Newfoundland, 176 U. S., 97.
*The court here cited the Olinde Rodriguez, 174 U. 8., 510.
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174 MARITIME LAW IN THE SPANISH WAR.
at Guantanamo Bay, in Cuba. She was proceeding at the
time under a charter, entered into on the preceding day
at Kingston, Jamaica, to one Solis, a Spanish, subject, at
whose disposal she was placed for the conveyance of pas-
sengers from the Cu))an ports of Manzanillo, Santiago,
and Guantanamo to Kingston. Accompanying the charter
there was a letter of instructions to the master, signed
by the agent of the company at Kingston, by which the
master was advised that on his arrival at Guantanamo,
whither he was to proceed direct, he would no doubt tind
American warships off the port; and he was directed, when
signaled, to stop immediately and acquaint the command-
ing officer with the voyage, in which case, said the instruc-
tions, it was not thought that the officer would object to his
continuing into port. The steamer was condemned,^ and
the sentence was affirmed by the Supreme Court, Mr.
Justice Brown delivering the opinion.'^
The questions involved were (1) the existence of a lawful
blockade at Guantanamo, (2) the knowledge of the block-
ade by those in charge of the vessel, and (3) their intent in
making the vo\^age from Kingston. No blockade of Guan-
tanamo was ever proclaimed by the President, the place
l)eing east of the line established by the proclamation of
J une 27. But it appeared that blockades of Santiago and
Guantanamo were in fact established by Admiral Sampson
early in June, and were maintained till some days after the
capture of the Adnla; and, in view of the operations then
being carried on for the purpose of destroying or captui--
ing the Spanish fleet and reducing Santiago, the court
thought these blockades must be held to have been law-
fully instituted, as an adjunct to such operations. It was
contended, however, that, at the tinie of the capture, the
port of Guantanamo was in the possession and control of
the United States and that the blockade was thereby ter-
minated. The town of Guantanamo is eighteen miles from
the mouth of Guantanamo Bay. The harbor was held by
1 The Adula, 89 Fed. Rep., 351.
'TheAdula, 176 U. S., 361. The President did **not find himself
justified in exercising clemency" in this case. (Mr. Hill, Acting Sec.
of State, to the Attorney General, Feb. 13, 1901, 250 MS. Dom. Let.,
651.)
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CONTRABAND. 175
United States naval vessels and by a party of marines who
occupied the crest of a hill on the west side of the harbor
near its entrance, but the town at the head of the bay was.
still held by the Spanish forces, as were several other posi-
tions near by; and the campaign in the neighborhood was.
in active progress, and encounters between the American
and Spanish troops were of frequent occurrence. Under
these circumstances the court held that "the blockade was
still operative as against vessels bound for the city of
Guantanamo. The occupation of a city," continued the
court, "terminates a blockade because, and only because,
it supersedes it; and if a vessel be bound to a port or place
beyond, which is still occupied by the enemy, the occupa-
tion of the mouth of the harbor does not necessarily
terminate the blockade as to such places. ^
The blockade being lawful, the court found, upon the
facts, that those in charge of the vessel had actual knowl-
edge of its existence, and that their sailing for the port
was therefore unjustifiable and properly subjected the
vessel to condemnation.
XI. CONTRABAND.
The question of contraband did not become the subject
of judicial controversy during the war with Spain, but it
was dealt with in General Ordei's No. 492. Premising its
definition with the explanation that " contraband of war
comprehends only articles having a belligerent destination
as to an enemy's port or fleet," the order specified certain
articles as " absolutel}'^ contraband" and others as "condi-
tionally contraband." The former were:
"Ordnance; machine guns and their appliances, and the
parts thereof; armor plate, and whatever pertains to the
offensive and defensive armament of naval vessels; arms
and instruments of iron, steel, brass, or copper, or of any
other material, such arms and instruments being specially
adapted for use in war by land or sea; torpedoes and their
appurtenances; cases for mines, of whatever material;
engineering and transport materials, such as gun carriages,
caissons, cartridge boxes, campaigning forges, canteens,
^ The court cited, as decisive on this point, The Circassian^ 2 Wall., 135.
6482—01 12
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176 MARITIME LAW IN THE SPANISH WAR.
pontoons; ordnance stores; portable I'ange finders; signal
flags destined for naval use; ammunition and explosives of
all kinds; machinery for the manufacture of arms and
munitions of war; saltpeter; military accoutrements and
equipments of all sorts; horses."
The *' conditionally contraband" were:
" Coal, when destined for a naval station, a port of call,
or a ship or ships of the enemy; materials for the con-
struction of railways or telegraphs, and money, when such
materials or money are destined for the enemy's forces;
provisions, when destined for an enemy's ship or ships, or
for a place that is besieged."
By the Spanish royal decree of April 23, 1898, contra-
band was defined as follows:
" Cannon, machine guns, mortars, guns, all kinds of arms
and firearms, bullets, bombs, grenades, fuses, cartridges,
matches, powder, sulphur, saltpeter, dynamite and every
kind of explosive; articles of equipment like uniforms,
straps, saddles and artillery and cavalry harness; engines,
for ships and their accessories, shafts, screws,- boilers and
other articles used in the construction, repair and arming
of war-ships; and in general all warlike instruments, uten-
sils, tools, and other articles, and whatever may hereafter
be determined to be contraband."
But for the last clause, which seemed to be capable of
rendering the preceding specific enumeration nugatory,
this paragraph would be open to little objection. Soon
after its promulgation the operation of the decree was
restricted, on the request of the Italian Government, by a
special dispensation in favor of sulphur, which is obtained
chiefly from Sicily.
XII. COMMERCIAL RELATIONS.
By the strict laws of war all trading between enemies
is prohibited. On April 27, 1898, the Treasury Depart-
ment issued to collectors of customs certain instructions,
which were prepared in consultation with the Depart-
ment of State. These instructions forbade the clearance
of an American vessel for a Spanish port, but the only
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COMMERCIAL INTERCOURSE. l77
restriction they placed upon the clearance of any other
vessel for such a port was that the vessel should not carry
cargo of contraband of war or of coal. Thus the clear-
ance of a neutral ship with an American-owned cargo for
a Spanish port was permitted, and to this extent trading
between enemies was allowed.
Two questions affecting commercial relations as welj as
belligerent operations, may be mentioned in this place.
The first is that of the cutting by a belligerent of subma-
rine cables owned by neutrals, in order to prevent the
adversary from making use of them in furtherance of
hostile designs. The protection of submarine cables out-
side territorial waters is regulated by the international
convention signed at Paris, March 14, 1884. This conven-
tion, to which the United States is a party, expressly pro-
vides that its stipulations "shall in no wise affect the
liberty of action of belligerents." The precedents as to
such action, prior to the war with Spain, were not numer-
ous, since communication by cables is a comparatively
recent thing. On the outbreak of the war, the Govern-
ment of the United States considered "the advantage of
declaring telegraph cables neutral," and to that end
directed its naval forces in Cuban waters to refrain from
interfering with them till further orders.^ This inhibition
evidently was soon revoked. Early in May, 1898, two out
of three cables were cut near Cienf uegos, with a view to
sever connection with Havana. On May 16, an unsuc-
cessful effort was made to cut the Santiago de Cuba-
Jamaica cables; and two days later one of them was
severed 1.3 miles off Morro Castle. May 20, the cable
connecting Cuba and Hayti was broken outside the marine
league off Mole St. Nicholas. July 11, the cable connect-
ing Santa Cruz del Sur, Trinidad, Cienf uegos and Havana,
with Manzanillo and the east of Cuba, was cut; as was
also, five days later, the line connecting Santa Cruz and
Jucaro.^ All or nearly all the cables were the property of
neutrals. The netitral (British) cable from Bolinao, in the
^ Naval Operations of the War with Spain, 176.
2 Naval Operations of the War with Spain, 186, 208, 209, 210, 211,
244, 255.
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178 MARITIME LAW IN THE SPANISH WAR.
Philippines, to Hong Kong was cut by Admiral Dewey/
In all these cases the object of the interruption was to
confuse and frustrate the military operations, whether
offensive or defensive, of the enemy.^
The second question is that of the disposition of mails
found on board captured vessels. The instructions issued
by. the Secretary of the Navy, August 18, 1862, to naval
officers of the United States, contained the following
paragraph on this subject:
''Fourthly. That, to avoid difficulty and error in rela-
tion to papers which strictly belong to the captured vessel,
and mails that are carried, or parcels under official seals,
you will, in the words of the law, ' preserve all the papers
and writings found on board and transmit the whole of
the originals unmutilated to the judge of the district to
which such prize is ordered to proceed;' but official seals,
or locks, or fastenings of foreign authorities, are in no
^ When Admiral Dewey obtained possession of the Philippines end of
the line, he found himself prevented, by the provisions of the Spanish
franchise under which the cable was laid, from controlling the Hong-
kong end so as to make of the line an exclusive use. The United
States then sought permission for the landing at Hongkong of a new
cable from the Philippines, to be constructed by an American com-
pany. The British Government, on consultation with the law officers
of the Crown, decided that to grant the permission under the circum-
stances would constitute a breach of neutrality, and that it therefore
could not be done. (Mr. Day, Sec. of State, to Mr. Hay, May 22,
May 31, and June 3, 1898, MS. Instr., Gr. Br., XXXII, 511, 524, 528.)
2 Claims for damages were submitted by or on behalf of the compa-
nies whose cables had been cut, namely, the Eastern Extension Tele-
graph Company, the Cuba Submarine Telegraph Company, and the
French Trans- Atlantic Cables Company. The position taken by the
United States with reference to these claims was that, as a general
proposition and as a matter of \slw, neutral telegraphic cables were
exposed to the same vicissitudes in time of war as other neutral prop-
erty; that this view found conventional confirmation in Article XV
of the treaty of Paris of March 14, 1884, for the protection of subma-
rine cables, which stipulated that the convention should not be under-
stood to affect the liberty of action of belligerents, but that it was
preferable to consider the claims from the point of view of equity;
wherefore the President submitted them to Congress with a recom-
mendation that, as a matter of equity, they be favorably considered to
the extent of the actual damage suffered. (Mr. Hay, Sec. of State, to
Mr. Cambon, March 13, 1900, MS. Notes to French Legation, XI, 21.)
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COMMERCIAL IKTERC0UB8E. l79
case, nor on any pretext, to be broken, or parcels covered
by them read by any naval authorities^ but all bags or
other things covering such parcels, and duly seized and
fastened by foreign authorities, will be, in the discretion
of the United States officer to whom they may come, de-
livered to the consul, commanding naval officer, or legation
of the foreign government, to be opened, upon the under-
standing that whatever is contraband or important as evi-
dence concerning the character of a captured vessel will be
remitted to the prize court; or to the Secretary of State at
Washington, or such sealed bag or parcels may be at once
forwarded to this Department, to the end that the proper
authorities of the foreign government may receive the
same without delay. "^
No international discussion as to the disposition of mails
arose during the war with Spain. By the Universal Postal
Convention of Vienna, Art. IV, sec. 1, which was in
force at the time, 'Hhe right of transit" was guaranteed
*' throughout the entire territory" of the countries form-
ing the Universal Postal Union, of which both the United
States and Spain are members. This stipulation was held
"to insure the safe transit under any conditions of closed
mails passing from one country of the Postal Union to
another country of the Union;" but to have ''no bearing
on mails passing from one post-office to another post-office
in the same country. "'^
By the protocol signed at Washington August 12, 1898,
provision was made for the immediate suspension of hos-
tilities, as a preliminary to the conclusion of peace. The
blockades were immediately raised, and on August 17,
1898, the Department of State, in response to inquiries
made on behalf of the Spanish Government, declared (1)
that no obstacle would be interposed to the reestablishment
of the postal service by Spanish steamers between Spain
on the one side and Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines
on the other; (2) that no objection would be made to the
importation of supplies in Spanish bottoms to Cuba and
^Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies, Series I, vol.
1, pp. 417, 418.
* Mr. Smith, Postmaster-General, to the Sec. of State, June 1, 1898,
MSS. Dept. of State.
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180 MARITIME LAW IN THE SPANISP WAR.
the Philippines, but that it had been decided to reserve the
importation of supplies from the United States to Porto
Rico to American vessels; and (3) that a Spanish steamer,
chartered by French merchants and then lying at Havre,
would be permitted to proceed to Philadelphia and to take
mineral oil for industrial purposes, provided it was not to
be transported to Porto Rico. These answers, it was ad-
ded, were given with the understanding that American
vessels would not for the time being be excluded from
Spanish ports, as well as upon the understanding that, if
hostilities should at any time be renewed, American acs-
sels that might happen to be in Spanish ports would be
allowed thirty days in which to load and depart with non-
contraband cargo, and that any American vessel which,
prior to the renewal of hostilities, should have sailed for
a Spanish port would be permitted to enter such port and
discharge her cargo, and afterwards forthwith to depart
without molestation, and, if met at sea by a Spanish ship,
to continue her voyage to any port not blockaded.^ These
conditions were accepted by the Spanish Government,^
and commercial intercourse was accordingly restored.
^ Mr. Moore, Acting Sec. of State, to M. Cambon, French ambassa-
dor, For. Rel. 1898, 802.
«M. Cambon to Mr. Moore, September 6, 1898, For. Rel. 1898, 811.
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